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Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Constitutional Unamendability

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An Unamendable Constitution?

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 68))

Abstract

Unamendability is a growing trend in global constitutionalism. Yet, unamendability, as a constitutional mechanism, raises various challenges and objections. Mainly, by perpetuating certain constitutional rules, values and institutions, unamendability exacerbates the ‘dead hand’ of the past, and by restricting all constitutional possibilities available to the people to revise their constitution, unamendability is seen as undemocratic and dangerous as it encourages extra-constitutional and revolutionary means in over to modify unamendable principles. Furthermore, the judicial enforcement of unamendability grants courts vast powers over other governmental branches, turning the judiciary into the final arbitrator of society’s values. This chapter identifies and analyses the main theoretical, practical and textual challenges to unamendability. It demonstrates that unamendability is a complex mechanism which ought to be applied with great care. Yet, it also argues that if the theory of unamendability is correctly construed as a mechanism which reserves a constitutional space for the decision-making of ‘the people’ in their capacity as holders of the primary constituent power (in contrast with the limited amendment power), this mitigates many of the challenges raised by unamendability.

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Koç-BC-Icon·S Workshop on Unamendable Constitutional Provisions held at Koç University Law School on 9 June 2015. I would like to thank the organisers of the workshop—Bertil Emrah Oder and Richard Albert and the participants for their valuable comments, especially to Serkan Köybaşi for his discussion. I would also like to thank Martin Loughlin, Thomas Poole, Ida Koivisto and the anonymous reviewer for useful remarks. An elaborated argument appears in Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment—The Limits of Amendment Powers (OUP 2017).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Albert (2008), pp. 37–44. Unamendability can also be informal when the social or political climate is such that although legally permissible, it is unimaginable that political or public agreement on amending certain constitutional subjects would be achieved. See Albert (2014a), p. 181, (2014b), pp. 1029, 1043. Likewise, unamendability can be ‘covert’, especially in politically enforced constitutions, when there is a convention that certain constitutional arrangements shall not be abolished or significantly altered; a convention which is enforced through disobedience of governmental branches, including the courts. See Geertjes and Uzman (this volume).

  2. 2.

    See Roznai (2013b), p. 557. Whereas unamendability can limit the constitutional amendment power, it cannot limit the primary constituent power which is unbound by prior constitutional rules. See Roznai (2017b), p. 23. This of course does not mean that the primary constituent power is unbound by any restrictions. See e.g., Widner and Contiades (2013), pp. 57, 58 (‘Today, the prevailing view is that there are implicit substantive limits built into the concept of constituent power…’).

  3. 3.

    See Roznai (2015), p. 775.

  4. 4.

    Roznai (2012), p. 240.

  5. 5.

    See Roznai (2013c), p. 657, Roznai and Yolcu (2012), p. 175, Roznai (2014b), p. 29.

  6. 6.

    Roznai (2017c), p. 5, see also Cahill (2016), pp. 245, 249–258 (argues that unamendability exists not only to defend specific content but also to defend the constituent power). A brief review of this distinction as the basis for unamendability appears in Yap (2015), pp. 114, 116–118. This distinction raises its own complications such as how do we recognise a genuine expression of primary constituent power? And where do we draw the line between amending a constitution and its replacement? These challenges are beyond the limited scope of this chapter which focuses on the main objections to unamendability. For an analytical description of the separation between primary and secondary constituent powers see also Köybaşi (this volume). Indeed, not everyone accept the distinction between primary and secondary constituent power. For example, Loughlin (2014), pp. 218, 231–232 argues that in light of the reflexive and relational nature of constituent power, this distinction is flawed. However, this is still the best explanatory theory for the constitutional phenomenon of unamendability, and therefore it is this premise for the analysis in this chapter.

  7. 7.

    Griffin (2007), p. 49.

  8. 8.

    See e.g., Amar (1988), pp. 1043, 1054–1058, Harris (1993), pp. 167, 193.

  9. 9.

    Albert (2008), pp. 47–48.

  10. 10.

    Albert (2010), pp. 663, 698.

  11. 11.

    Albert (2015), p. 655.

  12. 12.

    Sapir (2010), pp. 178–179.

  13. 13.

