Abstract
Unamendability appears to be a contradictory concept in Latin America. Though the rate among its countries varies strongly and the pace of constitutional replacements has waned in the last years, Latin America has long been portrayed as the region where changing the constitution is a common pattern. This paper will explore how this debate has taken place in Brazil, a major player in Latin America whose constitutionalism has been rather underexplored, though unamendability has long been regarded as a logical concept in its constitutionalism. Brazil is an interesting example since it has inscribed far-reaching unamendable provisions in its Constitution and has struck down constitutional amendments through judicial review in some relevant cases. Moreover, the fact that it had set out unamendable clauses in the constitutional text has not prevented its Supreme Court and the constitutional literature from going further in interpreting the scope of such clauses, expanding thereby the very concept of unamendability.
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Notes
- 1.
Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor (2012).
- 2.
Negretto (2012), pp. 752–753.
- 3.
Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor (2012), p. 753.
- 4.
Nolte (2008).
- 5.
See Ginsburg and Melton (2015), p. 686, 689.
- 6.
See Pou-Giménez and Pozas-Loyo (2018).
- 7.
Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Article 30.
- 8.
Negretto (2012), p. 753.
- 9.
See Roznai (2017) (arguing that “the recognition of implicit unamendability does not necessarily carry with it judicial review of constitutional amendments”).
- 10.
See Tushnet (2003), pp. 2781–2782.
- 11.
See Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa (2011) (contending that “Constitutional courts have taken on a pivotal political role throughout the region”).
- 12.
Espinosa and Landau (2017).
- 13.
Ibid., p. 328.
- 14.
Bernal (2013), p. 339, 340.
- 15.
Ramirez-Cleves (2016), p. 213.
- 16.
Bernal (2013), pp. 341–346.
- 17.
Colombian Constitutional Court, Decision C-141, 2010.
- 18.
Colombian Constitutional Court, Decision C-141, 2010, as translated by Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa and David Landau in Espinosa and Landau (2017), p. 358.
- 19.
See Sarria (2016).
- 20.
Dixon and Landau (2015), p. 620.
- 21.
One important exception is Roznai (2017).
- 22.
See Hirschl (2014) (arguing that “selection biases abound” in the comparative constitutional literature).
- 23.
See Koerner (2013), pp. 69–85.
- 24.
Bernal (2013), p. 340.
- 25.
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Article 60, §4, IV.
- 26.
See Roznai (2017), p. 70.
- 27.
Roznai (2017), p. 36 (mentioning that “the only countries with similarly detailed and unique unamendable provisions are those that were formerly Portuguese colonies”).
- 28.
See Chilcote et al. (2015).
- 29.
Yaniv Roznai will call such a feature of Brazilian constitutionalism aspirational and transformative. According to him, “The unamendable provision in the Brazilian Constitution, which reflects an aspirational character, can also be characterized as transformative, since it was adopted as a direct response to the former military dictatorship.” Roznai (2017), p. 32.
- 30.
See Constitutions of Brazil of 1891 (Art. 90, §4), 1934 (Art. 178, §5), 1946 (Art. 217, §6), 1967 (Art. 47, §1).
- 31.
See Holmes (1988), pp. 199–221.
- 32.
Holmes (1988), p. 231.
- 33.
See Roznai (2017), p. 123 (“While the aforementioned primary constituent power is a true power that rests with ‘the people’, the secondary constituent power, namely the amendment power vested in a constitutional organ, is an authority. It is an empowered legal competence that is established by the constitution, but it may be limited by it.”).
- 34.
See Brandão (2007), p. 9.
- 35.
Ibid.
- 36.
Ibid., pp. 9–10.
- 37.
See Barbosa (2012).
- 38.
See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, Article 60, Paragraph 2.
- 39.
Brandão (2007), p. 16.
- 40.
Ibid., p. 18.
- 41.
Ferreira Filho (1976).
- 42.
Ferreira Filho (1995), p. 11.
- 43.
Ibid., p. 12.
- 44.
Ibid., p. 13.
- 45.
Ibid.
- 46.
Ibid.
- 47.
Ibid.
- 48.
Ibid., p. 14.
- 49.
Ibid.
- 50.
Ibid.
- 51.
See Miranda (2002).
- 52.
Ibid., p. 416.
- 53.
Ferreira Filho (1995), p. 15.
- 54.
Ibid., p. 16.
- 55.
- 56.
See Ferreira Filho (1985), pp. 129–145.
- 57.
Ferreira Filho (1995), p. 16.
- 58.
Da Silva (2004), p. 459.
- 59.
Ibid.
- 60.
Ibid., p. 460.
- 61.
Ibid., p. 468.
- 62.
- 63.
Da Silva (2004), p. 469.
- 64.
Ibid., p. 468.
- 65.
- 66.
The Brazilian Constitution and the constitutional doctrine in Brazil have used the concept of “constitutional revision” in a distinct way from the general understanding in comparative constitutional law. In Brazil, it is normally used to indicate a change in the constitutional order as a result of a “fast-track” procedure of constitutional amendment that is normally less rigid than the regular one.
- 67.
See Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 25 (Sen. Humberto Lucena, DCN2, 11 de maio de 1995, p. 8026); Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 30 (Sen. Sérgio Machado, DCN2, de 19 de maio de 1995, p. 8480); Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 62, Dep. Saulo Queiroz, DCN1, de 7 Junho de 1995, p. 12404); Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 463/1997 (Dep. Inocêcio Oliveira, DCD, de 4 de Junho de 1997, p. 14551); Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 478/1997 (Dep. Inocêcio Oliveira, DCD, de 23 de outubro de 1997, p. 24819); Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 554/1997 (Dep. Miro Teixeira, DCD, de 13 de dezembro de 1997, p. 41684); Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 71 (Sen. Delcídio do Amaral, DSF, de 3 de setembro de 2003, p. 26040; Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 157 (Dep. Luiz Carlos Santos, DCD de 26 de setembro de 2003, p. 50457); Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n. 193 (Dep. Flávio Dino, DCD, 11 de dezembro de 2007, p. 65361).
- 68.
See Benvindo (2018).
- 69.
See Paixão et al. (2013).
- 70.
- 71.
Article 1. The Federative Republic of Brazil, formed by the indissoluble union of the states and municipalities and of the federal district, is a legal democratic state and is founded on: I—sovereignty; II—citizenship; III—the dignity of the human person; IV—the social values of labor and of the free enterprise; V—political pluralism […] Article 3. The fundamental objectives of the Federative Republic of Brazil are: I—to build a free, just and solidary society; II—to guarantee national development; III—to eradicate poverty and substandard living conditions and to reduce social and regional inequalities; IV—to promote the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, race, sex, color, age, and any other forms of discrimination.
- 72.
Sarlet (2003), pp. 78–97.
- 73.
Emenda Constitucional n. 95, de 15 de dezembro de 2016, DOU 16 de dezembro de 2016, p. 2.
- 74.
See Armando Castelar Pinheiro, “Por que Sim à PEC 241”, (Valor Econômico, 7 October 2016). http://www.valor.com.br/opiniao/4737903/por-que-sim-pec-241; “PEC do teto não é ótima, mas é o possível neste momento”, (Exame, 8 October 2016). http://exame.abril.com.br/economia/noticias/pec-do-teto-nao-e-otima-mas-e-o-possivel-neste-momento; “Temer: public policies are unsustainable without spending control”, (BrazilGovNews, 30 September 2016), http://www.brazilgovnews.gov.br/news/2016/09/temer-public-policies-are-unsustainable-without-spending-control.
- 75.
See “Economistas lançam documento com críticas à PEC dos gastos púlbicos” (Valor Econômico 10 October, 2016). http://www.valor.com.br/politica/4740633/economistas-lancam-documento-com-criticas-pec-dos-gastos-publicos.
- 76.
De Castro (2016).
- 77.
“Brazil and the new old normal: There is more than one kind of economic mess to be in” (The Economist, 12 October 2016). http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2016/10/brazil-and-new-old-normal.
- 78.
See Benvindo (2016).
- 79.
Albert (2018), p. 82.
- 80.
Ibid., p. 42.
- 81.
There is an even older decision of the Supreme Court issued in 1926 which discussed the constitutional revision of 1926 to the 1891 Constitution. The Court ruled, in the end, favorably to the constitutionality of the revision based on formal grounds, but it left open the possibility of striking down a constitutional amendment if it had violated one of the unamendable provisions of the 1891 Constitution. See STF, HC n. 18.178, Rel. Min. Hermenegildo de Barros.
- 82.
STF, MS n°. 20.257-DF, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ 27 de fevereiro de 1981, p. 1304.
- 83.
Ibid. (Ementa).
- 84.
The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality is an action aimed at directly questioning the unconstitutionality of a federal or state law or normative act directly in the Supreme Federal Court through the abstract and centralized system of judicial review. See Articles 102, I, a, and 103 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.
- 85.
STF, ADI n. 829-3-DF, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ 16 de setembro de 1994, p. 24278.
- 86.
The constitutional amendment anticipated the plebiscite from September 7, 1993, to April 21, 1993.
- 87.
STF, ADI n. 939, Rel. Min. Sydney Sanches, DJ 05 de janeiro de 1994.
- 88.
See previous session. See also Brandão (2007), pp. 19–30.
- 89.
STF, ADI n. 2.362, Rel. Min. Ayres Britto, DJe 19 de maio de 2011.
- 90.
STF, ADI n. 2.666, Rel. Min. Ellen Gracie, DJ 6 de dezembro de 2002.
- 91.
STF, ADI n. 3865, Rel. Min. Ellen Gracie, DJ 10 de agosto de 2006.
- 92.
STF, ADI n. 3.105, Rel. Cezar Peluso, DJ 18 de fevereiro de 2005.
- 93.
See previous session.
- 94.
See Brandão (2010), pp. 134–135.
- 95.
Emenda Constitucional n. 20, de 15 de dezembro de 1998.
- 96.
STF, ADI n. 1946, Rel. Min. Sydney Sanches, DJ 16 de maio de 2003.
- 97.
Ibid.
- 98.
Ibid.
- 99.
STF, ADPF n. 33-MC, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, DJ 7 de dezembro de 2005.
- 100.
See Roznai (2017).
- 101.
See Costa and Benvindo (2014) (showing how the Brazilian Supreme Court, despite the discourse of protection of basic rights, has felt short of expectations, at least in the centralized system of judicial review).
- 102.
See Espinosa and Landau (2017), p. 340.
- 103.
Roznai (2017), p. 225.
- 104.
Dixon and Landau (2015), p. 606.
- 105.
See Mendes (2005), p. 461.
- 106.
See Dixon and Landau (2015), p. 620 (showing the dangers of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments being applied, in Colombia and India, to cases that were nothing other than “ordinary exercise of the amendment power”).
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Benvindo, J.Z. (2018). Brazil in the Context of the Debate Over Unamendability in Latin America. In: Albert, R., Oder, B. (eds) An Unamendable Constitution?. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 68. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95141-6_13
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