Abstract
Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism have both been attacked as self-undermining positions. This charge can be spelled out by presenting sceptics and relativists with the following dilemma: if your conclusion is true, then it cannot be defended, and if it is false, then it is not worth defending. In the sceptic’s case, if it is true that we cannot possess knowledge, then we cannot know that this is the case, and if it is false, then we should reject scepticism. In the relativist’s case, if it is true that no knowledge claims admit of absolute justification, then we cannot be absolutely justified in knowing this to be so, and if it is false, then we should reject epistemic relativism. The aim of this chapter is to show that sceptics and relativists can accept the first horn of the dilemma without rendering their conclusions indefensible or their positions incoherent.
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Notes
- 1.
This is not to say that absolutists must accept the argument, or even that they should accept it, but only that they should recognize it as a rational threat to their position.
- 2.
A similar reply is given by Luper (2004, 282).
- 3.
Alternatively, she may show that her thesis is justified relative to a single epistemic system that both relativists and absolutists subscribe to. Given that they endorse many of the same epistemic principles, it is not unrealistic to think that this could be the case.
- 4.
See n. 12 in Chapter 2.
- 5.
- 6.
Of course, this is an empirical claim that could be mistaken, so I am prepared to rescind it in the face of contrary evidence. My dataset is limited to those students to whom I have presented the Agrippan trilemma without being able to compel them to adopt the sceptical policy of suspending judgement.
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Bland, S. (2018). The Charge of Incoherence. In: Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_7
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