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Background to the Climate Change Framework

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Book cover Climate and Energy Governance for the UK Low Carbon Transition

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Abstract

This chapter sets out the background to the Climate Change Act, outlining how it has been set in place in order to translate key elements of the UK’s national low carbon strategy into legally binding national commitments. An account of the intensive campaigning and political activity that helped to galvanise the Act is provided. The chapter also points out that the framework manifested in law the first long-term legally binding national reduction targets imposed by one nation upon itself in the world and clarifies the reasons why the framework is justly considered to be immensely significant. Environmental governance mechanisms established by the Act are touched on in preparation for Chapter 2, and expert commentary and debate is explored.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See further the body of major reports on this matter issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (‘IPCC’), the leading international scientific body convened to examine and assess climate change. In its Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC has stressed that:

    Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate system. …It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming [of the atmosphere and the planet] since the mid-20th century.

    IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report (Cambridge University Press, 2014), at pp. 15 and 17, respectively (emphasis appears in original).

  2. 2.

    See C. Mitchell, J. Watson, J. Whiting (eds.) New Challenges in Energy Security : The UK in a Multipolar World (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2013).

  3. 3.

    DECC, UK Low Carbon Transition Plan : National Strategy for Climate and Energy (HM Government, 2009). This was presented to Parliament pursuant to sections 12–14 of the CCA.

  4. 4.

    DECC, The Carbon Plan (HM Government, 2011).

  5. 5.

    A statute is a written law passed by a legislative body. In the UK, the pertinent legislative body is national Parliament, based at Westminster in London.

  6. 6.

    CCA, s.5(1)(a).

  7. 7.

    Ibid., s.1(1).

  8. 8.

    See further Chapter 2.

  9. 9.

    CCA, ss.4–10. Discussed in Chapter 2.

  10. 10.

    The CCC’s main advisory elements are set out at CCA, ss.33–35 and s.38.

  11. 11.

    See CCA, s.99, ‘Extent’.

  12. 12.

    See further R. Fouquet (ed.) Handbook on Energy and Climate Change (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013).

  13. 13.

    ‘Energy’ can take a wide range of forms, and it is consequently especially difficult to define, see, e.g., J. Andrews, N. Jelley, Energy Science (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2013), Chapter 1, ‘An Introduction to Energy Science’, pp. 1–19.

  14. 14.

    See further, e.g., T.L. Muinzer, G. Ellis, ‘Subnational Governance for the Low Carbon Energy Transition: Mapping the UK’s “Energy Constitution”’ 35(7) Environment and Planning C 1176 (2017), p. 1177.

  15. 15.

    CCA, s.1(1) requires the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 to be at least 80% below 1990 baseline levels; s.5(1)(a) initially set a 26% reduction figure on 1990 levels for 2020, which was subsequently adjusted up to 34% by s.2 of the Climate Change Act 2008 (2020 Target, Credit Limit and Definitions) Order 2009.

  16. 16.

    H. Townsend, ‘The Climate Change Act 2008: Something to Be Proud of After All?’ 7(8) Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 842 (2009).

  17. 17.

    P. McMaster, ‘Climate Change—Statutory Duty or Pious Hope?’ 20(1) Journal of Environmental Law 115 (2008).

  18. 18.

    Public statement released by Friends of the Earth UK’s climate team in 2008.

  19. 19.

    An NGO is a ‘Non-Governmental Organisation’, that is, a non-profit group that operates independent of government and that normally seeks to promote some aspect of human (or environmental) welfare.

  20. 20.

    At the time of writing, the monarch and Head of State is Queen Elizabeth II.

  21. 21.

    See further the provision made for ‘commencement’ at s.100 of the CCA.

  22. 22.

    K. Hill, The UK Climate Change Act 2008—Lessons for National Climate Laws (London, ClientEarth, 2009), see ‘Background’, p. 9.

  23. 23.

    See DETR, Climate Change: The UK Programme (HM Government, 2000).

  24. 24.

