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Great Powers and International Hierarchy pp 153–185Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Extending Hierarchy

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Abstract

In this chapter, I ask how the USA sought to expand hierarchy—in other words, how to bring new, friendly leaders to power within other states—in the postwar world. I show that by promising friendly leaders resources should they come to office, the USA has been able to in effect “purchase” regime change. Critically, I show that this ability requires relatively autocratic institutions within recipient states: if friendly leaders anticipate not being able to keep these resources for themselves, they are unwilling to pay the costs of coming to office. I show that an expectation of new aid increases the likelihood of both leader turnovers and coup attempts, but only in autocratic states.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Darío A. Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic: Region and State in Honduras, 1870–1972. University of North Carolina Press, 1996, pp. 113–114.

  2. 2.

    Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization.” International Security 37.4 (2013), pp. 90–131.

  3. 3.

    John M. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010. Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 22.

  4. 4.

    Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” World Politics 27.02 (1975), pp. 175–200; Patricia L. Sullivan. “War Aims and War Outcomes Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.3 (2007), pp. 496–524.

  5. 5.

    Scott Wolford, “Incumbents, Successors, and Crisis Bargaining Leadership Turnover as a Commitment Problem.” Journal of Peace Research 49.4 (2012), pp. 517–530.

  6. 6.

    James Meernik, “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy.” Journal of Peace Research 33.4 (1996), pp. 391–402; Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny. “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint.” International Studies Quarterly 50.3 (2006), pp. 539–560.

  7. 7.

    Downes and Monten, “Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization.”

  8. 8.

    Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, “Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914–2001.” International Organization 62.4 (2008), pp. 717–736.

  9. 9.

    Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig, “Beacons of Hope? The Impact of Imposed Democracy on Regional Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity.” Journal of Politics 67.4 (2005), pp. 1075–1098.

  10. 10.

    Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.” International Organization 64.4 (2010), pp. 627–660.

  11. 11.

    Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992.” International Studies Quarterly 44.4 (2000), pp. 615–642.

  12. 12.

    Patrick M. Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40.2 (1996), pp. 336–359.

  13. 13.

    Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civilwar Process.” Journal of Peace Research 45.3 (2008), pp. 345–363.

  14. 14.

    Suzanne Werner, “Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement.” American Journal of Political Science (2000), pp. 720–732; Rupen Cetinyan. “Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention.” International Organization 56.03 (2002), pp. 645–677.

  15. 15.

    Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization.” International Organization 60.04 (2006), pp. 911–933.

  16. 16.

    Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework.” International Organization 59.04 (2005), pp. 801–826, p. 804.

  17. 17.

    Brian Greenhill, “The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 54.1 (2010), pp. 127–145.

  18. 18.

    Antoaneta Dimitrova and Geoffrey Pridham, “International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and Its Limits.” Democratization 11.5 (2004), pp. 91–112.

  19. 19.

    Nikolay Marinov, “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49.3 (2005), pp. 564–576.

  20. 20.

    David A. Baldwin, “Foreign Aid, Intervention, and Influence.” World Politics 21.03 (1969), pp. 425–447.

  21. 21.

    Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations.” Journal of Political Economy 114.5 (2006), pp. 905–930.

  22. 22.

    Susan D. Hyde, “The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” World Politics 60.01 (2007), pp. 37–63.

  23. 23.

    Daniel Corstange and Nikolay Marinov, “Taking Sides in Other People’s Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention.” American Journal of Political Science 56.3 (2012), pp. 655–670.

  24. 24.

    Abel Escribà-Folch, “Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure Spending, Repression, and Sanctions.” Comparative Political Studies 45.6 (2012), pp. 683–713.

  25. 25.

    Susan D. Hyde, “Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion.” American Journal of Political Science 55.2 (2011), pp. 356–369.

  26. 26.

    Nita Rudra, “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World.” American Journal of Political Science 49.4 (2005), pp. 704–730.

  27. 27.

    Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coups and Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 44 (4 Oct. 2014), pp. 799–825. ISSN: 1469–2112.

  28. 28.

    Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization.” International Organization 56.03 (2002), pp. 515–549.

  29. 29.

    Marinov and Goemans, “Coups and Democracy,” p. 805.

  30. 30.

    Kevin M. Morrison, “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability.” International Organization (2009), pp. 107–138.

  31. 31.

    Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire. (Hachette UK, 2009), p. 214.

  32. 32.

    Thomas L. Friedman, Baker and Rabin Near a Loan Deal. http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/21/world/bakerand-rabin-near-a-loan-deal.html. July 1992.

  33. 33.

    Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders.” Journal of Peace Research 46.2 (2009), pp. 269–283; Amanda A. Licht. Regular Turnover Details, 1960–2004. 2014. url: https://sites.google.com/site/amandalichtphd/research/regularturnover-details.

  34. 34.

    Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 48.2 (2011), pp. 249–259.

  35. 35.

    These descriptive statistics are deflated by the number of observations that receive no aid. If the country-years receiving no aid are omitted, the respective values are $15.7 million (no leadership change), $21.6 million (leadership change but no coalition change), and $27.3 million (coalition change).

  36. 36.

    I also replicated this analysis with Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll’s data on the source of leadership support, which codes the societal coalitions from which leaders draw their support. The corresponding aid figures for the same three categories are, respectively, $3,530, $123,222, and $637,041, quite similar to the pattern presented above.

