Abstract
Evidentialism is typically viewed as a version of internalism. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: even views exhibiting fairly extreme forms of externalism can be evidentialist views. After saying what evidentialism is and identifying four grades of externalism, I argue that, for each of these grades of externalism (from the least external first grade to the most external fourth grade), there is a version of evidentialism exhibiting that grade of externalism.
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Notes
- 1.
That there are externalist versions of evidentialism isn’t a new thesis. See McCain (2015a) and his discussion there of Alston (1989 [1988]), Comesaña (2010), and Williamson (2000). What is novel is the claim that for each of the grades of externalism identified in this paper, there is a version of evidentialism exhibiting it.
- 2.
Roughly, propositional justification is something you have for a proposition in virtue of the evidence you have, whether you believe it or not and whether your belief is properly based (on your evidence) or not. Doxastic justification is something a belief of yours has in virtue of the evidence you have and of your belief being based on that evidence.
- 3.
A defeater here is thought of as a mental state of the believing subject, much like evidence is thought of as a mental state of the believing subject. Much of what I say below in the main text about evidence applies to defeaters as well. The main difference is that, whereas evidence for a belief contribute to that belief’s being justified, defeaters for a belief inhibit that belief from being justified.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
I’ll be working on the assumption that access internalism (which requires actual or potential awareness of some or all justification-contributors) is a stronger sort of internalism than mental state internalism (which requires that some or all justification-contributors are mental states). See Bergmann (2006: 9–13, 47–59, and 70) for some reasons for thinking access internalism is truer to the spirit of internalism (and, in that sense, a stronger sort of internalism) than mental state internalism.
- 7.
I define these four kinds of internalism more carefully below in notes 8, 11, 15, and 16.
- 8.
SAI requires, for the justification of a belief B, that the subject is (potentially or actually) aware of the obtaining of every fact the obtaining of which is required for and contributes to the justification of B.
- 9.
It may seem strange to say that a view can exhibit the lowest grade of externalism without counting as an externalist view. But the idea is that there are degrees of externalism and that a position has to exhibit a sufficient degree of externalism before it counts as an externalist position, full-stop, without qualification. In a similar way, there are degrees of justification but a belief has to exhibit a sufficient degree of justification before it counts as being justified, full-stop, without qualification.
- 10.
Juan Comesaña suggests that views exhibiting this first grade of externalism shouldn’t count as internalist views. He says (2005: 71):
No theory that allows an external factor such as [the fact that the belief is supported by the evidence on which it is based] to play a justificatory role is going to be internalist in any interesting sense. If internalism were simply the claim that all the factors that justify a belief are internal factors except those that are external, then it wouldn’t be a theory worth considering.
But in light of the implausibility of SAI (for the reasons Alston and Fumerton draw to our attention), there must be at least one necessary condition of justification such that it is not necessary for justification that the subject is aware that that condition is satisfied. To put it in Comesaña’s terminology: there must be at least one factor playing a justificatory role that is not an internal factor. Given that even die-hard internalists like Fumerton (who is an internalist if anyone is) acknowledge this, Comesaña seems mistaken to say that this isn’t an internalism worthy of the name. As we will see in the discussion that follows, there are sensible ways to draw the line between internalism and externalism that differ from Comesaña’s way of drawing the line.
- 11.
WAI requires, for the justification of a belief B, that the subject is (potentially or actually) aware of the obtaining of some fact the obtaining of which is required for and contributes to the justification of B.
- 12.
See Bergmann (2006: 9–13).
- 13.
- 14.
I think this is a mistake, for reasons given in Bergmann (2006: 49–57 and 70).
- 15.
SMI is the view that for any person S, justification for S’s beliefs supervenes on S’s mental states (and the basing relations holding between them). If a view denies WAI but affirms SMI, then it exhibits the second, but not the third grade of externalism.
- 16.
WMI is the view that for some person S, justification for S’s beliefs supervenes on S’s mental states (and the basing relations holding between them). If a view denies both WAI and SMI but affirms WMI, then it exhibits the third but not the fourth grade of externalism.
- 17.
