Troikanomics pp 133-170 | Cite as

Case Studies: Exploring the Lived Reality of Troikanomics

  • Ray Kinsella
  • Maurice Kinsella


In this chapter we reflect on the lived realities and consequences of the European Banking and Debt Crisis and the policy responses that sought to curtail its actual and prospective consequences. This is most explicitly apparent in the imposition of what we define as 'Troikanomics' on peripheral indebted countries. In the two case studies on Ireland and Greece that we provide, we are not seeking to retread already well-worn ground. Instead, our objective is to ask how both countries’ journey through the crisis provides insights into the anomalies and anxieties of Troikanomics—highlighting how its mandate and implementation stand in opposition to the foundational aspirations and values of the EU. The legacy of Troikanomics has involved social costs, diminished national autonomy, and endowed a profound sense of vulnerability within the Union. There is an abiding sense that both countries’ history, culture, and values were of little regard in the design and imposition of their austerity reforms. The teams operating under the mandate of the Troika were professional, polite, and well dressed. But all of this belied their true intentions. When they reached out their hand, it was not in solidarity. Rather, it was to sequester what little of the autonomy that 'debtor' nations had left. What ‘solidarity’ there was, was strictly conditional upon their surrendering political and fiscal governance to the Troika.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ray Kinsella
    • 1
  • Maurice Kinsella
    • 2
  1. 1.Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business (Formerly)Co DublinIreland
  2. 2.The Galilee House of StudiesAthyIreland

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