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The Unamendability of Amendable Clauses: The Case of the Turkish Constitution

  • Tarik OlcayEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT, volume 68)

Abstract

Although it has not been constitutionally empowered to do so, the Turkish Constitutional Court has exercised substantive review of constitutional amendments under three different constitutional settings, striking down amendments to the normally amendable provisions of the Turkish constitution. In doing so, it relied upon the unamendability clauses. The Court created an intra-constitutional hierarchy based on the unamendable clauses and exercised substantive review of constitutional amendments to check whether amendments violated the principles laid down in the unamendable clauses. This chapter looks at whether this judicial practice of identifying a constitutional core and exercising substantive review of constitutional amendments on this basis can find a justification in Carl Schmitt’s distinction of the constitution and constitutional laws. In the first part, it argues that while Schmitt’s distinction, which is based on democratic decisionism, might justify the Court’s reasoning that there are limits to constitutional amendment; his understanding of the guardian of the constitution is incompatible with the judicial oversight of the constituent decision. What makes Schmitt’s radical democratic constitutional theory consistent is his conception of the popularly elected head of state as the guardian of the constitution. Such conceptual justification of constitutional unamendability is not compatible with judicial review of constitutional amendments. In the second part, the chapter analyses all of the unamendability cases the Turkish Constitutional Court has decided and explains the Court’s arguments with regard to its authority over constitutional amendments. The chapter concludes by explaining that even if a Schmittian account of the constitution is adopted, the unamendability clause in the Turkish constitution remains a merely political and not a judicial check on the constitutional amendment power.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the participants of the Unamendable Constitutional Provisions workshop at Koç University, and in particular Richard Albert for serving as the discussant for the earlier workshop draft of this chapter with invaluable comments and suggestions, and Bertil Emrah Oder and the anonymous reviewer for written comments. I am grateful to Asli Ozcelik and Thomas Raine for their help and suggestions.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of LawUniversity of GlasgowGlasgowUK

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