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The Role of Trust in Israeli Peace Negotiations (2017)

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Part of the book series: Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice ((PAHSEP,volume 22))

Abstract

Trust has many definitions and usages in international relations and conflicts, but it is basically the belief or conviction that one’s protagonists are sincere, i.e., that there is credibility that they will do what they commit themselves to do, will honor their agreements. This belief may be based on many elements, most of all, perhaps, the perception of the protagonists. This perception itself may be influenced by intelligence, history, past experience, ideology, preconceived notions, and more. The absence of trust may not necessarily be the same as distrust but rather uncertainty regarding future behavior of the other, for example, their capacity to implement an agreement, particularly to deal with spoilers; the trustworthiness of successors in future leadership or regime change. It is difficult to measure trust (or distrust) but the perceived degree of risk or threat may be good indicators. Yet, often one must deal not only with a leader or negotiator’s trust or distrust of the protagonist but also with that of the public, both one’s own and that of the other side (Putnam). And the absence of trust, but particularly distrust, may be self-perpetuating or “self-fulfilling prophecy” inasmuch as it may influence perceptions and misperceptions of the other. All of these aspects of trust may be found in Israel’s negotiations with its adversaries over the years. Indeed, while not the only factor, the element of trust, or absence of trust or actual distrust, has played a central role with regard to both failures and breakthroughs in efforts for agreements with Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians since 1967 (Golan 2014). This chapter shall examine two instances in some detail, Jordan (1967–68) and Egypt (1971, 1973, 1977–79), and look briefly at subsequent efforts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This text was first published as: “The Role of Trust in Israeli Peace Negotiations,” in Ilai Alon and Danny Bar-tal (eds.) Alon and Bar-Tal (eds.), The Role of Trust in Conflict Resolution, Springer, 2017. The permission was granted by Springer’s Rights & Permissions team in Heidelberg on 9 October 2017.

  2. 2.

    For further instances and greater detail, see Golan (2014).

  3. 3.

    Knesset speech, 13 July 1992, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Historical Documents, 1992–1994, Parens. www.mfa.gov.il/Archive.

  4. 4.

    Israel State Archives (ISA), a-8164/7, Protocol, Government Meeting, Document 2, 18 June 1967. Eshkol, among others, suggested this; some ministers challenged whether Israeli conditions should be delineated only as a tactic or if a real offer should be considered at least in talks amongst themselves. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said it was safe to speak of conditions for peace since the Arabs would not agree to a settlement anyway.

  5. 5.

    Ibid. and Document 3, 19 June 1967, Minister of Police, Eliyahu Sasson. Only one participant, Education Minister Zalman Aranne suggested that holding onto the West Bank “will only bring us sorrow,” though Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir expressed concern over the large number of Arabs, and Justice Minister Haim Shapiro spoke of the risk of a binational state if the territories were annexed and citizenship granted the inhabitants.

  6. 6.

    19 June 1967 and again on 30 July 1967 in support of holding onto the West Bank, (Alon 1989, 28). Many other ministers made similar comments, e.g., Israeli Galili: “I think that we must prepare ourselves to hold on to the territories conquered by the IDF, on the assumption that there will not be interest on the part of the Arabs to negotiate for peace. The time factor is of the greatest importance for our steadfastness in the face of pressures and all kinds of ‘peace on earth’ proposals that will have nothing to do with ensuring our interests.” [my rough translation] (op.cit, Document 3).

  7. 7.

    ISA, op.cit., Document 2, also cited in Tzoref (2002), 580. Only one member of the government mentioned that King Hussein had made some moderate comments a few days before. (Minister of Police Eliyahu Sasson, ISA, op.cit., Document 2).

  8. 8.

    Department of State, History Division, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), XIX, Document 505, “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel,” 5 November 1967.

  9. 9.

    Pedatzur (1996), 103 (on Eban), Shifris (2010), 334 (on Dayan); see also, Yanai (1988), 104.

  10. 10.

    FRUS, XX, Doc. 227, “Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State,” 3 August 1968. King Hussein appears to have been willing to consider other Israeli territorial demands in the nature of minor adjustments, for example, the Latrun area. (FRUS 1964–68, XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–68, Doc. 221, “Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State,” 20 July 1968.).

  11. 11.

    FRUS XIX, Doc. 331, “Memorandum of Conversation” (between King Hussein and President Johnson), 28 June 1967.

  12. 12.

    Dayan argued against a very broad expansion proposed by General Rehavam Ze’evi (Gandhi), on the grounds that such a large annexation would include too many Palestinians (Pedatzur 1996, 117–118).

