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Theorising Institutional Change: The Impact of the European Integration Process on the Development of Space Activities in Europe

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Abstract

While Political Science is often defined as the study of institutions (Steinmo et al. in Structuring politics—historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 3, 1992), the study of institutions touches upon several academic disciplines, such as International Relations, International Law, International Political Economy, International History and European Studies (Rittberger and Zangl in International organization—polity, politics and policies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 3, 2006).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The best overview of the defining features, as well as the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of each can be found in Hall and Taylor (1996a, pp. 936–57); for a short overview cf. Rhodes et al. (2006. p. xiii).

  2. 2.

    Krasner argues that when States have different preferences over the possible cooperative outcomes that can be achieved under different institutional forms, the power of the States involved will determine the outcome achieved (cf. Conner, 2010, p. iix).

  3. 3.

    e.g. Trondal and Jeppesen (2008), Yataganas (2001), Geradin and Petit (2004), Wonka and Rittberger (2010), Pollack (1997b), Rittberger and Wonka (2011), Majone (2001), Egeberg and Trondal (2010), DiMaggio (1988).

  4. 4.

    Also, the internal market programme, launched in 1985, had given new political impetus to the stagnating integration process and served as a stimulus for the question of classical integration theory and a renewed debate on how the development of the European integration process could be explained. The turning point is also often said to be provided by the seminar article on the joint-decision trap Cf. as well as by the influential article by March and Olsen (1984), calling for the rediscovery of institutional thinking in political science and heralded the institutionalist turn in political science. Cf. Peterson and Shackleton (2006b, p. 5), Jachtenfuchs (2001, p. 249), Boin (2008, p. 88), Aspinwall (2000).

  5. 5.

    The best overview of the defining features, as well as the characteristic strengths and weaknesses, of each can be found in Hall and Taylor (1996a, pp. 936–57).

  6. 6.

    Institutions are understood to build up expertise and infrastructure. These are summarised as transaction costs. When a given institution is established the transaction costs of changing that institution are not negligible.

  7. 7.

    A facet is understood as “one of several parts” (cf. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English) being synonymous to “aspects”.

  8. 8.

    e.g. principles prescribing goals of behaviours and appropriate ways to pursue them.

  9. 9.

    e.g. legal, constitutional or other rules that constrain and regulate behaviour.

  10. 10.

    e.g. culturally shaped assumptions about reality and the frames through which it is perceived, understood and given meaning.

  11. 11.

    For more information on “critical junctures” refer to the following literature cf. Florensa (2004, p. 18), Christiansen and Vanhoonacker (2008), Campbell (2004, p. 26), Hall and Taylor (1996a, p. 942), Krasner (1984, p. 235 in Ikenberry, 1994, p. 9), Horak (2007, p. 21), March and Olsen (2005, p. 12).

  12. 12.

    For example, changes in the markets, technological innovations or legislative changes (cf. Florensa 2004, p. 18; Pollack 1996, p. 438).

  13. 13.

    Krasner (2010) argues that when States have different preferences over the possible cooperative outcomes that can be achieved under different institutional forms, the power of the States involved will determine the outcome achieved (cf. Conner, 2010, p. iix).

  14. 14.

    In that sense, this approach is quite similar to the phenomenon of critical junctures proposed by Historical Institutionalism.

  15. 15.

    Institutional entrepreneurs are individual and organisational actors, who in line with their own preferences create opportunities for innovation and institutional change. (cf. Fligstein, 2010).

  16. 16.

    Windows of opportunities constitute information signals from the broader policy environment (Copeland & James, 2014, p. 3).

  17. 17.

    With the objective to induce cooperation from people that appeal to their identity and interests, while at the same time using those same stories to frame actions against various opponents (Fligstein, 1997b, p. 17).

  18. 18.

    For a discussion on the use of the model of advocacy coalitions cf. Dudley and Richardson (1999).

  19. 19.

    Uncertainty refers to the extent to which actors are not fully informed about others’ behavior, the state of the world, and/or others’ preferences. cf. Haas (1992, p. 3).

  20. 20.

    Institutional embeddedness captures the relationship whether complementary or substitutive that a given international institution has with other institutions that appear to serve to the same purpose (Conner, 2010, p. ix).

  21. 21.

    For more information on the EU institutions cf. Wallace (2000a), Dinan (1999).

  22. 22.

    For more information on the role of the Commission refer to Ludlow (1991). For more information on the structure of the Commission and the policy formation, cf. Donnelly (1993).

  23. 23.

    For a more detailed discussion on the role of the European Commission in Space policy cf. Marta and Stephenson (2016, p. 101).

  24. 24.

    Bureaucrats hold institution-specific knowledge and practical experience acquired through a long and costly learning process, which makes the establishment of new institutions difficult, costly and dilemmatic: “if existing competencies and human resources are kept out, institution building suffers from lack of experienced personnel, but if it is called in, they tend to implant the old rules, practices and habits, sabotaging the innovative effort and reinstating many of the features of the previous institutional regime”. Cf. Lanzara (1998, p. 13).

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    Dr. Nina-Louisa Remuss

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Remuss, NL. (2018). Methodology and Theoretic Framework. In: Theorising Institutional Change: The Impact of the European Integration Process on the Development of Space Activities in Europe. Springer Theses. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95978-8_2

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