Evidentialism, Hope, and Wisdom: Are Evidentialist Theories of Wisdom Hopeless?

Ryan, Sharon

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_16

Evidentialism, Hope, and Wisdom: Are Evidentialist Theories of Wisdom Hopeless?

Sharon Ryan³

Chapter
First Online: 03 October 2018

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 398))

Abstract

Wisdom is an important epistemic virtue. Do wise people follow the demands of evidentialism? W.K. Clifford, one of the most influential defenders of evidentialism, tells us to believe all and only what our evidence supports. Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, more moderate contemporary evidentialists, tell us to believe all and only what our evidence supports when our goal is to have epistemically justified beliefs. What if our goal is to achieve wisdom? Should we believe all and only what our evidence supports? Although having justified beliefs seems to be a requirement for wisdom, wisdom also seems to involve more epistemic boldness, intuitive insight, hope, and faith than evidentialism allows. That is, evidentialism seems far too cautious and confining for wisdom. This paper will explore the apparent tension between the demands of evidentialism and the achievement of wisdom. I will show that the demands of evidentialism, once properly understood, are essential to wisdom.

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Notes

1.
Richard Feldman and Earl Conee (1985).
2.
Feldman (1988, 2000).
3.
Sharon Ryan (2015).
4.
William Kingdon Clifford (1987, p. 25).
5.
Ryan (2017) is one such evidentialist theory of wisdom.
6.
The wording isn’t perfect here since just a few, or even one, very important or extremely irrational belief could be enough of a problem to rule one out as a wise person. The point is just to tie wisdom to evidentialism and avoid an unreasonably high demand of doxastic perfection.
7.
Trudy Govier (2011).
8.
Miriam Schleifer McCormick (2017, p. 129).
9.
Philip Pettit (2004, p. 159).
10.
Adrienne Martin (2013, p. 35).
11.
We can imagine an analogous way of thinking about one type of faith. One might adopt the attitude of faith rather than belief when one lacks sufficient evidence to justify belief. Of course, faith is just as ambiguous as hope, but this could be one of the many instances of faith.
12.
Adrienne Martin (2011, p. 157).
13.
Barack Obama (2012).
14.
Adam Kadlac (2015, p. 343).
15.
In Ryan (2015), I argue that Clifford’s view has been unfairly dismissed in the recent ethics of belief literature.
16.
Kate Nolfi (2015, p. 39).
17.
If her wedding date is 15 years away, or if her grandfather is seriously ill, hope would not fit with her evidence.

References

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Department of Philosophy, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA
Sharon Ryan

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Correspondence to Sharon Ryan .

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Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, USA
Kevin McCain

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Ryan, S. (2018). Evidentialism, Hope, and Wisdom: Are Evidentialist Theories of Wisdom Hopeless?. In: McCain, K. (eds) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Synthese Library, vol 398. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_16

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_16
Published: 03 October 2018
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-95992-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-95993-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)

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