  13. 13.

    www.sixdaywar.org/content/ReunificationJerusalem.asp (CAMERA Committee for the Accuracy of Reporting on the Middle East in America).

  14. 14.

    Meir (1975, 364, 365). Meir was also distrustful of the Americans, ever fearful that they might make a deal with the Soviets regarding a return to the 1967 lines (the dreaded Rogers Plan). See Rabin (1996, 209, 211).

  15. 15.

    FRUS XXV, Doc. 31, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 27 February 1973.

  16. 16.

    FRUS XXV, Doc. 24, “Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” 23 February 1973.

  17. 17.

    Gazit, (head of the Prime Minister’s office at the time), (1997, 97–115). His analysis is challenged by others who placed credence in Sadat’s responses to Jarring’s proposals in 1971: “The United Arab Republic Reply to Ambassador Jarring’s Aide Memoire, February 15, 1971,” document in Moore (1977, 1151–1153) read: “When Israel gives these commitments per resolution 242] the UAR will be ready to enter a peace agreement with Israel…” (1153); Whetten (1974, 147), Spiegel 1985, 204).

  18. 18.

    While in 1971 the Israeli position was sovereignty over Sharm el-Sheikh, by 1973 Meir appeared amenable to the American proposal for just an Israeli military presence, not sovereignty. (Rabin 1996, 191–218 and FRUS, 1969–1976, XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Doc. 33, “Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” 1 March 1973.).

  19. 19.

    Bar-Joseph (2006, 553) citing transcript made by Hanoch Bartov at the 17 April 1971 meeting (Bartov 2002).

  20. 20.

    FRUS, XXVI Arab-Israeli Dispute’ Doc. 183, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 11 June 1975.

  21. 21.

    Sharm el-Sheikh was not demanded in these talks although Rabin had commented once to the Americans that he cared little about Sharm el-Sheikh, saying “we just want to be there until we see a commitment to peace that is solid.” (FRUS, XXVI, Doc. 183, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 11 June 1975.).

  22. 22.

    MFA, Rabin Speeches, Volume 3: 1974–1977. See also, early Rabin references to testing “in practical terms” Arab intentions, Interview, Israel Television, 20 September 1974 (MFA, Vol. 3: 1974–1977).

  23. 23.

    FRUS, XXVI Arab-Israeli Dispute, Doc. 183, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 11 June 1975.

  24. 24.

    In a letter to Kissinger. (FRUS, XXVI Arab-Israeli Dispute, Doc. 144, “Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security (Scowcroft) to the President,” 13 March 1975.).

  25. 25.

    “Documents Related to the Peace Process Between Israel and Her Neighbors,” www.knesset.gov.il.

  26. 26.

    Israel State Archives (ISA), a-4270/1, “Meeting of the Government; 24 November 1977.”.

  27. 27.

    MFA, Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, 26 March 1979.

  28. 28.

    Maariv, 24 March 1978.

  29. 29.

    For more detailed account, see Golan (2015).

  30. 30.

    16 March 1977 speech in Clinton, Massachusetts (AP, 17 March 1977).

  31. 31.

    For a detailed analysis of Begin’s negotiating techniques, see Golan (2015).

  32. 32.

    Sharon was considering further measures; at times he related these to a testing of Palestinian sincerity and capability following the disengagement from Gaza, other times he spoke of ending the occupation of the Palestinians, and he indeed looked into the evacuation of settlements from the West Bank, beyond the four virtually empty ones included in the 2005 disengagement. (MFA, “The Disengagement Plan—General Outline,” 18 April 2004; CNN, transcript of Ariel Sharon’s speech at the Egypt summit, 8 February 2005; MFA, “PM Sharon Addresses the United Nations General Assembly,” 15 September 2005;) Weisglas (2012). Arik SharonA Prime Minister: Personal Account (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonot-Sifriat Hemed; Landau (2014).

  33. 33.

    Maoz (1995, 127), Rabinovich (1998, 55), Ross (2004, 88–89), Indyk (2009, 181).

  34. 34.

    For example, Maoz (1995, 206–207). Though some believed that Asad merely sought improved relations with the Americans by engaging in talks with Israel, as distinct from actually seeking return of the Golan.

  35. 35.

    For all that Rabin was willing now to speak of peace (to the Knesset) as a component of security, he still defined security in primarily military terms. Positing a continued attitude of enmity on the part of the partner to the peace agreement, one needed to be able to prevent a surprise attack, as explained to an American military delegation by then chief of staff Ehud Barak, April 1994 (Rabinovich 1998, 140) or be prepared for a lesser violation of a treaty.