    On this problem, see e.g. Ely (1980), p. 11, Klarman (1997), pp. 381, 382, McConnell (1998), pp. 1127–1128, Samaha (2008), p. 606.

  14. 14.

    Sager (1995–1996), p. 275, Pettys (2008), pp. 313, 332.

  15. 15.

    Albert (2010), p. 667.

  16. 16.

    For an analytical elaboration of the people’s role in the French amendment process, see Derosier (2017), p. 315.

  17. 17.

    In a famous correspondence between James Madison and Thomas Jefferson from 6 September 1789, Jefferson argued that constitutions should be rewritten every generation, declaring that the dead should not govern the living, since ‘the earth belongs always to the living generation’. For an analysis, see Rubenfeld (1997–1998), p. 1085. In contrast, in Federalist No. 49, Madison contended that frequent ‘recurrence to the people’ would endanger ‘the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions’ and ‘deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows’ and on which every government depends for stability. See Hamilton et al. (1817), pp. 233, 274.

  18. 18.

    Paine and Philp (1998), pp. 91–92 (‘every age and generation must be as free to act for itself … [I]t is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated’).

  19. 19.

    Fombad (2007), pp. 27, 57–58.

  20. 20.

    Mulford (1870), p. 155.

  21. 21.

    See Linder (1981), p. 717.

  22. 22.

    See Elster (2000), p. 102.

  23. 23.

    See debate in Da Silva (2004), pp. 454, 456–458, Smith (2011), pp. 369, 375, Tribe (2000), pp. 111–114, Orfield (1942), p. 85.

  24. 24.

    See e.g. Joseph and Walker (1987), pp. 155, 159.

  25. 25.

    On this maxim see Singh (1966), p. 273.

  26. 26.

    See Roznai (2014a), see also Mazzone (2005), pp. 1747, 1818, Klein (1999), pp. 31, 37–38, Albert (2014a), 209–215.

  27. 27.

    See Roznai (2017b).

  28. 28.

    Jackson (2013), p. 47. See also Goerlich (2008), pp. 397, 404, Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos (2011), p. 43.

  29. 29.

    Compare with Eisgruber (1997), pp. 1611, 1616.

  30. 30.

    Mazzone (2005), p. 1843. Moreover, when considering the fact that a national constitution’s median lifespan is a mere 19 years, any arguments regarding unamendability as binding future generations to the ‘dead hand of the past’ are relaxed. On the lifespan of constitutions, see Elkins et al. (2009), p. 129.

  31. 31.

    Michel and Cofone (this volume). The authors give as an example for the high costs of constitution-making bargaining the failed constitution-making process in Turkey as described in Yegen (this volume).

  32. 32.

    On the constitution as a means for ensuring respect-worthiness in the legal system, see e.g. Balkin (2003), pp. 485, 486. Of course, Balkin himself acknowledges that ‘The legitimacy of the constitutional/legal system … is not simply a matter of its current content. It is always imbricated with the past and projected toward the future. It is always premised on an interpretation of and selective identification with the past, the creation of a transtemporal “us,” whom we revere and of whom our present selves are merely the latest installment’. This idea of a transtemporal people actually supports unamendability which seeks to protect a certain constitutional identity superior to the present temporary political majority. In other words, unamendability seems compatible with the transcendental understanding of primary constituent power, which aims to link diverse generations and unite the nation under common basic principles. It invites the people to see themselves as part of something greater than their individuals—having a superior unamendable constitutional identity.

  33. 33.

    For such claims of inconsistency, see Orfield (1929–1930), pp. 550, 581, McGovney (1920), pp. 499, 511–513, Albert (2010), p. 676.

  34. 34.

    Ingham (1928–1929), pp. 161, 165–166.

  35. 35.

    Case No U-5/04 Request of Mr Sulejman Tihić, Decision of 31 March 2006 http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/CODICES/full/eur/bih/eng/bih-2006-1-003, Case No U-13/05, Request of Mr Sulejman Tihić, Decision of 26 May 2006 http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/CODICES/full/eur/bih/eng/bih-2006-2-005. Accessed 14 August 2016. See Feldman (2011), pp. 117, 142–144, (2012), pp. 151, 164. Contrary to the Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights held that it has the jurisdiction to decide upon the issue, and that the abovementioned constitutional provision is discriminatory and constitutes a breach of the European Convention of Human Rights. See Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 27996/06, Eur. Ct. H. R., Judgment of Dec. 22, 2009. See e.g., Bardutzky (2010), p. 309.

