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A Constitution for Eternity: An Economic Theory of Explicit Unamendability

  • Konstantinos PilpilidisEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT, volume 68)

Abstract

Although no constitution is truly eternal, the justification for heightened constitutional entrenchment remains an important problem. The paper provides a novel typology of constitutional eternity. Further, it argues that eternity clauses decrease constitutional flexibility and therefore endanger the longevity of the constitution. The importance of explicitly considering dynamic efficiency is shown and a novel justification for eternity clauses is provided based on this aspect. Since eternity clauses increase the cost of constitutional change, they are suited as barriers against the redistribution of political rents deriving from constitutional protection. The paper concludes by proposing a test of justifiability based on dynamic efficiency.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Prof. Richard Albert, Prof. Stefan Voigt, Stephan Michel, Jerg Gutmann, Tobias Hlobil and all the participants of the Workshop on Unamendable Constitutional Provisions, Koc University, Istanbul, 9 June 2015 for their valuable comments and feedback.

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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Law and Economics, University of HamburgHamburgGermany

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