  36. 36.

    For example, Seale (2000, 72).

  37. 37.

    The ad hoc Syrian confidence building measures, such as a 1993 visit to the US by a group of Syrian Jews, had not assuaged Rabin’s concerns over the nature of the peace that would reign between Israel and Syria.

  38. 38.

    William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with President Hafez al-Asad of Syria in Geneva, January 16, 1994,” The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    Ibid. See also Indyk (2009, 105).

  41. 41.

    He called in Uri Sagie (then chief of IDF intelligence and participant in much of the negotiations) to illustrate past Asad statements (in Arabic) of this nature, though Sagie was later to say that he viewed repetition of such statements as signs of Asad’s seriousness regarding an agreement, not, like Rabin, the opposite (Indyk 2009, 108). According to Indyk, both Sagie and then chief of staff Ehud Barak believed that Asad’s reference to Israel and normal peaceful relations in the same breath and in the presence of Clinton and the press (as Barak put it) were important.

  42. 42.

    Sagie (2011, 121), Yatom (2009, 221), Ben-Ami (2006, 243), Clinton 886; Ross (2004, 543–544), Indyk (2009, 260).

  43. 43.

    Knesset speech, 13 July 1992, MFA, Historical Documents, 1992–1994, www.mfa.gov.il/Archive.

  44. 44.

    “What Kind of Israel Do You Want,” Commencement exercises at the National Security College, G’lilot, 12 August 1993 (Rabin 1996, Appendix 1, 397–398.).

  45. 45.

    Translation, Yoram Perry, ‘Afterword,’ in Rabin (1996), 406–407 (slightly more complete than the MFA excerpted version of the 21 September 1993 Knessetspeech, www.mfa.gov.il/Archive.

  46. 46.

    See notes 25 and 26.

  47. 47.

    Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Ratification of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 5 October 1995, www.mfa.gov.il/Archive.

  48. 48.

    Rabin said to Ross, adding that Arafat was also undeserving of respect because of past terrorism. (Ross 91).

  49. 49.

    Speech December 1993 (no exact date or occasion listed, Yoram Perry, Appendix G, in Rabin, Memoirs, 413); speech 21 September 1993 (‘Afterword,’ in Rabin, Memoirs, 406–407 and www.mfa.gov.il/Archive.

  50. 50.

    Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Ratification of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 5 October 1995 www.mfa.gov.il/Archive.

  51. 51.

    Former Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, as deputy Prime Minister, quoted this speech in an interview as proof that Rabin adhered to Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Rift Valley. (Haaretz, 14 June 2012).

  52. 52.

    Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin Presenting his Government, 13 July 1992, www.mfa.gov.il/Archive; speech December 1993 (nd., Yoram Perry, Appendix G, in Rabin, Memoirs, 413).

  53. 53.

    E.g., Samih al Abed in Shamir/Maddy-Weizman (2003, 76); New York Times, 26 July 2001.

  54. 54.

    Sher (2006, 34–35). General Shlomo Yanai said leasing or sharing protection of the Palestinian-Jordanian border between Israel, Palestine and even a third party would be acceptable in terms of security. He also said that a small Israeli contingent temporarily would do.

  55. 55.

    Mahmoud Abbas, “I Reached Understandings with Olmert on Borders, Security,” MEMRI, 16 November 2010 (speech in the UAR); “Meetings of Mahmoud Abbas with Jewish Leaders,” no date or publisher; and meeting with Israeli MKs on 22 August 2013 (Haaretz, 23 August 2013).

  56. 56.

    Yedioth Aharonoth, 8 September 2010; Yediot Aharonot, 29 September 2008; Maariv, 15 April 2010; Ben Birnbaum, “It’s Just a Matter of Time,” The New Republic, 19 March 2013). Jennifer Hanin, “Exclusive: Olmert’s Own Words,” 7 February 2011, actforisrael blog.

  57. 57.

    Avishai.

  58. 58.

    INSS Annual Conference, 28 January 2014 (Poll conducted by Yehuda Meir and Olana Bagno-Moldavsky). Poll results among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, presented by Khalil Shikkaki at the conference, were virtually the same regarding possible peace with Israel.

  59. 59.

    Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, Peace Index, December 2013 (Tel Aviv University).

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Golan, G. (2019). The Role of Trust in Israeli Peace Negotiations (2017). In: Galia Golan: An Academic Pioneer on the Soviet Union, Peace and Conflict Studies, and a Peace and Feminist Activist. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95213-0_9

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