    DEFRA, Climate Change: The UK Programme 2006 (HM Government, 2006).

  25. 25.

    DTI, Our Energy Future—Creating a Low Carbon Economy (HM Government, 2003).

  26. 26.

    DTI, Meeting the Challenge: A White Paper on Energy (HM Government, 2007).

  27. 27.

    A summary media and public release document produced by Friends of the Earth entitled The Big Ask Campaign : A Brief History of the Campaign for a New Climate Change Law is available from the organisation on request and provides a useful chronology of the unfolding campaign.

  28. 28.

    See N. Carter, ‘The Party Politicization of Climate and Energy Policy in Britain’, pp. 66–82, in G. Leydier, A. Martin (eds.) Environmental Issues in Political Discourse in Britain and Ireland (Cambridge Scholars, Newcastle, 2013), p. 74.

  29. 29.

    For further discussion of the Big Ask, see G. Haq and A. Paul, Environmentalism Since 1945 (Routledge, Oxford, 2012), pp. 21–22.

  30. 30.

    Friends of the Earth Scotland , which operates more independently than the group’s equivalent branches in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, was able to feed the Scottish dimension of the Big Ask campaign into the creation of a special subnational Climate Act for Scotland, which enhances the operation of the CCA in that region; this Scottish legislation is examined in detail in Chapter 3.

  31. 31.

    MPs are Members of Parliament, elected by the public in the UK to represent them in the national Parliament.

  32. 32.

    Hill, supra, n. 22.

  33. 33.

    See further The Big Ask —Questions and Answers, at Friends of the Earth Europe, http://www.foeeurope.org/node/670.

  34. 34.

    Quoting from the ‘Big Ask’ campaign’s homepage, hosted at the Friends of the Earth Europe, http://www.foeeurope.org/the-big-ask.

  35. 35.

    At that time, the Labour Party was in government in the UK, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair.

  36. 36.

    Early Day Motion (EDM) No. 178, 24 April 2005. See also K. Hill, supra, n. 22, p. 9.

  37. 37.

    HM Government, Draft Climate Change Bill , Cm 7040, March 2007.

  38. 38.

    DEFRA, Taking Forward the UK Climate Change Bill : The Government Response to Pre-Legislative Scrutiny and Public Consultation (HM Government, 2007), p. 6.

  39. 39.

    Hill records that this interview was conducted on 2 October 2009; Hill, supra, n. 22, p. 34, n. 17.

  40. 40.

    Hill, ibid., p. 10.

  41. 41.

    Hill records that this interview was conducted on 7 October 2009; Hill, ibid., p. 34, n. 16.

  42. 42.

    Hill, ibid., p. 10.

  43. 43.

    Hill, ibid., p. 10.

  44. 44.

    N. Stern, et al. Stern Review : The Economics of Climate Change (HM Government, 2006).

  45. 45.

    See amongst numerous scientific examples the body of major scientific reports issued by the IPCC, discussed at supra, n. 1 above.

  46. 46.

    Given the USA’s role as both the world’s most powerful economy and the second largest emitter of greenhouse gasses (behind China), Jennifer Wallace has pointed out how the acute nature of this problem in the USA serves to partially set the tone for the international community; J. Wallace, ‘US Environmental Policy and Global Security’, pp. 185–195, in N.R.F. Al-Rodhan (ed.) Policy Briefs on the Transnational Aspects of Security and Stability (LIT Verlag, Munster, 2007), p. 187. Discussion of this problem in the Australian context arises with reference to climate change in S. Smith, T. Dunne, A. Hadfield (eds.) Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016), p. 403. Governmental bias towards short-term economic interests is augmented by the role of powerful corporations that work to downplay the climate problem or outright stimulate support for climate change denial in order to preserve their own short-term economic goals, as highlighted by R.A. Schultz, Technology Versus Ecology: Human Superiority and the Ongoing Conflict with Nature (IGI, Hershey, PA, 2013), p. 52.

  47. 47.

