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Truth Relativism and Evans’ Challenge

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Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History

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Abstract

In this chapter I develop a version of Evans’ challenge for MacFarlane’s assessment-sensitive relativism. The argument is meant to show that, contrary to MacFarlane’s intentions, the correctness of an assertion is a relative matter if the area of discourse has an assessment-sensitive semantics. Thus MacFarlane’s truth-relativism is an inherently unstable doctrine for it is unclear how we should behave in order to achieve the goal of an assertion.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Sebastiano Moruzzi

Authors
  1. Sebastiano Moruzzi
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Correspondence to Sebastiano Moruzzi .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA

    Annalisa Coliva

  2. Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Paolo Leonardi

  3. Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Sebastiano Moruzzi

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Moruzzi, S. (2018). Truth Relativism and Evans’ Challenge. In: Coliva, A., Leonardi, P., Moruzzi, S. (eds) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95777-7_18

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