Abstract
I attempt to get further insights from Cocchiarella’s history and philosophy of logic in understanding the contrast of Aristotelian and Fregean logic. Recently Cocchiarella proposed a conceptual theory of the referential and predicable concepts used in basic speech and mental acts (Cocchiarella in Synthese 114:169–202, 1998). This theory is interesting in itself in that singular and general, complex and simple, and pronominal and nonpronominal, referential concepts are claimed to be given a uniform account. Further, as a fundamental goal of this theory is to generate logical forms that represent the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts, as well as logical forms that represent only the truth conditions of those acts, it is an indispensable part of Cocchiarella’s conceptual realism as a formal ontology for general framework of knowledge representation. In view of the recent surge of interest in his formal ontology by cognitive scientists and AI people, at least, Cocchiarella’s theory of reference deserves careful examination. Above all, however, the utmost value of Cocchiarella’s theory of reference must be found in its challenge against what he calls “the paradigm of reducing general reference to singular reference of logically proper names” that pervades the 20th century (Cocchiarella in Synthese 114:169–202, 1998, 170). The aim of the present chapter is to provide an impressionistic sketch of Cocchiarella’s challenge.
This chapter was originally published in Park (2001, pp. 79–89).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
It will be an interesting and meaningful project to probe exactly when and where Cocchiarella figured out the substantial part of his theory of reference.
- 2.
- 3.
We may cite Nicola Guarino and his formal ontology research lab in Padova, Italy as an example.
- 4.
According to Cocchiarella, there are two kinds of realism in conceptual realism. One is an intensional realism which concerns the denotata of nominalized predicates and propositional forms. The other is a natural realism which has to do with natural kinds and natural properties. I briefly discussed the former in Park (1990) and Park (1992), The latter was also presented in Park (1996).
- 5.
In Cocchiarella (1995), 699, we find one further function of such cognitive capacities, i.e., “to identify objects”.
- 6.
Cocchiarella (1995, in 699), characterized concepts as “intersubjectively realizable (and in that sense objective) cognitive structures that underlie our ability to think and communicate with one another”. Note the special role of the cognitive capacities that ground predicable concepts.
- 7.
- 8.
References
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1986). Logical investigations of predication theory and the problem of universals. Naples: Bibliopolis Press.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1987). Logical studies in early analytic philosophy. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1988). Predication versus membership in the distinction between logic as language and logic as calculus. Synthese, 77, 37–72.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1992). Conceptual realism versus quine on classes and higher-order logic. Synthese, 90, 379–436.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1995). Knowledge representation in conceptual realism. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 43, 697–721.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1997). Conceptual realism as a theory of logical form. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2, 180.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1998). Reference in conceptual realism. Synthese, 114, 169–202.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (1999, 2001). A logical reconstruction of medieval terminist logic in conceptual realism. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 4, 35–72.
Cocchiarella, N. B. (2007). Formal ontology and conceptual realism. Dordrecht: Springer.
Frege, G. (1952). Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege. In P. Geach & M. Black (Eds.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Humphreys, P., & Fetzer, J. (Eds.). (1998). The New theory of reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its origins. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Park, W. (1990). Scotus, Frege, and Bergmann. The Modern Schoolman, 67, 259–273.
Park, W. (1992). Frege’s distinction between ‘falling under’ and ‘subordination’ (in Korean). Yonsei Philosophy, 4, 53–80; reprinted in Park (1997a), pp. 49–74.
Park, W. (1996). The theory of causation in medieval Aristotelianism. In Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy. (Ed.), Causality and theories of causation. Seoul: Philosophy and Reality Press; reprinted in Park (1997b), pp. 283–308.
Park, W. (1997a). In search of the lost science. Seoul: Damron Sa. (in Korean).
Park, W. (1997b). The seduction of medieval philosophy. Seoul: Philosophy and Reality Press. (in Korean).
Park, W. (2001). On Cocchiarella’s retroactive theory of reference. In O. Majer (Ed.), Logica yearbook 2000 (pp. 79–89). Prague: Czech Academy of Science.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Park, W. (2018). On Cocchiarella’s Retroactive Theory of Reference. In: Philosophy's Loss of Logic to Mathematics. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 43. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95147-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95147-8_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-95146-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-95147-8
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)