  36. 36.

    Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South-Africa, 1996(4) SALR 744. See Sachs (1996–1997), p. 1249.

  37. 37.

    Suksi (1995), p. 6.

  38. 38.

    Beaud (1994), p. 345.

  39. 39.

    See e.g., Roznai and Suteu (2015), p. 542.

  40. 40.

    Albert (2016), p. 13.

  41. 41.

    Bernal (2013), pp. 339, 349.

  42. 42.

    Schwartzberg (2009), p. 2.

  43. 43.

    Albert (2010), p. 667.

  44. 44.

    Nogueira (2005), pp. 79, 84.

  45. 45.

    Earlier thoughts appeared in Roznai (2013a).

  46. 46.

    Dworkin (1990), pp. 14, 35, (1995), p. 2, Barak (2009), pp. 23–26, Rostow (1952), pp. 193, 195, Bishin (1977–1978), p. 1099, Michelman (1998), pp. 399, 419.

  47. 47.

    Rousseau (1994), pp. 261, 273–282.

  48. 48.

    Mohallem (2011), pp. 765, 766–767. Therefore, Oran Doyle argues that ‘The further that a constraint moves power away from a contemporary majority, the stronger the justification that is needed’. See Doyle (2017), p. 73.

  49. 49.

    Albert (2010), p. 675.

  50. 50.

    Cf. Holmes (1993), pp. 195, 239. Especially in weak democracies, judicial review of constitutional amendments may strengthen democracy from collapsing into autocracy rather than be deemed undemocratic. See Issacharoff (2012), pp. 33, 45.

  51. 51.

    See e.g., McIlwain (1975), p. 132.

  52. 52.

    Roznai (2017c), Keshavamurthy (1982), p. 89.

  53. 53.

    For example, art. 288(e) Const. (1976) (Portugal) entrenches ‘The rights of the workers, workers’ committees, and trade unions’.

  54. 54.

    See e.g., Christopher Bryant (2003), p. 501, Brandon (1995), see also Albert (2013b) (arguing that another way of reading the Corwin Amendment is not as making slavery absolutely unamendable but only as restricting congressional power).

  55. 55.

    Michel and Cofone (this volume).

  56. 56.

    See Masri (this volume).

  57. 57.

    For example, the unamendable provision which was inserted in the Constitution of Bangladesh is extremely broad as it protects nearly third of the constitution (the preamble, all fundamental rights provisions and ‘the provisions of articles relating to the basic structure’) from any amendment. See Hoque (this volume).

  58. 58.

    Sapir (2010), p. 79.

  59. 59.

    Tushnet (2018), p. 332.

  60. 60.

    See generally Bickel (1962), pp. 16–23.

  61. 61.

    O’Connell (1999), pp. 48, 51. Of course, at least with regard to explicit unamendable provisions, Michel Rosenfeld was right to state that ‘any countermajoritarian difficulty would have to be ascribed to the constitution itself rather to judicial interpretation’. See Rosenfeld (2005), pp. 165, 186.

  62. 62.

    Cf Freeman (1990–1991), pp. 327, 353–354 and echoing Hamilton (1817), pp. 418, 421.

  63. 63.

    I elaborate on this point in Roznai (2017c).

  64. 64.

    See Fombad (2007), p. 57, Friedrich (1968), pp. 138, 143–146, Suber (1999), pp. 31–32, Tushnet (2012–2013), pp. 1983, 2007.

  65. 65.

    Albert (2010), pp. 684–685.

  66. 66.

    Mendes (2005), pp. 449, 461, 721.

  67. 67.

    Vanossi (2000), p. 188.

  68. 68.

    Elster (2000), pp. 95–6.

  69. 69.

    See Friedman (2011), pp. 77, 93–96.

  70. 70.

    Linder (1981), p. 723. As Tushnet (2012–2013) 2007 suggests, ‘perhaps constitutional theory should treat an unconstitutional amendment as a pro tanto exercise of the right to revolution through the form of law, a form that allows fundamental change to occur without violence’; See also Tushnet (2015), pp. 639, 642–643.

  71. 71.