    On this subject in the context of the Stern Review, see also N. Stern, ‘What Is the Economics of Climate Change?’ 2(7) World Economics 1 (2006).

  48. 48.

    On the efforts of ExxonMobil, the Koch brothers and the Donors Trust to use their enormous financial resources to stimulate support for climate denial, often covertly, see Chapter 5, ‘Case Studies in the Anthropology of Climate Change’, in H. Baer, M. Singer (eds.) The Anthropology of Climate Change: An Integrated Critical Perspective (Routledge, Abingdon, 2014).

  49. 49.

    Carbon budgeting is outlined and discussed in Chapter 2.

  50. 50.

    M. Stallworthy, ‘New Forms of Carbon Accounting: The Significance of a Climate Change Act for Economic Activity in the UK’ International Company & Commercial Law Review 331 (2007), p. 333.

  51. 51.

    N. Carter, ‘Combating Climate Change in the UK: Challenges and Obstacles’ 79(2) The Political Quarterly 194 (2008), p. 200.

  52. 52.

    S. Fankhauser, A. Averchenkova, J. Finnegan, 10 Years of the UK Climate Change Act (Grantham Research Institute and London School of Economics, 2018), p. 9.

  53. 53.

    Taking Forward the UK Climate Change Bill : The Government Response to Pre-Legislative Scrutiny and Public Consultation, Cm 7225 (The Crown, Norwich, 2007).

  54. 54.

    See CCA, s.100, ‘Commencement’.

  55. 55.

    Subject to the provisions at CCA, s.99.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., s.5(1)(a).

  57. 57.

    Ibid., s.1(1).

  58. 58.

    See CCA, Part 1; discussed further in Chapter 2.

  59. 59.

    That is, the Committee on Climate Change, as introduced earlier above.

  60. 60.

    Robinson has encouraged the idea that the CCC could be usefully imbued with powers to compel active policy changes; however, this would overreach its fundamental purpose and require substantial adjustment to its overall role, as the CCC has been designed as an advisory and reporting body. See further G. Robinson, ‘Stemming the Rising Tide: Developing Approaches for UK Law and Policy to Combat Climate Change’ 2(1) Birmingham Student Law Review 27 (2017), pp. 28–29.

  61. 61.

    See further the Climate Change Act 2008 (2020 Target, Credit Limit and Definitions) Order 2009.

  62. 62.

    The issue of whether international aviation and international shipping emissions should be incorporated directly within the final framework also proved to be a challenging and at times contentious issue. Ultimately, it was decided that they were not to be counted directly within the UK 2020/2050 carbon accounting regime, but a power has been created where the Secretary of State can issue regulations in order to change this circumstance and incorporate them directly if so desired (see CCA, s.30). These emissions sources are, however, still taken into account when budgets are being set and the CCC is providing budgeting advice.

  63. 63.

    The reference to ‘Kyoto’ greenhouse gas emissions alludes to the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement arrived at in 1997: Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The agreement committed the cohort of developed nations listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to greenhouse gas reduction targets of a minimum of 5% below 1990 emissions levels over the years 2008–2012. See further the consideration of the international experience in Chapter 3.

  64. 64.

    Letter from Adair Turner, Chair of the CCC, to the Secretary of State, headed Interim Advice by the Committee on Climate Change , 7 October 2008.

  65. 65.

    The recommendation was based on the consensus view amongst scientists as to what minimum level of action was necessary over the rest of the century in order to most likely mitigate the negative projected impacts of climate change over time.

  66. 66.

    This became the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), which has now developed in turn into the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS).

  67. 67.

    See further I. Johnson, ‘Climate Change Department Closed by Theresa May in “Plain Stupid” and “Deeply Worrying” Move’, Independent (UK Newspaper), 14 July 2016.

  68. 68.

    ‘Analysis—Roger Harrabin, Environment Analyst’, set within the news item ‘Government Axes Climate Department’ by P. Rincon, BBC News, 14 July 2016.

  69. 69.

    Harrabin, ibid.

  70. 70.

