Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History pp 241–261Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Fregean Presentationalism

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

The paper focuses on two claims widely held in the philosophy of mind, namely, content externalism (the claim that the representational properties of mental states constitutively dependent, at least in part, on worldly, environmental facts) and phenomenological internalism (the claim that the phenomenal properties of conscious occurrent mental states constitutively depend only on the intrinsic, non-relational features of a subject). The question it addresses is which picture, if any, of the relationship between representational and phenomenal properties makes the conjunction between the two claims tenable. The main thesis of the paper is that the conjunction is tenable only within an account which treats the two kinds of properties as distinct, irreducible and yet related to each other. The relationship between them is then articulated within a Frege-inspired framework that treats phenomenal properties as manners of presentation of representational properties.

My reflections on Frege owe a deep intellectual debt to Eva Picardi . I hasten to say, however, that the position I here qualify as “Fregean Presentationalism” is very different both in the letter and in the spirit from the Fregean theory I learned to appreciate and estimate thanks to Eva’s works (Picardi 1994, 1996, 2007). What comes out from my picture is a sort of hybrid figure in which some traits of the real Frege, in particular his concern with the notion of mode of presentation, are combined with traits that typically belong to people in the phenomenological tradition. Even though I suspect that this bizarre operation would not have met Eva’s approval, I hope not to have created a philosophical monster. At least not in her eyes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  • Bourget, D., and Mendelovici, A. 2016. Phenomenal Intentionality. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016, Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/.

  • Burge, T. 1979. Individualism and the Mental. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. P. French, T. Uheling, and H. Wettstein. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. 2003. Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 503–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. 2003. The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief. In Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Q. Smith and A. Jokic, 220–227. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. 2004. The Representational Character of Experience. In The Future for Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rpt. in Chalmers 2010. The Character of Consciousness, 339–379. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crane, T. 2001. Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellis, J. 2010. Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism. Philosophical Studies 147: 273–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Farkas, K. 2008. Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 71 (2): 273–293.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey, C. 2013. Phenomenal Presence. In Phenomenal Intentionality, ed. U. Kriegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Georgalis, N. 2006. The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T., and J. Tienson. 2002. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. D. Chalmers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T., J. Tienson, and G. Graham. 2004. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In The Externalist Challenge, ed. R. Schantz. Amsterdam: Walter de Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (ed.). 1993. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. 2002. Phenomenal Content. Erkenntnis 57: 175–198.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. 2007. Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. 2009. Subjective Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. (ed.). 2013. Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, J. 2003. Experience and Representation. In Consciousness: New Essays, ed. Q. Smith and A. Jokic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. 1997. Phenomenal States II. In The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. 2003. Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn and B. Ramberg, 229–258. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W.G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W.G. 2001. The Case for Phenomenological Externalism. Philosophical Perspectives 15: 17–35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M.G.F. 2002. Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought. In Logic, Thought, and Language, ed. A. O’Hear, 173–214. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M.G.F. 2006. On Being Alienated. In Perceptual Experience, ed. T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 356–410. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. 1988. Consciousness and Content. In The Nature of Consciousness, ed. N. Block et al., 295–307. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Montague, M. 2010. Recent Work on Intentionality. Analysis Reviews 70 (4): 765–782.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, D. 2002. Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pautz, A. 2006. Sensory Awareness Is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2): 205–240.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Picardi, E. 1994. La chimica dei concetti. Bologna: Il Mulino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Picardi, E. 1996. Frege’s Anti-psychologism. In Frege, Importance and Legacy, ed. M. Schirn. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Picardi, E. 2007. On Sense, Tone, and Accompanying Thoughts. In The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, ed. R.E. Auxier and L.E. Hahn, 491–520. LaSalle: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pitt, D. 2009. Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1): 117–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. 2007. Mental Pointing: Phenomenal Knowledge Without Concepts. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 184–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacchi, E. 2007. Thought and Thinking: The Ontological Ground of Intentionality. In Explaining the Mental. Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes, ed. M. Beaney, C. Penco, and M. Vignolo, 135–152. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacchi, E. 2011. Aspectuality and Phenomenal Character: Towards a Phenomenologically Oriented Account of the Phenomenon of Aspectuality in Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and Mind 1: 58–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacchi, E., and A. Voltolini. 2017. Against Phenomenological Externalism. Critica 49 (145): 25–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. 1994. Phenomenal Character. Noûs 28: 21–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D.W. 1986. The Structure of (Self-)Consciousness. Topoi 5: 149–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D.W. 1989. The Circle of Acquaintance. Dordrecht: Kluver Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D.W. 2005. Consciousness with Reflexive Content. In Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, ed. D.W. Smith and A. Thomasson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Thau, M. 2002. Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomasson, A.L. 2000. After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 8: 190–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. 2009. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2004. Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 66–87.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy

    Elisabetta Sacchi

Authors
  1. Elisabetta Sacchi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Elisabetta Sacchi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA

    Annalisa Coliva

  2. Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Paolo Leonardi

  3. Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Sebastiano Moruzzi

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Sacchi, E. (2018). Fregean Presentationalism. In: Coliva, A., Leonardi, P., Moruzzi, S. (eds) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95777-7_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation