Abstract
Aristotle shifted the discussion from biological motivators to biological activities. His four causes formed a foundation for all explanations. “Material causes” speak to composition; “formal causes” speak to shape, but also interactions with the surrounding world; “efficient causes” speak to external and accidental influences; and “final causes” speak to “that for the sake of which” a thing occurs. When the last three coincide, they can be called a soul. Aristotle used souls to explain the biological activities: nutrition, reproduction, sensation, locomotion, and reason. Although causes, souls, and activities were reimagined in the Middle Ages, they are, in their original forms, surprisingly compatible with scientific accounts.
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- 1.
Aristotle might say that the matter loses the form of cookie and takes on the form of Sharon. In this sense, the matter persists, while the forms change. I have chosen to focus on the substance rather than the matter, not because the matter is less important, but because essences will be key to Aristotle ’s biology.
- 2.
For simplicity, I am sticking with Aristotle ’s concept of hylomorphic substances present in Categories (and Shields 2007, pp. 53–64). A different concept, embracing forms as substances, appears in Metaphysics.
- 3.
Based on On the Soul III.5 and Metaphysics Λ, some have argued the Aristotle saw the nous as an immortal immaterial aspect of the soul along the lines of Plato . Martin and Barresi (2006, pp. 21–22) and Johnson (2005, pp. 171–172) provide discussion. As our focus will be on the vegetable soul, which lacks intellect, I will not go into greater detail here.
- 4.
In Physics (194b26–29) Aristotle provided several examples, including definition, kind, and ratio.
- 5.
- 6.
For a modern example of end states being necessary to understand causal relations without intentionality, consider contrastivity as discussed in Schaffer (2016).
- 7.
See Johnson (2005, pp. 131–158) for a review and discussion of whether this involves teleology and final causes. Aristotle holds elements to be primary bodies of which other bodies are composed, but which cannot, themselves be divided (On the Heavens III.3). C.S. Lewis (1964, p. 93) has noted that the description of ‘inclining ’ is less anthropomorphic and teleological than the modern metaphor of ‘obeying laws.’
- 8.
In Aristotle , they cannot be reduced to elemental motion. In modern biology, it remains unclear how they might be reduced to physics and chemistry. Nowhere does Aristotle provide exactly this list, though two lists come close. On the Soul 413a24 “thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition , decay and growth ”; 414a31 “the nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking”; Reproduction appears distinct from nutrition at 415a26 “The acts in which it manifests itself are reproduction and the use of food.”
References
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Mix, L.J. (2018). Three Causes in One: Biological Explanation in Aristotle. In: Life Concepts from Aristotle to Darwin. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96047-0_4
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