    See, e.g., Macrory’s consideration of the CCA in R. B. Macrory, ‘The UK Climate Change Act—Towards a Brave New Legal World?’ pp. 306–322, in I. Backer, O. Fauchald, C. Voigt (eds.) Pro Natura (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2012); Feldman’s discussion of the Act in D. Feldman, ‘Legislation Which Bears No Law’ 37(3) Statute Law Review 212 (2016).

  71. 71.

    R.A. Pielke, ‘The British Climate Change Act: A Critical Evaluation and Proposed Alternative Approach’ 4(2) Environmental Research Letters 1 (2009).

  72. 72.

    Pielke, ibid., pp. 2, 6.

  73. 73.

    See, e.g., supra, n. 18 ( Friends of the Earth ); M. Lockwood, ‘The Political Sustainability of Climate Policy: The Case of the UK Climate Change Act’ 23(5) Global Environmental Change 1339 (2013), p. 1346.

  74. 74.

    C.T. Reid, ‘A New Sort of Duty? The Significance of “Outcome” Duties in the Climate Change and Child Poverty Acts’ 4 Public Law 749 (2012).

  75. 75.

    See further below.

  76. 76.

    Reid, supra, n. 74. See also C.T. Reid, ‘Scotland: Constraints and Opportunities in a Devolved System’, in M. Peeters, M. Stallworthy, J.C. de Larragán (eds.) Climate Law in EU Member States : Towards National Legislation for Climate Protection (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012); C.T. Reid, ‘Climate Law in the United Kingdom’, in E.J. Hollo, K. Kulovesi, M. Mehling (eds.) Climate Change and the Law (Springer, Dordrecht, 2012).

  77. 77.

    The EU issues ‘Directives’ in the sphere of environmental governance (and other areas of governance) that often adopt an approach similar to the CCA. For example, Directive 2009/28/EC, known as the ‘Renewables Directive’, has applied an overall target to EU Member States requiring an uplift of renewables to 20% of the EU energy share by 2020.

  78. 78.

    C.T. Reid, supra, n. 74, p. 753.

  79. 79.

    The UK was an EU Member State at the time of the CCA’s creation.

  80. 80.

    In 2012 Reid pointed out strong similarities existing between aspects of legislative approaches to climate law and child poverty law at that time; see further Reid, supra, p. 74 (‘A New Sort of Duty?’).

  81. 81.

    Reid, ibid., p. 749.

  82. 82.

    Reid, ibid., pp. 766–767.

  83. 83.

    Reid, ibid., p. 767.

  84. 84.

    As an energy example of sanctions, contrast, for instance, the range of sanctions strung throughout the Energy Act 2011 for failure to comply with aspects of its diverse energy obligations: Energy Act 2011, ss.16, 45, 48, 51, 57, 60, 63, 87B.

  85. 85.

    In law, substantive duties and procedural duties are often ascribed technical legal meaning. In the present case, the author is using the terms in a generalist, interdisciplinary way, not in a narrow technical legal sense.

  86. 86.

    M. Stallworthy, ‘Legislating Against Climate Change: A UK Perspective on a Sisyphean Challenge’ 72(3) Modern Law Review 412 (2009).

  87. 87.

    Townsend, supra, n. 16, p. 842.

  88. 88.

    McMaster, supra, n. 17.

  89. 89.

    In effect, this was the case in the UK prior to the CCA’s creation.

  90. 90.

    See Energy Act 2016, ss.1–7.

  91. 91.

    Energy Act 2016, s.16.

  92. 92.

    Reid, supra, n. 74, p. 757.

  93. 93.

    For more detail, see ‘What Is Judicial Review, and What Are Its Purposes?’ pp. 2–6, in G. Anthony (ed.) Judicial Review in Northern Ireland (Hart, Oxford, 2014).

  94. 94.

    See further M. Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (6th edition, Hart, Oxford, 2012).

  95. 95.

    Reid, supra, n. 74, p. 757.

  96. 96.

    Reid, ibid.

  97. 97.