Denying WAI entails denying SAI, so the second grade entails the first grade; denying WMI entails denying SMI, so the fourth grade entails the third grade; and denying both WAI and SMI entails denying WAI, so the third grade entails the second grade. None of this is intended to suggest that denying SMI entails denying WAI or that there can’t be things other than mental states that are accessible on reflection.
- 18.
See also Feldman (2004 [1988]) where he defends a more restrictive view according to which one’s evidence consists of what one is currently aware of.
- 19.
So, despite the fact that (as I mentioned in note 13 and the text to which it is attached) Conee and Feldman want to define internalism by focusing on the internality of the mental and not on the internality of access, their own evidentialist view is internal on both counts.
- 20.
- 21.
Alston (1989 [1988]) is an externalist who endorses clause (I) and, perhaps, clause (III) of EV1 but not clause (II). (I say “perhaps” in the case of clause (III) because Alston requires access (1989 [1988]: 237) not to one’s evidence but to states of the same sort as one’s evidential states.) Alston rejects clause (II) because he thinks justification supervenes not solely on the subject’s accessible mental states and the basing relations between them but also on facts about whether the grounds for beliefs are reliable indicators of the beliefs based on those grounds (since it is, according to him, these latter facts about reliable indication that determine whether beliefs fit the grounds or evidence on which they’re based). Alston comes close, then, to endorsing WAI—insofar as he comes close to endorsing clause (III)—so he comes close to avoiding externalism of the second grade and, instead, to endorsing externalism of the first grade only. Insofar as he also endorses clause (I), he also comes close to endorsing a kind of evidentialism, albeit not the usual kind that endorses a supervenience thesis like clause (II). All this to say that Alston comes close to being an evidentialist exhibiting externalism of the first grade, although not a standard version of such a view, given his rejection of clause (II) of EV1. See note 25 for a brief discussion of a similar view developed by Comesaña.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
See Williamson (2000: 2007–8) where he says:
Could belief be epistemically justified except by evidence? … It is far from obvious that any belief is justified in the truth-directed sense without being justified by evidence … evidence plausibly suffices for all truth-directed justification. … If we are aiming at the truth, we should proportion our belief to the evidence.
- 25.
Comesaña (2010) defends what he calls ‘evidentialist reliabilism,’ some versions of which endorse clauses (I) and (III) of EV2 (since some versions are accessibilist about evidence and some are not). But, like Alston (see note 21), Comesaña’s version of evidentialism denies clause (II) because he thinks justification supervenes not solely on the subject’s mental states and the basing relations between them but also on facts about whether the process type producing a belief B based on evidence E (where B is the belief whose justification is at issue and E is the evidence on which B is based) is reliable (since it is, according to him, these latter facts about the reliability of such processes that determine whether beliefs fit the evidence on which they’re based). Versions of evidentialist reliabilism that deny accessibilism are also instances of evidentialism that exhibit the second grade of externalism. Versions of evidentialist reliabilism that affirm accessibilism are, like Alston’s view discussed in note 21, instances of evidentialism that exhibit the first grade of externalism only—though, like Alston’s view, these versions of evidentialist reliabilism differ from standard versions of evidentialism by denying clause (II) of EV1.
- 26.
This example was originally proposed in Bergmann (2006: 64).
- 27.
See note 15 for a statement of SMI.
- 28.
See note 11 for a statement of WAI.
- 29.
What (II*) is intended to say is that, in cases where S is human, if you hold fixed that it is S’s beliefs we’re talking about and you also hold fixed S’s evidence and the basing relations that hold between S’s beliefs and S’s evidence, then you will thereby be holding fixed the facts about which (if any) of S’s beliefs are justified.
- 30.
Three things are worth noting here. First, although philosophers disagree about what counts as a fitting response to evidence (for humans), there is also a lot of agreement on this matter and the point here is to focus on this wide agreement. Second, although this is what proper function requires for humans, it isn’t what proper function requires for all possible cognizers. Third, the idea that fittingness depends on proper function is a view I explore and defend in Bergmann (2006: Chap. 5).
- 31.
In part by determining which beliefs fit which evidence.
- 32.
