Abstract
The term constructive conflict may imply conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Out of the conviction that a conflict may never be resolved, the stronger party may prefer to maintain an element of control so as to prevent its erupting into violence. Control may take different forms such as oppression of the weaker party, interim or partial agreements, or entry into a peace process—with or without the prospect of eventual resolution. Thus, a conflict may be shifted to a more constructive phase—talking, for example, rather than killing—without necessarily delineating a final goal. Such ambiguity may be deliberate, born of purposeful deception (what Oliver Richmond calls “devious acting” [Newman/Richmond 2006]) in which nothing more than control is intended by the stronger party, or no more than respite and reinvigoration by the weaker. Alternatively, the hope of resolution may indeed be present with or without confidence that it can be achieved. At the very least, however, the conflict would have entered a phase of constructive conflict due to a significant change in process. One may never know the actual motivations for the shift of the process itself. With this uncertainty in mind, we shall try to understand the factors that brought the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the phase of constructive conflict, that is, a shift from extreme violence to a peace process and a near-breakthrough to resolution.
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Notes
- 1.
This text was first published as: “Factors for De-escalation: Israel and a Shift to Constructive Conflict, in Bruce Dayton and Louis Kriesbeg (eds.), Constructively Waged Conflicts, Rowman and Littlefield, 2017. The permission to republish this text was granted on 10 January 2018 by Rowman and Littlefield. An analytical study of the factors behind the breakthroughs can be found in G. Golan, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Lessons for a Breakthrough”, Middle East Policy, XXII/3, 2015, 100–109.
- 2.
Italics mine.
- 3.
Similar pressures earlier had brought the building of the “security barrier” (in part fence, in part wall) between Israel and Palestinians dipping into the West Bank, though Sharon initially opposed it because it might de facto delineate a border, leaving settlements on the other side.
- 4.
Exact new wording on the refugee issue: “Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 194”. In 2013, the principle of land swaps was added.
- 5.
Sharon would not deal with Arafat and commented to aides in 2003 that “Abu Mazen, too, is still an Arab” displaying, according to his biographer David Landau, disdain for Arabs in general, explaining his preference for unilateralism. (Landau).
- 6.
Senior IDF officers, including the Chief of Staff, Moshe Yaalon, and politician Yossi Beilin, did press this point (Aronov 2014).
- 7.
In a poll at the end of December 2005, 81% of Israelis said the “PA and its leaders are making no effort to prevent…the rocket fire from Gaza,” though 55% said the Disengagement was, nonetheless, a correct step (Hermann/Yaar 2005).
- 8.
At the Knesset vote on the Plan, October 26, 2004, 23 Likud MKs voted in favor but 17 voted against.
- 9.
In what amounted to his last speech to the Likud convention shortly after the Disengagement Sharon said “future efforts must focus on shoring up our hold on Jerusalem, completing the security fence, strengthening the large settlement blocs, the Jordan valley and security areas, the Negev, the Galilee, the Golan Heights” (Landau 2014).
- 10.
In his October 8, 2004 interview with Haaretz, Weisglas, Sharon’s senior advisor said: “Arik doesn’t see Gaza today as an area of national interest. He does see Judea and Samaria as an area of national interest.”.
- 11.
He continued: “Arik grasped that this state of affairs could not last, that they [the Americans] wouldn’t leave us alone, wouldn’t get off our case. Time was not on our side. There was international erosion, internal erosion. Domestically, in the meantime, everything was collapsing. The economy was stagnant, and the Geneva Initiative had gained broad support. And then we were hit with the letters of officers and letters of pilots and letters of commandos. These were not weird kids with green ponytails and a ring in their nose with a strong odor of grass. These were people like Spector’s group [Yiftah Spector, a renowned Air Force pilot who signed the pilot’s letter]. Really our finest young people.”.
- 12.
Olmert spoke of possibly re-demarcating the fence/wall; estimates of the territory that might be evacuated were 90–92% of the West Bank including roughly 60,000 settlers.
- 13.
Post-Disengagement shelling from Gaza contributed to the disappointment in unilateralism that climaxed with the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier at the Gaza border and the Hizballah incursions in the north.
- 14.
Hamas was on America’s list of terrorist organizations; both the EU and the Americans ascribed to Israel’s conditions for dealing with Hamas: renunciation of terrorism, recognition of Israel, acceptance of previous agreements.
- 15.
Tower.org, May 17, 2013 quotes Abbas later in reference to Olmert’s proposal: “This is the best offer we’ve ever gotten from Israel and the best we will ever get.” Erekat told Mideast Web that Olmert’s offer had been the most advanced ever and that the two sides were quite close (Mideast Web, July 21, 2010). Both Abbas and Olmert were to insist that the Palestinians never said no (Bernard Avishai, New York Times, February 7, 2011; Birnbaum, March 19, 2013; Reuters, October 4, 2012; Maariv, April 15, 2010).
- 16.
In 2010, Olmert told the Israeli press “we were a hair’s breath away from a peace agreement….the negotiations had not ended,” and he believed the remaining issues could have been resolved by “half a percent here, half a percent there.” Birnbaum, March 19, 2010; Maariv, April 15, 2010.
- 17.
Avishai (2011); Abbas has said this repeatedly to Arab, Israeli, American, and European audiences – see, e.g., Mahmoud Abbas (2010); see also PLO Negotiations Unit (n.d.), and in a meeting with Israeli MKs on August 22, 2013 as reported in (Haaretz, August 23, 2013). See also, Daniel Kurtzer, et al., 228–229; New York Times, January 27, 2011.
- 18.
Abbas excluded Har Homa, begun after the Oslo Accords.
- 19.
Birnbaum (2013b). Abbas made similar comments in internal discussions and even on Israel television, channel 2, on November 1, 2012, for which he was criticized by many Palestinians.
- 20.
Wording intentionally used to accommodate Israeli concerns; see then one then of the authors of the API, Marwan Muasher (2008).
- 21.
Material leaked from the PLO negotiations unit. See Clayton Swisher (2011).
- 22.
At the time Livny was head of Olmert’s party and expected to be his successor as prime minister.
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Golan, G. (2019). Factors for De-escalation: Israel and a Shift to Constructive Conflict (2017). In: Galia Golan: An Academic Pioneer on the Soviet Union, Peace and Conflict Studies, and a Peace and Feminist Activist. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95213-0_8
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