    See further C. Callaghan, ‘What Is a “Target Duty”?’ 5(3) Judicial Review 186 (2000); R v London Borough of Islington ex p. Rixon [1997] ELR 66, 69.

  98. 98.

    See further the consideration of the role of UK Government and the Secretary of State under the terms of the framework in Chapter 2.

  99. 99.

    This general assumption in itself is also subject to uncertainties, however. Feldman has suggested that where the Secretary of State fails to produce an annual report to Parliament in accordance with mandatory CCA reporting duties, the courts may be unlikely to issue a mandatory order for the report to be produced due to the fact that they do not normally make orders that intrude on the working of the Houses of Parliament; for this proposition, Feldman cites the Bill of Rights 1688, Art. IX as legal authority. See further Feldman, supra, n. 70, p. 222.

  100. 100.

    A. McHarg, ‘Climate Change Constitutionalism? Lessons from the United Kingdom’ 2(4) Climate Law 469 (2011), p. 477.

  101. 101.

    Though note that work from the author has argued that there is some facility under the terms of environmental law for courts to take a more robust approach to enforceability in the express context of the CCA than the law may have traditionally permitted, given both the innovative nature of the CCA itself and the novel nature of the issue it is designed to combat (climate change): T.L. Muinzer, ‘Is the Climate Change Act 2008 a “Constitutional Statute”?’ European Public Law (2018, forthcoming). See also J. Church, ‘Enforcing the Climate Change Act’ 4(1) UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 109 (2015).

  102. 102.

    Reid, supra, n. 74, p. 762. A related but slightly different position might be that these sorts of environmental target duties might be regarded by the courts as a mandatory relevant consideration, so that a failure by the government to take them into account when making policy would be an error that the courts could review. The author is grateful to Professor David Feldman QC for raising this point over the course of research.

  103. 103.

    Stallworthy, supra, n. 50, p. 340.

  104. 104.

    E. Fisher, E. Scotford, E. Barritt, ‘The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change’ 2(80) Modern Law Review 173 (2017).

  105. 105.

    See Urgenda Foundation v Netherlands (24 June 2015) ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196.

  106. 106.

    Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning [2007] NSWLEC 59; see further the discussion at Fisher, Scotford and Barritt, supra, 104, p. 191.

  107. 107.

    See further H. Townsend, supra, n. 16, p. 842; and (unattributed) ‘Energy Legislation: The Climate Change Act 2008’ (legislative comment) Environmental Law Monthly 1 (2008).

  108. 108.

    McMaster, supra, n. 17.

  109. 109.

    UK Government had indicated that judicial review would be available to operate as a form of sanction, although it was not expressly stated in the legislation.

  110. 110.

    The CCA’s reporting obligations are outlined in Chapter 2.

  111. 111.

    See Chapter 2.

  112. 112.

    Townsend has also made the following salient observation:

    Any law student could tell Government that a duty of this kind is simply unenforceable but, as Ministers insisted during the Bill’s passage through Parliament, they might just be missing the point. The Government’s objective in setting this statutory target is to give greater certainty as to the scale of change required than could be achieved by more traditional means. In doing so they seek international credibility for the UK in treaty negotiations, and domestically the platform for a gear change in policy formation.

    H. Townsend, ‘Climate Change Act 2008: Will It Do the Trick?’ 11(2) Environmental Law Review 116 (2009), p. 117.

  113. 113.

    See further Chapter 2, and in particular discussion of the role of the Secretary of State in UK Government.

  114. 114.

    Callaghan, supra, n. 97, pp. 185–186.

  115. 115.

    On the courts making allowance for the Treasury’s budgetary control in assessing the Secretary of State’s role in constricting solar energy subsidies, see T.L. Muinzer, ‘“To PV or Not to PV”: An Analysis of the High Court’s Recent Treatment of Solar Energy’ 17(2) Environmental Law Review 128 (2015).

  116. 116.

    ‘It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline’ (CCA, s.1(1), emphasis added), etc.

  117. 117.

