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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work

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Abstract

Though the divide between reason-based and causal-explanatory approaches in psychiatry and psychopathology is old and deeply rooted, current trends involving multi-factorial explanatory models and evidence-based approaches to interpersonal psychotherapy, show that it has already been implicitly bridged. These trends require a philosophical reconsideration of how reasons can be causes. This paper contributes to that trajectory by arguing that Donald Davidson’s classic paradigm of 1963 is still a valid option.

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Correspondence to Elisabetta Lalumera .

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Lalumera, E. (2018). Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work. In: Coliva, A., Leonardi, P., Moruzzi, S. (eds) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95777-7_13

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