    See, on this, Roznai (2017b); Roznai (2017a).

  72. 72.

    Lawrence Lowell (1918), p. 103.

  73. 73.

    Akzin (1967), pp. 1, 12.

  74. 74.

    Tushnet (2012–2013), p. 2007.

  75. 75.

    Roznai and Suteu (2015).

  76. 76.

    Akzin (1956), pp. 313, 332. See also Vile (1990–1991), pp. 271, 295: ‘No mere parchment barrier can prevent the people from exercising the right to propose a new constitution if sufficient numbers insist upon doing so and have the necessary power to back up their demands’.

  77. 77.

    Arendt (2006), p. 142.

  78. 78.

    Roel (1968), pp. 251, 256–259, Moses (1891), pp. 1, 4.

  79. 79.

    Spiliotopoulos (1983), pp. 463, 466–467.

  80. 80.

    Muñiz-Fraticelli (2009), pp. 379–380.

  81. 81.

    Murphy (1992), pp. 337, 348.

  82. 82.

    On sham constitutions, see recently Law and Versteeg (2013), p. 863.

  83. 83.

    Pilpilidis (this volume).

  84. 84.

    Maia (2000), pp. 54, 60.

  85. 85.

    See e.g. Wright (1994), pp. 35, 72.

  86. 86.

    See e.g., Tribe (1983), pp. 433, 440–443, Ingham (1928–1929), p. 168.

  87. 87.

    See e.g. Smith (2011), p. 369.

  88. 88.

    See e.g. French Constitutional Council No. 2003-469DC, March 26, 2003; Wright (2005), p. 495, Baranger (2011), pp. 389, 396.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., p. 398.

  90. 90.

    Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan, repored as PLD 2005 SC 719; Conrad (2003), pp. 186, 192.

  91. 91.

    Vile (1995), pp. 191, 198–199.

  92. 92.

    Zweig (1909), p. 324.

  93. 93.

    Roznai (2017c), Roznai and Suteu (2015).

  94. 94.

    Lowernstein (1972), pp. 180–181.

  95. 95.

    Conrad (1970), pp. 380, 394.

  96. 96.

    Fox and Nolte (1995), pp. 1, 19.

  97. 97.

    Ackerman (1993), pp. 20–21.

  98. 98.

    Schwartzberg (2009), pp. 3, 22, 184–189.

  99. 99.

    Mohallem (2011), p. 781.

  100. 100.

    Schwartzberg (2009), pp. 15–16, Landau (2013), p. 189.

  101. 101.

    Madhava Menon (2006), pp. 59, 137, 138.

  102. 102.

    Mohallem (2011), p. 766.

  103. 103.

    See Dixon (2011), pp. 96, 98, Sweet (2000), p. 89, Yap (2006–2007), pp. 99, 104–105, Dellinger (1983–1984), pp. 386, 414–415, Comella (2009), pp. 104–107, Kyvig (1996), p. 106. On how constitutional amendments are used in order to nullify effects of courts’ judgments in India see Chandrachud (this volume).

  104. 104.

    Vedel (1992), p. 173, cited in Troper (2003), pp. 99, 113, Baranger (2011), p. 407. On ‘lit de justice’ see Radin (1934–1935), pp. 112, 115.

  105. 105.

    Tribe (1983), pp. 442–443.

  106. 106.

    Ponthoreau and Ziller (2002), pp. 119, 140.

  107. 107.

    See Roznai (2014b), pp. 38–40. Cf Yap (2015), p. 132 (argues that in easily amended constitutions, ‘judges may interfere with the substance of the amendment only when its passage would substantially destroy the pre-existing constitution, i.e. the constitutional change in question must be manifestly unreasonable’.).

  108. 108.

    Dellinger (1983–1984), pp. 414–416.

  109. 109.

    Roznai (2017b).

  110. 110.

    Baranger (2011), p. 414. Even in Hungary, where the constitution explicitly prohibits the constitutional court from conducting a substantive judicial review of amendments, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has emphasised in decision 12/2013 that as guardian of the constitution, it will continue to interpret and apply the Fundamental Law as a ‘coherent system’, which might lead to a ‘de facto substantive review of constitutional amendments’. See Gárdos-Orosz (this volume).

  111. 111.

