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The Forms of Unamendability

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Book cover An Unamendable Constitution?

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 68))

Abstract

In this introductory chapter to our edited volume on “An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional States,” we explore one of the most fascinating—and controversial—developments in constitutional design in the last half-century: the rise of unamendability. Whether formal or informal, unamendability serves many purposes, and we illustrate each of them with reference to constitutions around the world. We discuss the substantive, procedural and temporal limitations on constitutional amendment, we highlight the foundational questions in modern constitutionalism raised by unamendability, and we situate each of the thirteen chapters comprising the volume within the literature on constitutional change. Our objective in this volume is to theorize the subject of unamendability and to probe deeply the uses and misuses of unamendability in constitutional design.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Burgess (1893), p. 137.

  2. 2.

    Albert (2013), pp. 225, 247–257.

  3. 3.

    Dixon and Holden (2012), p. 195.

  4. 4.

    Sajó (1999), pp. 39–40.

  5. 5.

    Rasch and Congleton (2006), pp. 319, 326, Denning and Vile (2002), p. 247, 279.

  6. 6.

    Ku (1995), pp. 535, 571.

  7. 7.

    Dellinger (1983), pp. 386, 431.

  8. 8.

    Rubenfeld (2001), p. 174.

  9. 9.

    Giovannoni (2003), pp. 37.

  10. 10.

    Lutz (2006), p. 170.

  11. 11.

    Albert (2018a).

  12. 12.

    Albert (2018b), pp. 29–60.

  13. 13.

    Dixon and Landau (2015), p. 606, Landau (2013), pp. 189.

  14. 14.

    Albert (2010), pp. 663, 665–666.

  15. 15.

    Ibid, p. 666.

  16. 16.

    See, eg, Kommers (1991), pp. 837, 846, Preuss (2011), pp. 429, Zuleeg (1997), p. 505, 510.

  17. 17.

    See Roznai (2017), pp. 20–21.

  18. 18.

    German Basic Law, pt I, art 1(1) (1949); pt VII, art 79(3).

  19. 19.

    Algeria Const, tit IV, art 178 (1996).

  20. 20.

    Brazil Const, sec VIII, sub-sec II, art 60, s 4(IV) (1988).

  21. 21.

    Ukraine Const, tit XIII, art 157 (1996).

  22. 22.

    Bosnia & Herzegovina Const, art II(7) (1995).

  23. 23.

    Togo Const, tit XIII, art 144 (1992); Turkey Const, pt I, art 4 (1982).

  24. 24.

    Afghanistan Const, ch X, art 149 (2004); Iran Const, ch XIV, art 177 (1980).

  25. 25.

    Cuba Const, ch XV, art 137 (1976).

  26. 26.

    Indonesia Const, ch XVI, art 37, s 5 (1945); Kazakhstan Const, sec IX, art 91(2) (1995).

  27. 27.

    Jordan Const, ch III, art 126 (1984); Kuwait Const, pt V, art 175 (1962).

  28. 28.

    France Const, tit XVI, art 89 (1958); Haiti Const, tit XIII, art 284(4) (1987); Italy Const, tit VI, s 2, art 139 (1948).

  29. 29.

    Greece Const, pt IV, sec II, art 110 (1975).

  30. 30.

    El Salvadore Const, tit VI, ch II, arts 154, 248 (1983); Guatemala Const, tit IV, ch III, arts 187, 281 (1985).

  31. 31.

    Portugal Const, pt IV, tit II, art 288(i) (1976); Romania Const, tit VII, art 152 (1991).

  32. 32.

    Albert (2017), pp. 188–189.

  33. 33.

    See Marsteintredet (2015). In a similar decision, the Bangladesh Supreme Court’s Appellate Division has recently applied the doctrine to invalidate an original constitutional provision. For a critique of this judgment, see Hoque (2016), p. 13.

  34. 34.

    Schwartzberg (2007), pp. 8–16.

  35. 35.

    Ibid, p. 8.

  36. 36.

    Ibid, pp. 8–16.

  37. 37.

    Portugal Const, pt IV, tit II, arts 288(b) (1976).

  38. 38.

    US Const, art. V (1789).

  39. 39.

    Ibid, p. 12.

  40. 40.

    Ibid, pp. 13–14.

  41. 41.

    Italy Const, tit VI, s 2, art. 139 (1948).

  42. 42.

    France Const., tit. XVI, art. 89 (1958).

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    US Const, art I, § 9, cl 1; US Const, art I, § 9, cl 4.

  45. 45.

    See Greene (2011), pp. 517, 518–19.

  46. 46.

    Linder (1981), pp. 717, 721.

  47. 47.

    See Dixon and Ginsburg (2011), pp. 636, 644. One can understand unamendability in this respect as a ‘gag rule’ that silences debate on matters of contention. See Holmes (1993), pp. 19–58.

  48. 48.

