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Generalized Graph k-Coloring Games

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 10976))

Abstract

We investigate pure Nash equilibria in generalized graph k-coloring games where we are given an edge-weighted undirected graph together with a set of k colors. Nodes represent players and edges capture their mutual interests. The strategy set of each player consists of k colors. The utility of a player v in a given state or coloring is given by the sum of the weights of edges \(\{v,u\}\) incident to v such that the color chosen by v is different than the one chosen by u, plus the profit gained by using the chosen color. Such games form some of the basic payoff structures in game theory, model lots of real-world scenarios with selfish players and extend or are related to several fundamental class of games.

We first show that generalized graph k-coloring games are potential games. In particular, they are convergent and thus Nash Equilibria always exist. We then evaluate their performance by means of the widely used notions of price of anarchy and price of stability and provide tight bounds for two natural and widely used social welfare, i.e., utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare.

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Correspondence to Raffaello Carosi or Gianpiero Monaco .

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Carosi, R., Monaco, G. (2018). Generalized Graph k-Coloring Games. In: Wang, L., Zhu, D. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10976. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94776-1_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94776-1_23

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