    Otto Pfersmann describes provisions that were given a different meaning from what they actually mean (because otherwise they would be invalidated by the court) as ‘norms without texts’. See Pfersmann (2009), pp. 81, 88. Of course, such application of interpretation may conflict with principles of legal certainty and separation of powers. See Tobisch (2011), pp. 424, 427.

  112. 112.

    Landfried (1988), p. 154.

  113. 113.

    Kyvig (2000), pp. 9, 10 (arguing that ‘removing an amendment from the constitution requires the same supermajority approval as its initial adoption, thus a reversal of political sentiment of enormous magnitude’).

  114. 114.

    Baranger (2011), p. 421.

  115. 115.

    Opsahl (1991–1992), pp. 181, 185–186.

  116. 116.

    See Rosenfeld (1994–1995), p. 1049, Jacobsohn (2006), pp. 361, 363, Jacobsohn (2010a), pp. 133, 335, Jacobsohn (2010b), p. 47.

  117. 117.

    Gören (2009), pp. 1, 12–13.

  118. 118.

    Abraham (2000), pp. 195, 204, Issacharoff (2012), p. 45, Stith (1996), pp. 65–66.

  119. 119.

    McGovney (1920), p. 514. See also Orfield (1942), p. 108.

  120. 120.

    Gözler (2008), pp. 69–71.

  121. 121.

    Schweber (2007), p. 137, Kay (1997), pp. 161, 163, Yap (2015), pp. 118–120.

  122. 122.

    Murphy (1995), pp. 163, 177. See also Murphy (1992), p. 14.

  123. 123.

    Murphy (1987), pp. 1, 12–13.

  124. 124.

    Cf, Child (1926), pp. 27, 28, Machen (1909–1910), pp. 169–170, Morris (1909), pp. 82, 85, Marbury (1919–1920), pp. 223, 225, Holding (1923), pp. 481, 487, Schaffner (2005), pp. 1487, 1493, Han (2010), pp. 71, 82, Murphy (2007), p. 506.

  125. 125.

    Barber (1984), p. 43.

  126. 126.

    See, for example, Davis (1881), p. 197; Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424,426 (Cal. 1894); and the briefs presented before the U.S. Supreme Court against the validity of the 18th Amendment (see Dodd (1921), pp. 321, 330–332).

  127. 127.

    Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (J. Khanna at 1426-7).

  128. 128.

    Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, 41 DLR 1989 App. Div. 165 (Judge B.H. Chowdhury, para 196; Shahabuddin, J, id., at paras. 336, 417).

  129. 129.

    Cf Yap (2015), p. 121 (‘in such instances where the constitution explicitly authorizes the repeal of any of its provisions via the amendment process, the textual argument in favour of giving a narrow reading to the word “amend” loses its force’).

  130. 130.

    Schmitt (2008), p. 152.

  131. 131.

    Borucka-Arctowa (1991), pp. 79, 80.

  132. 132.

    Murphy (1992), pp. 351–352. See also Nielsen (1979), pp. 155, 157.

  133. 133.

    Dhamija (2007), p. 223.

  134. 134.

    The rejection of the Indian basic structure doctrine in Singapore was based upon this argument. See Teo Soh Lung v. The Minister for Home Affairs [1989] 2M.L.J. 449, 456–457.

  135. 135.

    See Pillsbury (1909), pp. 741, 742–743, Williams (1928), pp. 529, 544, Orfield (1942), pp. 115–116, Orfield (1929–1930), pp. 553–555; Linder (1981), p. 730, Da Silva (2004), p. 459.

  136. 136.

    Vile (1985), pp. 373, 383.

  137. 137.

    Yeaman (1871), pp. 710–711.

  138. 138.

    Dow (1990–1991), p. 1, Dow (1995), p. 127. See also Baker (2000), pp. 1, 3.

  139. 139.

    Gözler (2008), p. 102.

  140. 140.

    Pfersmann (2012), pp. 81, 103.

  141. 141.

    Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, para 210.

  142. 142.

    Roznai (2017c), Keshavamurthy (1982), p. 51.

  143. 143.

    Conrad (1970), p. 379, Schmitt (2008), p. 152. Compare with Fleming (1994–1995), pp. 355, 366 (entrenchment of certain compromises should not deny unalienable rights held by the people).

