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Iran’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: An Impediment or a Catalyst for Development?

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Industrial, Trade, and Employment Policies in Iran
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Abstract

Iran became an observer to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005. There have been heated internal debates ever since on the pros and cons of joining the multilateral trading system, with some exaggerated claims on both sides. Proponents rightly consider accession as an inevitable path toward Iran’s integration into the global economy but tend to underestimate the devilish details specific to each accession and their potential impact on development policies. Opponents often view Iran’s accession as a prelude to deindustrialization and to locking the economy in the lower end of the global value chains (GVCs). Yet, export-driven development in a GVC-dominated world economy is highly unlikely without joining the WTO. This chapter argues that Iran’s accession, if negotiated properly, has the potential to improve the country’s institutional quality in terms of trade/economic policy formulation and implementation. At the same time, due to longtime relative isolation from the global economy and presence of uncompetitive industrial and services sectors, WTO accession, if executed without a clear vision and policy precision, could involve high, if not prohibitive, adjustment costs. Therefore, on the technical level, various components of WTO accession policy should be regarded as potential tools for fostering and embedding Iran’s pre-existing but long overdue long-term economic reform plans. On the political level, Iran’s accession strategy must be considered by the leadership in a broader geopolitical context—as an important gateway for the country’s multilevel engagement with the global economy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Not all acceded members have eliminated their AMS. While China has done so, for instance, Russia and Saudi Arabia have managed to reserve a large sum in the magnitude of billion dollars for their agriculture amber box. For those left with no tolerance for amber box support, they can still use green box subsidies as well as de minimis support. For definitions see the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and Annex 1 thereof.

  2. 2.

    See China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum (DS—431, 432, 433); China—Duties and other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials (DS—394, 395, 398); China—Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials (DS—508, 509).

  3. 3.

    According to the Economist (2011), “The price of re-entry was as steep as the wait was long. China had to relax over 7000 tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers. Some feared that foreign competition would uproot farmers and upend rusty state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as to some extent it did. But China, overall, has enjoyed one of the best decades in global economic history.”

  4. 4.

    Sanctions have no doubt contributed heavily to what constitutes record levels of illegal and informal trade. Due to some accounts, at the height of sanctions, more than half of Iran’s imports can be entering through informal channels with little to no supervision or taxation.

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Bigdeli, S.Z. (2018). Iran’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: An Impediment or a Catalyst for Development?. In: Alaedini, P., Razavi, M. (eds) Industrial, Trade, and Employment Policies in Iran. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94012-0_7

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