Abstract
In this chapter, I first present a very short history of contemporary Ostrich Nominalism. This short history is divided into two parts: the friends and foes of the Ostrich, i.e. some contemporary metaphysicians who have explicitly or implicitly assumed a negative or a positive attitude toward Ostrich-style thinking. I strongly suspect that some of the main insights of Ostrich Nominalism were also defended in the more distant past, in particular in medieval philosophy. But I will avoid any attempt to trace them back into this distant past due to the complexities of the history of philosophy. After this short historical outline, based on the views of friends and rivals, I will extract what constitutes the core of this position. Some initial differences between the old Ostrich and the new Priority Nominalism will also become clear at this point.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
‘The logically primitive relation is the relation of an object falling under a concept: all relations between concepts can be reduced to it’ (my translation, Frege 1983: 128). Of course, one can dispute the claim that a logically primitive relation is automatically also a metaphysically primitive relation. However, I do not want to argue that Frege really was an ostrich realist, but only that this is a plausible position.
- 2.
See Bergmann’s ‘Frege’s Hidden Nominalism’ (1958).
- 3.
- 4.
Van Cleve (1994:583) offers a passage from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Norman Kemp Smith, A 186–87/B229/30) that suggests he was also a sort of ostrich: ‘The determinations of a substance, which are nothing but special ways in which it exists, are called accidents. If we ascribe a special existence to this reality in substance (for instance, to motion, as an accident of matter), this existence is entitled, in distinction from the existence of substance, which is entitled subsistence. But this occasions many misunderstandings; it is more exact and more correct to describe an accident as being simply the way in which the existence of a substance is positively determined.’
- 5.
In his definition, R is supervenient on the natures of its terms = df. Necessarily, (x) (y)(x bears R to y only if there are non-relational properties F and G such that (i) x has F, (ii) y has G, and (iii) necessarily, (w)(z)(w has F and z has G only if w bears R to z).
- 6.
See Donagan’s approach (1963).
References
Armstrong, D.M. 1978. Nominalism and Realism, Vol. I: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1980. Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 440–449.
Azzouni, J. 2012. Simple Metaphysics and “Ontological Dependence”. In Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed. F. Correia and B. Schneider, 234–253. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bergmann, G. 1958. Frege’s Hidden Nominalism. The Philosophical Review 67 (4): 437–459.
Calemi, F.F. 2016. Ostrich Nominalism or Ostrich Platonism. In Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong, ed. F.F. Calemi. Berlin: De Gruyter.
De Melo, T.X. 2013. O Problema dos Universais como um Problema de Categorização Ontológica. Master Dissertation, PPGLM/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro.
Devitt, M. 1980. Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 433–439 Reprinted in Properties, Mellor, H., and Oliver, A., 1997.
Donagan, A. 1963. Universals and Metaphysical Realism. The Monist 47 (2): 211 Reprinted in Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology, ed. Loux, M. 1970, 128–158.
Frege, G. 1983. In Nachgelassene Schriften und Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, ed. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Goodman, N., and W.V.O. Quine. 1947. Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12: 105–122.
Melia, J. 2005. Truthmaking Without Truthmakers. In Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, ed. H. Beebee and J. Dood, 67–84. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mellor, D.H., and A. Oliver. 1997. Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peacock, H. 2009. What’s Wrong with Ostrich Nominalism? Philosophical Papers 38: 183–217.
Pickel, B., and N. Mantegani. 2012. A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism. Philosophers’ Imprint 12 (6): 1–21.
Quine, W.V.O. 1948. On What There Is. In Review of Metaphysics, 2. Reprinted in W. V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 1–19. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism. A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Summerford, J. 2003. Neither Universals Nor Nominalism. Kinds and the Problem of Universals. Metaphysica 5: 101–126.
Van Cleve, J. 1994. Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 577–590.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Imaguire, G. (2018). What Is It Like to Be an Ostrich?. In: Priority Nominalism. Synthese Library, vol 397. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95004-4_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95004-4_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-95003-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-95004-4
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)