    See generally M. Loughlin, The British Constitution : A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013).

  118. 118.

    See C. Turpin, A. Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (6th edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), p. 3.

  119. 119.

    For more on this, see N. Parpworth, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), p. 11.

  120. 120.

    Constitution of Ireland—Bunreacht na hEireann.

  121. 121.

    Constitution of France. The present version dates from 1958 and has been amended on a number of occasions.

  122. 122.

    See further Parpworth, supra, n. 119, p. 12 (‘Sources of the UK Constitution’).

  123. 123.

    M. Elliott, R. Thomas, Public Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), p. 4.

  124. 124.

    McHarg, supra, n. 100.

  125. 125.

    McHarg, supra, n. 100, p. 476.

  126. 126.

    Human Rights Act 1998.

  127. 127.

    Ibid. (Human Rights Act); see particularly the rights set out at Schedule 1 to the Act, which are drawn from the European Convention on Human Rights.

  128. 128.

    See ibid. (Human Rights Act 1998).

  129. 129.

    McHarg, supra, n. 100, p. 476.

  130. 130.

    McHarg, ibid., pp. 476–477.

  131. 131.

    McHarg, ibid., p. 476.

  132. 132.

    Greenhouse Gas.

  133. 133.

    McHarg, supra, n. 100, p. 483.

  134. 134.

    T.L. Muinzer, supra, n. 101 (‘Is the Climate Change Act 2008 a “Constitutional Statute”?’).

  135. 135.

    The IPCC.

  136. 136.

    Noam Chomsky made this statement in a public lecture, entitled ‘Global Warming and the Common Good’ (delivered at East Stroudsburg University, February 7, 2013). The talk is transcribed on the Reading Chomsky website, where this statement is drawn from, see, http://readingchomsky.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/normal-0-0-2-false-false-false-en-us-ja.html.

  137. 137.

    Muinzer, supra, n. 101.

  138. 138.

    Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151.

  139. 139.

    See, e.g., Lord Hope’s treatment of the Scotland Act 1998 in H. v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 308, at para [30].

  140. 140.

    While it is possible to conclude that the CCA is a ‘constitutional statute’ in these terms, the courts may not necessarily take this view. A case has not yet arisen to resolve the point.

  141. 141.

    See generally, T.L. Muinzer, supra, n. 101.

  142. 142.

    Muinzer, ibid.

  143. 143.

    Muinzer, ibid.

  144. 144.

    Another example of a ‘higher’ level would be the EU/‘supranational’ level, during the period of the UK’s membership of the EU.

  145. 145.

    Townsend, supra, n. 16, p. 842.

  146. 146.

    See further the detailed analysis of EU-UK governance dynamics in this area in T.L. Muinzer, ‘An Evaluation of the Implications of EU Climate and Energy Governance for the UK in Light of Brexit’ 23(2) European Journal of Current Legal Issues (2017).

  147. 147.

    These sorts of multilevel dimensions are outlined and examined in T.L. Muinzer, ‘Does the Climate Change Act 2008 Adequately Account for the UK’s Devolved Jurisdictions?’ 25(3) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 87 (2016).

  148. 148.

    Muinzer, supra, n. 146. Benjamin has suggested that due to the CCA’s sense of alignment with international and EU obligations and developments, it can be viewed as incorporating a ‘transnational’ dimension; L. Benjamin, ‘The Responsibilities of Carbon Major Companies: Are They (and Is the Law) Doing Enough?’ 2(5) Transnational Environmental Law 353 (2015), p. 360.

  149. 149.

    S. Turner, ‘Northern Ireland’s Consent to the Climate Change Act 2008: Symbol or Illusion?’ 25(1) Journal of Environmental Law 63 (2013); S. Turner, ‘Committing to Effective Climate Governance in Northern Ireland: A Defining Test of Devolution’ 25(2) Journal of Environmental Law 203 (2013).

  150. 150.

