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Rational Choice Explained and Defended

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The Mystery of Rationality

Abstract

Choice behavior can generally be best modeled using the rational actor model, according to which individuals have a time-, state-, and social context-dependent preference function over outcomes, and beliefs concerning the probability that particular actions lead to particular outcomes. Every argument that I have seen for rejecting the rational actor model I have found to be specious, often disingenuous and reflecting badly on the training of its author.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I regret using the term “utility” which suggests incorrectly that the theorem is related to philosophical utilitarianism or that it presupposes that all human motivation is aimed at maximizing pleasure or happiness. The weight of tradition bids us retain the venerable name of the theorem, despite its co notational baggage.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM, USA

    Herbert Gintis

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  1. Herbert Gintis
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Correspondence to Herbert Gintis .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Paris Diderot University, Paris, France

    Gérald Bronner

  2. Nankai University, Tianjin, China

    Francesco Di Iorio

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Gintis, H. (2018). Rational Choice Explained and Defended. In: Bronner, G., Di Iorio, F. (eds) The Mystery of Rationality. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94028-1_8

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