Skip to main content

Introduction: Douglass North’s NIEH in Context

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 541 Accesses

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in the History of Economic Thought ((PHET))

Abstract

The economic historian Douglass North is most famous for developing a theory that interprets the causes of economic change by explaining them in terms of social institutions. This theory, the New Institutionalist Economic History, has had a far-reaching influence. In this chapter, Krul explains how this theory originated in existing institutionalist ideas within economics, how it built on these ideas and developed them further, and how it contributed to the rise of a new way of thinking across the fields of social science concerned with economic thought. Krul also discusses the reception of North’s theory, both by its supporters and its critics. As shown here, for understanding North’s approach it is important to distinguish the specifics of his theory from other forms of New Institutionalist Economics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Often the approach is called by its practitioners the New Institutional Economics (e.g. North 1986; Alston 2008) instead. However, in the philosophy of social science literature reference to ‘(new) institutionalism’ is more prevalent, and it is also so used in comparative context (Nee 2005). I follow here the philosophical convention (see Mäki 1993), which also has the advantage of distinguishing it from the adjectival derivation ‘belonging to an institution’. The terms are in any case entirely equivalent.

  2. 2.

    I shall throughout distinguish ‘economics’ as a discipline from ‘economic thought’. The latter will be used for convenience as an umbrella term for all fields of social science concerned with economic structures and behavior as their primary subject matter, including economic history, economic sociology, economic anthropology, and so forth.

  3. 3.

    Another element she identifies is the debate about public goods and free riding, to which I will also return later in the context of North’s NIEH. However, to avoid category mistakes this is best seen as a subject matter rather than a component school of theory.

  4. 4.

    Much of the material of this book was prepared before the recent death of Douglass North, on November 3, 2015. In order to emphasize the ongoing relevance of his work, I have not changed the tense used. Discussions of past phases of North’s NIEH will be in past tense, while his arguments as formulated in the final phase, most notably his last two monographs, will be in present tense.

  5. 5.

    As Robert Bates has put it, “If anyone can lay claim to being the founder of the new institutionalism, it would be Douglass North” (Bates 2014).

  6. 6.

    A lengthier treatment of the origins of the term “NIE” and “NIEH” and their relation to differences between North and other NIE authors can be found in Richter (2005).

  7. 7.

    For a discussion of this term, see Weintraub (1979).

  8. 8.

    Another early contributor to this theoretical line of thought was Allen Barton, who however did not publish it (Harcourt et al. 2016: 271). I thank Geoff Harcourt for this reference.

  9. 9.

    The decisive step here for North was the abandonment of the assumption that institutional arrangements are necessarily efficient in some sense, which inaugurated the second stage of his NIEH (North 1981).

  10. 10.

    However, the relationship between game theoretical approaches and North’s analysis of individual strategic behavior, given rules-as-constraints, will come up again when I discuss North’s concept of the ‘rules of the game’ in depth. See chap. 3.

  11. 11.

    The only other book-length discussion specifically devoted to North’s work is, by my knowledge, the honorary collection of essays published as Galiani and Sened (2014). I refer to some of its contributions here.

  12. 12.

    This means that the present work does not deal in any detail with North’s earliest, purely Cliometric work. As it is unconnected to the NIEH project until the point that North becomes dissatisfied with it, it does not properly belong to a discussion of North’s NIEH. It should certainly be part of an intellectual biography of North, which I do not here intend to write.

  13. 13.

    A point also noted by Boldizzoni (2011: 19–22).

References

  • Acemoglu, Daron. 2010. Institutions, Factor Prices and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?, NBER Working Paper 15693.

    Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, Daron, Francisco Gallego, and James A. Robinson. 2014. Institutions, Human Capital and Development, NBER Working Paper 19933.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alston, L.J. 2008. New Institutional Economics. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bates, Robert H. 2014. The New Institutionalism. The Work of Douglass North. In Institutions, Economic Growth, and Property Rights: The Legacy of Douglass North, ed. Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened, 50–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Boldizzoni, Francesco. 2011. The Poverty of Clio: Resurrecting Economic History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Burki, Shahid Javed, and Guillermo E. Perry. 1998. Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter. In World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies: Viewpoints. Washington, DC: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4 (16): 386–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Colander, David. 2000. The Death of Neoclassical Economics. Journal of the History of Economic Thought 22 (2): 127–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Colander, David, Richard Holt, and J. Barkley Rosser. 2004. The Changing Face of Mainstream Economics. Review of Political Economy 16 (4): 485–499.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eggertsson, Thráinn. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Fine, Ben. 2000. Economics Imperialism and Intellectual Progress: The Present as the History of Economic Thought? History of Economics Review 32 (1): 10–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002. Economics Imperialism: A View from the Periphery. Review of Radical Political Economics 34 (2): 187–201.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, Ben, and Dimitris Milonakis. 2003. From Principle of Pricing to Pricing of Principle: Rationality and Irrationality in the Economic History of Douglass North. Comparative Studies in Society and History 45 (3): 546–570.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009. From Economics Imperialism to Freakonomics: The Shifting Boundaries Between Economics and Other Social Sciences. Abingdon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galiani, Sebastian, and Itai Sened, eds. 2014. Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Granovetter, Mark. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91 (3): 481–510.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greif, Avner. 1998. Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis. The American Economic Review 88 (2): 80–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Greif, Avner, and Chris Kingston. 2011. Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? In Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy, and Voting, ed. Gonzalo Caballero and Norman Schofield, 13–44. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Groenewegen, John, Frans Kerstholt, and Ad Nagelkerke. 1995. On Integrating Old and New Institutionalism: Douglass North Building Bridges. Journal of Economic Issues 29 (2): 467–475.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harcourt, Geoff, et al. 2016. Post-Keynesian Essays from Down Under Vol. III: Essays on Ethics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heiner, Ronald A. 1983. The Origin of Predictable Behavior. The American Economic Review 73 (4): 560–595.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2001. How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2007. Meanings of Methodological Individualism. Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (2): 211–226.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Langlois, Richard N. 1990. Bounded Rationality and Behavioralism: A Clarification and Critique. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 146 (4): 691–695.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mäki, Uskali. 1993. Social Theories of Science and the Fate of Institutionalism in Economics. In Rationality, Institutions, and Economic Methodology, ed. Bo Gustafsson, Christian Knudsen, and Uskali Mäki, 76–109. London: Routledge.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009. Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (3): 351–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matthews, R.C.O. 1986. The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth. The Economic Journal 96 (384): 903–918.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ménard, Claude, and Mary M. Shirley. 2014. The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics. In Institutions, Economic Growth, and Property Rights: The Legacy of Douglass North, ed. Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened, 11–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Milonakis, Dimitris, and Ben Fine. 2007. Douglass North’s Remaking of Economic History: A Critical Appraisal. Review of Radical Political Economics 39 (1): 27–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nee, Victor. 2005. The New Institutionalisms in Economics and Sociology. In Handbook of Economic Sociology, ed. Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, 49–74. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2008. Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics. In Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley, 789–818. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, Richard R., and Sidney G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Belknap.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglass C. 1977. Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: The Challenge of Karl Polanyi. Journal of European Economic History 6 (3): 703–716.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1986. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 142 (1): 230–237.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary Field of Institutional Analysis. Journal of Institutional Economics 3 (3): 239–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom. 2004. The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 63 (1): 105–147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peukert, Helge. 2001. Bridging Old and New Institutional Economics: Gustav Schmoller and Douglass C. North, Seen with Old Institutionalists’ Eyes. European Journal of Law and Economics 11 (2): 91–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Richter, Rudolf. 2005. The New Institutional Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects. European Business Organization Law Review 6 (2): 161–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2015. Essays on New Institutional Economics. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2): 131–165.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rutherford, Malcolm. 1994. Institutions in Economics: The Old and New Institutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2001. Institutional Economics: Then and Now. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (3): 173–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schotter, Andrew. 1981. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, Viktor. 1988. Rules and Choice in Economics and Sociology. Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 7: 1–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallis, John Joseph. 2015. Structure and Change in Economic History: The Ideas of Douglass North. CEPR Policy Portal. https://voxeu.org/article/ideas-douglass-north. Accessed 24 Jan 2018.

  • Weintraub, E. Roy. 1979. Microfoundations: The Compatibility of Microeconomics and Macroeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver E. 1973. Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations. American Economic Review 63 (2): 316–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology 87 (3): 548–577.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3): 595–613.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver E., and Sidney G. Winter. 1991. The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Krul, M. (2018). Introduction: Douglass North’s NIEH in Context. In: The New Institutionalist Economic History of Douglass C. North. Palgrave Studies in the History of Economic Thought. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94084-7_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94084-7_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-94083-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-94084-7

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics