Abstract
It is evident that it is impossible to provide a commonly accepted definition of rationality, and that there is a lack of agreement on the meaning of the concept. As a consequence, it can be said that there is a ‘mystery of rationality’. What is it to be rational? The disagreements concerning the meaning of rationality can be related to (often intermingled) debates on six well-known dichotomies: (i) normative versus descriptive; (ii) instrumental versus non-instrumental; (iii) Cartesian versus non-Cartesian; (iv) tacit versus explicit; (v) explanation versus interpretation; and (vi); intended versus unintended.
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Notes
- 1.
According to some supporters of the descriptive theory of rationality such as Ludwig von Mises, even akratic actions, i.e. actions characterized by weakness of will, must be regarded as rational because, even if the agent will later regret having carried them out, akratic actions attempt to “remove a certain uneasiness” (1998 p. 15) in the way that the agent considers, when he/she acts, the action most appropriate given his/her subjective knowledge.
- 2.
This point is stressed not only by sociologists, who often criticize the model of rationality used in economics, but also by many economists (e.g. Sen 1977; Vandberg 1994; Ben-Ner and Putterman 1998). However, this difference should be not regarded as excessively radical. As argued by Wolfesperger (2001), there are a number of works in econometrics that consider ethics and social prestige as important explanatory factors. See also Gätchter and Ferhr (1999).
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Bronner, G., Di Iorio, F. (2018). Introduction: Rationality as an Enigmatic Concept. In: Bronner, G., Di Iorio, F. (eds) The Mystery of Rationality. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94028-1_1
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