  144. 144.

    Article 9 Const. (1961) (Turkey). See Olcay (this volume).

  145. 145.

    Turkish Constitutional Court, decision No 1965/40, 4 AMKD 290, 329 (26 September 1965) (obiter dicta), cited in Olcay (this volume). See also Gözler (2008), pp. 95–96, Yegen (this volume).

  146. 146.

    Turkish Constitutional Court, decision No 1970/37, 9 AMKD 416, 428–429 (3 April 1971), cited in Olcay (this volume) and Gözler (2008), pp. 96–97.

  147. 147.

    Art. 139 Const. (1947) (Italy).

  148. 148.

    See in Carrozza (2007), pp. 168, 174–175, Groppi (2012), pp. 203, 210, Galizzi (2000), pp. 235, 241, Fusaro (2011), pp. 211, 215, Comella (2009), p. 107.

  149. 149.

    Corte Const. judgment no. 1146 of Dec. 15, 1988, quoted in Del Duca and Del Duca (2006), pp. 799, 800–801.

  150. 150.

    Escarras (1993), pp. 105, 112–116; 117, 130–138, Scotti (this volume).

  151. 151.

    Hauriou (1923), p. 297 (my translation).

  152. 152.

    Burdeau (1930), pp. 78–83.

  153. 153.

    Burdeau (1983), pp. 231–232, quoted in Gözler (2008), p. 94 (my translation).

  154. 154.

    Williams (1928), p. 543.

  155. 155.

    As Black once wrote, ‘these are (in part at least) cartoon illustrations. But the cartoon accurately renders the de jure picture, and seems exaggerated only because we now conceive that at least some of these actions have no appeal to anybody’. See Black (1963), pp. 957, 959.

  156. 156.

    Roznai (2017c).

  157. 157.

    Cf., Judge Landau opinion in Israeli Supreme Court decision Yeredor v. Chairman, Central Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19 P.D. 365. (1965). See Guberman (1967), pp. 455, 457. On this case, see Masri (this volume) at 9–10.

  158. 158.

    Harris (1993), p. 183.

  159. 159.

    Iyer (2003), pp. 1, 2. As Ringera J stated in the case which adopted the basic structure doctrine in Kenya: ‘Parliament has no power to and cannot in the guise or garb of amendment either change the basic features of the Constitution or abrogate and enact a new Constitution. In my humble view, a contrary interpretation would lead to a farcical and absurd spectacle’. See Njoya & Others v. Attorney General & Others, [2004] LLR 4788 (HCK), high Court of Kenya at Nairobu, 25 March 2004, para 61 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-subject/336-kenya-njoya-and-others-v-attorney-general-and-others-2004-ahrlr-157-kehc-2004-.html.

  160. 160.

    Da Silva (2004), p. 459.

  161. 161.

    Orfield (1942), pp. 123–124.

  162. 162.

    I elaborate on this in Roznai (2017c).

  163. 163.

    Katz (1995–1996), pp. 251, 273, Lakshminath (1978), pp. 144, 159, Keshavamurthy (1982), p. 82, Sripati (1998), pp. 413, 480, Nahar and Dadoo (2008), pp. 559, 571.

  164. 164.

    Garlicki and Garlicka (2012), p. 185.

  165. 165.

    Michel and Cofone (this volume). On the expressive function of unamendability, see Albert (2013a), pp. 225, 254.

  166. 166.

    Pilpilidis (this volume), p. 21.

  167. 167.

    Hickory (1787–1788), pp. 138–139, 140–141, cited in Wood (1998), pp. 377, 379.

  168. 168.

    ‘Report on Constitutional Amendment’, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 81st Plenary Session (Venice, Dec 11–12 2009) para 218 www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)001-e.asp?PrintVersion=True&L=E#P768_153923. Accessed 14 August 2016.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel

    Yaniv Roznai

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  1. Yaniv Roznai
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Correspondence to Yaniv Roznai .

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  1. School of Law, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

    Richard Albert

  2. Law School, Koç University, Sarıyer, Istanbul, Turkey

    Bertil Emrah Oder

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Roznai, Y. (2018). Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Constitutional Unamendability. In: Albert, R., Oder, B. (eds) An Unamendable Constitution?. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 68. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95141-6_2

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