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Brexit, Defence Expenditure and Defence Industries

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Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?

Abstract

The macroeconomic impact of Brexit on the UK is the subject of vigorous debate, including the potential ramifications for security and defence. One aspect that has gathered only scant attention is the impact of Brexit upon defence industries. In general terms, the overall impact will depend upon what trade and customs arrangements for goods are eventually negotiated between the UK and the EU. More specifically, the UK is a major arms exporter whose main markets are beyond the EU and it could be argued prima facie that Brexit will have a relatively minor impact on this segment of the UK’s manufacturing. This would, however, be mistaken since key defence industries, most notably the aerospace industries, rely heavily on access to research and development funding, overseas expertise and, more often than not, they are part of multinational industries. The potential exclusion of the UK from EU defence research funding as well as from potential partnerships may well harm this critical sector of the UK’s economy. A more major concern remains the UK’s heavy exposure to U.S. contracts and further fluctuations in exchange rates, alongside the possible need for European industrial partners based in the UK to relocate or for UK companies to move to the EU, or at least to co-locate.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This includes a maritime task group centred on the Queen Elizabeth II aircraft carrier; a land division with 3 brigades including a new Strike Force; an air group of combat, transport and surveillance aircraft and a Special Forces Task Group.

  2. 2.

    Romania is likely to reach the goal in 2018, while Latvia and Lithuania have committed to reaching it as well.

  3. 3.

    For example, the MoD estimated that the cost of the Trident successor programme to be £25 billion. By 2015 and the SDSR the cost had risen to £31 billion. One estimate puts the eventual cost as high as £167 billion (see SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, pp. 630–631).

  4. 4.

    VEAT notices are those that apply to contracts awarded without prior publication, or to a contract by negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice. In the event that the administrative court has not received an appeal within 10 days, the contract awarded without prior notice is not subject to review (this represents around 30% of the UK contract notices, but this still compares well to Romania and Italy where 71% and 80% of notices respectively were the result of a contract award without prior publication).

  5. 5.

    This should not be confused with the identically named 2016 Airbus FCAS concept to provide the Bundeswehr with a potential successor to the Tornado. In this case the FCAS would be a manned system.

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Correspondence to Simon Duke .

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Duke, S. (2019). Brexit, Defence Expenditure and Defence Industries. In: Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96107-1_3

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