Abstract
So far, we have seen that Heidegger’s critique of subjectivism and objectivism must be taken not simply as a philosophical critique of metaphysics , but, much more crucially, as an existential injunction to enact and embody a non-metaphysical way of being in the world. We saw that Heidegger’s own terms for such a non-metaphysical way of being include “dwelling,” “poetizing,” “thinking ,” and “listening ,” and that these all belong together. And finally, we have seen that while Heidegger himself framed his concerns as ontological, and not as ontic, the notion that the ontological and the ontic are wholly distinct domains is itself a metaphysical presumption. Therefore, the practice of ontology , or thinking (in the expansive sense), is most generously understood not as a retreat from the ethical challenges of everydayness , but as a posture in which we affirm and accept responsibility for these tensions. As such, authenticity was shown to consist not in indifference to others, but as a clarification and an intensification of our ontico-ontological responsibilities to them qua thrown.
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Notes
- 1.
GA 16, 741.
- 2.
On the Way to Language, 136.
- 3.
Ibid.
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
Contributions, 401; GA 65, 510.
- 6.
SZ, 190, 251/ BT, 178, 232.
- 7.
SZ, 187/ BT, 175.
- 8.
SZ, 190/ BT, 177.
- 9.
SZ, 186/ BT, 174.
- 10.
SZ, 186, 188/ BT, 174, 176.
- 11.
SZ, 192/ BT, 179.
- 12.
“What Is Metaphysics?,” 101.
- 13.
Ibid., 104.
- 14.
SZ, 310/ BT, 286.
- 15.
Ibid.
- 16.
Elucidations of Hölderlin ’s Poetry, 118, 36.
- 17.
What Is Called Thinking?, 139; GA 8, 142.
- 18.
Ibid.
- 19.
Ibid., 146. “Das, was uns je und je zu denken gibt, ist das Bedenklichste. Was es gibt, seine Gabe, übernehmen wir dadurch, daß wir das Bedenklichste bedenken. Hierbei halten wir uns denken an das Bedenklichste. Wir denken es an. So gedenken wir dessen, dem wir die Mitgift unseres Wesens, das Denken, verdanken. Insofern wir das Bedenklichste denken, danken wir.” GA 8, 151.
- 20.
Ibid.
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
Ibid., 143.
- 23.
Country Path Conversations, 97; GA 77, 148.
- 24.
Zollikon Seminars, 97; GA 89, 126.
- 25.
What Is Called Thinking?, 85.
- 26.
GA 16, 741.
- 27.
“…Poetically Man Dwells…,” 214.
- 28.
Ibid., 215
- 29.
Ibid.
- 30.
SZ, 329/ BT, 303.
- 31.
SZ, 251/ BT, 232.
- 32.
“What Is Metaphysics?,” 100–101.
- 33.
What Is Called Thinking?, 142.
- 34.
“Building Dwelling Thinking,” 152.
- 35.
Raymond Geuss , “Art and Theodicy,” in Morality, Culture and History: Essays on German Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 109.
- 36.
GA 79, 73; “The Turning,” 43. For an essay that places this quotation within a larger analysis of Heidegger’s thinking on grace, see Andrew Mitchell, “The Exposure of Grace: Dimensionality in the Later Heidegger,” Research in Phenomenology 40, no. 1 (2010): 313, 309–330.
- 37.
Scott, The Question of Ethics, 119.
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Atkins, Z. (2018). “Thinking Is Thanking”: From Anxiety to Gratitude. In: An Ethical and Theological Appropriation of Heidegger’s Critique of Modernity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96917-6_6
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