In considering whether design plans can be contingent features of cognizers, it’s worth keeping in mind that design plans for cognizers typically don’t specify a response for every possible circumstance in which the cognizer might find itself. So a design plan that included more details than a previous one—by focusing on more circumstances (including ones the cognizer hadn’t been in before but that it will be in in the future)—counts as a new design plan. For related discussion, see Plantinga (1993: 22–4) where he distinguishes between design plans and max plans (or mini-max plans).
- 33.
This sort of example was originally proposed in Bergmann (2006: 52 and 63–4). Note that the proposal here isn’t merely that it’s possible for God to design or redesign cognizers to come to have beliefs in this way. In addition, the proposal is that in believing in accord with this design plan, such beliefs would be justified. This is compatible with it’s also being the case that there are some plans for belief formation that couldn’t be plans for justified belief formation, so that even if God made beings that formed beliefs in accord with those design plans, those beliefs wouldn’t be justified. Plausibly, a design plan that required beings to often recognize but always ignore defeating evidence for one’s beliefs and to hold those beliefs anyway, would be a design plan that does not yield justified beliefs, even if the believer is supposed to hold those beliefs (in the proper function sense of ‘supposed to’) and even if (unbeknownst to these beings) the environment for which these beings were designed and in which the designer always placed them was such that all recognized defeaters they encountered and ignored were misleading in ways the beings couldn’t detect. See Bergmann (2006: Chap. 6) for further discussion.
- 34.
See notes 15 and 16 for statements of WMI and SMI.
- 35.
Again, see note 11 for a statement of WAI.
- 36.
As an objection to including in EV4 the claim that JWE2 is possible, one might argue that someone in whom God directly caused the belief that God exists would be likely to have a defeater for that belief arising as one thinks to oneself “that belief seemed to come out of nowhere and I don’t seem to have any good reason to think it’s true”. (See BonJour (1985: 42) for suggestions along these lines.). As was mentioned in note 33, I think this is an important objection insofar as I think believed defeaters are defeaters, regardless of a cognizer’s design plan (see Bergmann (2006: Chap. 6) for further details). But what matters here are the answers to the following two questions: (i) would the person in whom God directly caused the belief that God exists in fact have such potentially defeating thoughts arise? (ii) is it the case that they epistemically should have such potentially defeating thoughts arise? If the answer to both questions is ‘no’ in a particular case, then these worries about defeat aren’t a problem in that case. (See Bergmann (2006: Chap. 6) for further discussion of the importance of these two questions.) And given that these possible cases described in JWE2 include God’s involvement in human belief formation and in the human design plan, there’s no reason to think that the answer will not be ‘no’ to both questions in many possible cases of this kind.
- 37.
Although this is what proper function requires for humans in condition C, it isn’t what proper function requires for all possible cognizers or for humans in all possible conditions. See also note 30.
- 38.
Hence, if we hold fixed that S is a human in condition C (as the supervenience claim in (II**) of EV4 recommends), we thereby hold fixed facts about which beliefs fit which evidence.
- 39.
They also explain why views like EV1 can seem true even if they’re false and EV4 (as developed above) is in fact the truth.
- 40.
In their (2004: 1), Conee and Feldman say:
…the two of us saw evidentialism as sufficiently obvious to be in little need of defense. When we noticed to our amazement that prominent contemporary epistemologists were defending theories that seemed incompatible with evidentialism, this prompted us to write our first paper explicitly on this topic, “Evidentialism” … We have been defending it ever since. We remain mildly amazed.
McCain (2014: 2), mentioning this passage, says he shares their amazement. In the quoted passage, Conee and Feldman are speaking of something like EV1, which is stronger than (and entails) the Evidentialist Insight.
- 41.
Though, of course, I don’t find standard evidentialism of the EV1-sort plausible. However, because I find the Evidentialist Insight plausible, I can see why it’s tempting (even if, in my view, mistaken) to endorse EV1.
- 42.
Thanks to Jeff Brower, Kevin McCain, and Josh White for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Bergmann, M. (2018). Externalist Versions of Evidentialism. In: McCain, K. (eds) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Synthese Library, vol 398. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_8
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