Practical Knowledge and Linguistic Competence

Abstract

This chapter examines the distinction between practical and propositional (or theoretical) knowledge. It then considers the objections put forward by Stanley and Williamson and finds them wanting. Afterwards, it presents Chomsky’s position on linguistic competence as a form of propositional knowledge. It criticizes both the theoretical and the empirical arguments Chomsky puts forward in favor of his view and presents some observations in favor of the idea that linguistic competence is ultimately practical. In so doing, it aims to re-habilitate the picture of practical knowledge and of linguistic competence endorsed, arguably, by Wittgenstein and Ryle.

My deepest thanks go to Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Aaron James for comments and criticisms on the penultimate draft of this chapter. The first version of the chapter was originally presented in French at Collège de France. I wish to thank Claudine Tiercelin for inviting me to deliver a talk in the context of her seminar. Thanks are also due to Andrea Sereni and to people in attendance at a talk delivered at Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori in Pavia.