    For more on temporary unamendability in the United States and elsewhere, see Varol (2014), pp. 409, 439–448.

  49. 49.

    For an analysis of the forms of temporal restrictions on formal amendment. See Albert (2014), pp. 913, 952–54.

  50. 50.

    See, e.g., Cape Verde Const, pt VI, tit III, art 309(1) (1980) (prohibiting formal amendments for 5 years following ratification of the constitution).

  51. 51.

    See Albert (2010), p. 679.

  52. 52.

    Compare Algeria Const, tit IV, art 178(3) (1989), Iran Const, art 177 (1980), with Portugal Const, pt IV, tit II, art 288(c) (1976), Turkey Const, pt I, art 4 (1982).

  53. 53.

    For useful illustrations of the use of unamendability as a transformative device in Germany, India and South Africa, see Halmai (2012), pp. 182, 183–88, 190–91.

  54. 54.

    Bosnia & Herzegovina Const., art X, § 2 (1995).

  55. 55.

    See Mansfield (2003), pp. 2052, 2056.

  56. 56.

    Ukraine Const, tit XIII, art 157 (1996).

  57. 57.

    See Rezie (1999), pp. 169, 175–81.

  58. 58.

    Namibia Const, ch XIX, art 131 (1990).

  59. 59.

    See Wing (1993), pp. 295, 337–44.

  60. 60.

    See Albert (2010), pp. 685–87.

  61. 61.

    Ibid, pp. 693–98.

  62. 62.

    Niger Const, tit XII, art 136 (1999) (superseded); Niger Const, tit XII, art 141 (1999) (superseded).

  63. 63.

    See Albert (2013), p. 254.

  64. 64.

    Cuba Const, s 3 (1976) (as amended in 2002).

  65. 65.

    Afghanistan Const, art 149 (2003).

  66. 66.

    Colón-Ríos (2013), pp. 521, 525.

  67. 67.

    India Const, pt XX, art 368(2) (1950).

  68. 68.

    See Lutz (2006), p. 170 (ranking the Indian Constitution as one of the least rigid in a study sample of 36 democratic constitutions).

  69. 69.

    See Sajó (1999), pp. 39–40, Sullivan (1995), pp. 20, 22–23.

  70. 70.

    See Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, 1951 AIR 458, 1952 SCR 89, online: http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1706770.

  71. 71.

    Golaknath v. State of Punjab, 1967 AIR 1643, 1967 SCR (2) 762, online: http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/120358.

  72. 72.

    1973 SCC (4) 225, online: http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/25786.

  73. 73.

    Ibid. para 316.

  74. 74.

    Ibid.

  75. 75.

    One could interpret India’s escalating formal amendment rules as creating a hierarchy of constitutional importance. See Albert (2013).

  76. 76.

    1980 AIR 1789, 1981 SCR (1) 206, SCC (2) 591, online: http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1939993.

  77. 77.

    Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s 55.

  78. 78.

    Ibid.

  79. 79.

    Minerva Mills (see Footnote 76).

  80. 80.

    See Roznai (2013), pp. 657, 670–711.

  81. 81.

    Mexico Const, tit IX, art 136 (1917).

  82. 82.

    Articles of Confederation, art 13 (1781) (“And the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United Sates, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”).

  83. 83.

    James Madison criticized the Articles of Confederation on these grounds. See Cooke (1961), pp. 258, 263.

  84. 84.

    See US Const., art V (1789) (temporarily entrenching Article I, Section 9, Clauses 1 and 4 from formal amendment until the year 1808).

  85. 85.

    See Germany Const, pt VII, art 79(3); ibid. at pt II, art 20(1) (1949) (permanently entrenching federalism against formal amendment).

  86. 86.

    Unamendability of course cannot survive revolution. See Goldsworthy (2010), p. 70. Indeed, unamendability may provoke revolution. See Dicey (1915), p. 66.

  87. 87.

    See Mexico Const, tit IX, art 136 (1917).

  88. 88.

    See Cape Verde Const, pt VI, tit III, art 309(1) (1980).

  89. 89.

    Gözler (2008).

  90. 90.

    Schwartzberg (2007), pp. 8–16.

  91. 91.

    Krishnaswamy (2010).

  92. 92.

    Roznai (2017).

  93. 93.

    Sieyès (2002), p. 53.

  94. 94.

    For more on the failed process in 2011–13 and comparisons with previous commissions, see Oder (2015), pp. 136–140, Oder (2012), pp. 69–98.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Texas School of Law, Austin, TX, USA

    Richard Albert

  2. Koç University Law School, Istanbul, Turkey

    Bertil Emrah Oder

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

    Richard Albert

  2. Law School, Koç University, Sarıyer, Istanbul, Turkey

    Bertil Emrah Oder

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Albert, R., Oder, B.E. (2018). The Forms of Unamendability. In: Albert, R., Oder, B. (eds) An Unamendable Constitution?. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 68. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95141-6_1

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