Energy Infrastructures for the Low-Carbon Transformation in Europe

Abstract

Both in the German energiewende and in the European low-carbon energy system transformation, infrastructure is generally considered as a conditio sine qua non: a necessary though not sufficient condition for a low-carbon economy—and one without which energy transformation may fail. At second glance, there may be some doubt as to whether “big infrastructure” is really the appropriate way to approach the low-carbon transformation. The main reason is that in a carbon-intensive energy system, more infrastructure automatically implies more carbon emissions (sometimes called “carbon lock-in”). In this chapter, we analyze the role of physical infrastructure in the European low-carbon transformation, with a special focus on large-scale transmission infrastructure for electricity, natural gas, and CO₂. Although these infrastructures can play a certain role, they are not necessarily the critical factors in low-carbon transformation, and often low-cost measures such as improving regulation or tightening access rules are more effective than capital-intensive infrastructure expansion. Section 11.2 suggests that although a majority of authors see infrastructure development as a no-regrets option, there are also arguments against an oversupply of infrastructure. Sections 11.3–11.5 provide model- and case study-based analyses of different infrastructure sectors. Section 11.3 focuses on electricity transmission and compares the plans for pan-European electricity highways with other, more modest scenarios focusing on domestic upgrades and selected cross-country interconnectors. Section 11.4 is dedicated to natural gas infrastructure: Our results show no evidence of a substantial need for additional pipeline or LNG infrastructure, but rather a need for modest investment, given the diverse and global European supply of natural gas. Our analysis of infrastructure planning for carbon pipelines in Section 11.5 yields an even more striking result: Perhaps not a single cross-border pipeline may be required—except for perhaps a few in the North Sea—simply because the underlying technology, carbon capture, transport, and storage (CCTS), is unlikely to be used at the expected scale. Our conclusion in Section 11.6 is that the way forward is more likely to lie in regional and local cooperation in infrastructure.

To place one’s faith in purely permissive sequences and to rely on the ability of SOC [social overhead capital, i.e., infrastructure] to call forth other economic activities, can, under these circumstances, be just as irrational as the so-called “Cargo Cult” that has been engaged in by some of the New Guinea tribes after the lamented departure of the Allied expeditionary force at the end of World War II: “Those in coastal villages have built wharves out into the sea, ready for the ships to tie up, and those in land villages have constructed airstrips out to the jungle for the planes to land. And they have waited in expectancy for the Second Coming of the Cargoes.” Touching as it is, such a belief in the propitiatory powers of social overhead capital should not be the basis of development policy.

Albert O. Hirschman (1958, 10:94): The Strategy of Economic Development.