The Forms of Unamendability

  • Richard AlbertEmail author
  • Bertil Emrah Oder
Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT, volume 68)


In this introductory chapter to our edited volume on “An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional States,” we explore one of the most fascinating—and controversial—developments in constitutional design in the last half-century: the rise of unamendability. Whether formal or informal, unamendability serves many purposes, and we illustrate each of them with reference to constitutions around the world. We discuss the substantive, procedural and temporal limitations on constitutional amendment, we highlight the foundational questions in modern constitutionalism raised by unamendability, and we situate each of the thirteen chapters comprising the volume within the literature on constitutional change. Our objective in this volume is to theorize the subject of unamendability and to probe deeply the uses and misuses of unamendability in constitutional design.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of Texas School of LawAustinUSA
  2. 2.Koç University Law SchoolIstanbulTurkey

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