Putnam on Foundations: Models, Modals, Muddles

  • John P. BurgessEmail author
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 9)


Putnam has famously offered a sketch of a mathematics without foundations, existing in two equivalent descriptions, set-theoretic and modal-logical. Here his proposal is critically examined, with attention to difficulties surrounding both the modal-logical description itself and especially the notion of equivalence of descriptions.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyPrinceton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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