    Reid, ‘Scotland: Constraints and Opportunities in a Devolved System’ (supra, n. 76), p. 137; Reid, ‘A New Sort of Duty? The Significance of “Outcome” Duties in the Climate Change and Child Poverty Acts’ (supra, n. 74); C.T. Reid, ‘Climate Change Law in Scotland’ Ympäristö-Juridiikka Miljöjuridik (1) Finnish Environmental Law Review 18 (2012). See further Reid, supra, n. 76 (‘Climate Law in the United Kingdom’).

  151. 151.

    See Turner, supra, n. 149, ‘Committing to Effective Climate Governance in Northern Ireland’; Reid, supra, n. 76 (‘Scotland: Constraints and Opportunities in a Devolved System’).

  152. 152.

    The department’s functions have since been transferred to the Northern Ireland Executive’s Department for the Economy and Department for Communities.

  153. 153.

    T.L. Muinzer, The UK’s Energy Decarbonisation Process and the Challenges of Devolution (PhD research thesis), Queen’s University Belfast (1 October 2011–1 July 2015).

  154. 154.

    ‘Delivering Renewable Energy Under Devolution’, funded by the ESRC, commencing in January 2011 and finishing at the end of January 2013.

  155. 155.

    Important DREUD research outputs include: G. Ellis, R. Cowell, F. Sherry-Brennan, P. Strachan, D. Toke, Delivering Renewable Energy Under Devolution : Initial Findings Summary Report (DREUD, 2013); G. Ellis, R. Cowell, F. Sherry-Brennan, P. Strachan, D. Toke, ‘Planning, Energy and Devolution in the UK’ 84(3) Town Planning Review 397 (2013); D. Toke, F. Sherry-Brennan, R. Cowell, G. Ellis, P. Strachan, ‘Scotland, Renewable Energy and the Independence Debate: Will Head or Heart Rule the Roost?’ 84(1) (January–March) Political Quarterly 61 (2013).

  156. 156.

    These key devolved governmental actors include most importantly the UK’s devolved governments and parliaments; see further Chapter 3.

  157. 157.

    Muinzer, supra, n. 153 and as developed with Geraint Ellis of DREUD in supra, n. 14, ‘Subnational Governance for the Low Carbon Energy Transition: Mapping the UK’s “Energy Constitution”’.

  158. 158.

    The national-subnational dimensions of the CCA are explored further in Chapter 3.

  159. 159.

    Supra, n. 14, ‘Subnational Governance for the Low Carbon Energy Transition: Mapping the UK’s “Energy Constitution”’.

  160. 160.

    Muinzer and Ellis, ibid.

  161. 161.

    See Muinzer and Ellis, ibid., pp. 5–11, ‘The UK’s “Energy Constitution”: Mapping the Powers’.

  162. 162.

    See Muinzer and Ellis, ibid., pp. 5–11 and the Appendix, at pp. 19–22.

  163. 163.

    Muinzer, supra, n. 147.

  164. 164.

    On the general attitudes and approaches that have been adopted by the UK’s devolved territories, and their impact on the CCA’s intended outcomes, see further Chapter 3.

  165. 165.

    Questions arising around the most appropriate level(s) at which climate and energy initiatives should be spatially scaled can pose complex problems, and as such should be considered carefully in the context of any national climate regime design, see further: M.H. Benson, ‘Regional Initiatives: Scaling the Climate Response and Responding to Conceptions of Scale’ 100(4) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 1025 (2010); B.K. Sovacool, M.A. Brown, ‘Scaling the Policy Response to Climate Change’ 27(4) Policy and Society 317 (2009); M.R. Pasimeni, et al. ‘Scales, Strategies and Actions for Effective Energy Planning: A Review’ 65 Energy Policy 165 (2014); G. Bridge, et al. ‘Geographies of Energy Transition: Space, Place and the Low Carbon Economy’ 53 Energy Policy 331 (2013).

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    Thomas L. Muinzer

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Muinzer, T.L. (2019). Background to the Climate Change Framework. In: Climate and Energy Governance for the UK Low Carbon Transition. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94670-2_1

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