  37. 37.

    Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth 5.1 (2000), pp. 33–63.

  38. 38.

    Available from https://explorer.usaid.gov/data-download.html.

  39. 39.

    Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders”; Licht, Regular Turnover Details, 1960–2004.

  40. 40.

    Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 A New Dataset.”

  41. 41.

    Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffrey M. Ritter, “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions.” International Studies Quarterly 43.1 (1999), pp. 115–144.

  42. 42.

    Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Expanded Trade and GDP Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46.5 (2002), pp. 712–724.

  43. 43.

    Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002” (2002).

  44. 44.

    I have also performed all of the following analysis using a measure of opportunity costs that is calculated as a per capita measure, rather than as a percentage of GDP. The results are identical regardless of the measure used. Alternate per capita specification is available from the author upon request.

  45. 45.

    To reiterate, this variable takes a value of 1 under two conditions: if a country-year is coded as undergoing an irregular leadership transition by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza or if a leader is replaced by a leader of a different party or faced a threat of violence before departing, according to Licht. All other observations are coded as 0.

  46. 46.

    Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 A New Dataset.”

  47. 47.

    Marshall and Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002.”

  48. 48.

    All results are robust to using winning coalition size, as well (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. “The logic of political survival.” The logic of political survival [2003]). I present the results using Polity because the measure is more widely-used and because the temporal coverage is greater.

  49. 49.

    Gleditsch, “Expanded Trade and GDP Data.”

  50. 50.

    Michael L. Ross, “Oil and Gas Data, 1932–2011.” Harvard Dataverse Network (2013).

  51. 51.

    Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 2007.

  52. 52.

    Richard A. Nielsen et al., “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 55.2 (2011), pp. 219–232.

  53. 53.

    The results are robust to including the same measures using observed bilateral US aid. They are also unchanged if the measures of World Bank aid distribution are omitted, as missingness on this variable causes a number of observations to be dropped. Results available from author upon request.

  54. 54.

    Mark R. Thompson, “The Anti-marcos Struggle.” Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines, New Haven and London (1995), p. 47.

  55. 55.

    Thompson, “The Anti-Marcos Struggle,” p. 148.

  56. 56.

    Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 47–48.

  57. 57.

    Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz, United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (Westview Press, 1994), pp. 30–31.

References

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  • Balch-Lindsay, Dylan. Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce. “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process.” Journal of Peace Research 45.3 (2008), pp. 345–363.

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  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. “The Logic of Political Survival.” The Logic of Political Survival, 2003.

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  • Checkel, Jeffrey T. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework.” International Organization 59.4 (2005), pp. 801–826.

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  • Corstange, Daniel, and Nikolay Marinov. “Taking Sides in Other People’s Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention.” American Journal of Political Science 56.3 (2012), pp. 655–670.

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  • Dimitrova, Antoaneta, and Geoffrey Pridham. “International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and Its Limits.” Democratization 11.5 (2004), pp. 91–112.

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  • Escribà-Folch, Abel. “Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure Spending, Repression, and Sanctions.” Comparative Political Studies 45.6 (2012), pp. 683–713.

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  • Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Michael D. Ward. “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization.” International Organization 60.4 (2006), pp. 911–933.

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  • Gleditsch, Nils Petter et al. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 2007.

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  • Goemans, Henk E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders.” Journal of Peace Research 46.2 (2009), pp. 269–283.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenhill, Brian. “The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 54.1 (2010), pp. 127–145.

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  • Hyde, Susan D. “Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion.” American Journal of Political Science 55.2 (2011), pp. 356–369.

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  • Hyde, Susan D. “The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” World Politics 60.1 (2007), pp. 37–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric Werker. “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations.” Journal of Political Economy 114.5 (2006), pp. 905–930.

    Google Scholar 

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    Google Scholar 

  • Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” World Politics 27.2 (1975), pp. 175–200.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marinov, Nikolay. “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49.3 (2005), pp. 564–576.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marinov, Nikolay and Hein Goemans. “Coups and Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 44 (04 Oct. 2014), pp. 799–825. ISSN: 1469–2112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002” (2002).

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  • Mattes, Michaela, Brett Ashley Leeds, and Royce Carroll. “Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations.” International Studies Quarterly (2014).

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  • Meernik, James. “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy.” Journal of Peace Research 33.4 (1996), pp. 391–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrison, Kevin M. “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability.” International Organization (2009), pp. 107–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nielsen, Richard A. et al. “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 55.2 (2011), pp. 219–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Owen IV, John M. The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010. Princeton University Press, 2010.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pevehouse, Jon C. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization.” International Organization 56.3 (2002), pp. 515–549.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pickering, Jeffrey, and Mark Peceny. “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint.” International Studies Quarterly 50.3 (2006), pp. 539–560.

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne. “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 A New Dataset”. Journal of Peace Research 48.2 (2011), pp. 249–259.

    Google Scholar 

  • Regan, Patrick M. “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40.2 (1996), pp. 336–359.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Michael L. “Oil and Gas Data, 1932–2011.” Harvard Dataverse Network (2013).

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudra, Nita. “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World.” American Journal of Political Science 49.4 (2005), pp. 704–730.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schulz, Donald E. and Deborah Sundloff Schulz. United States: Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America. Westview Press, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sebestyen, Victor. Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire. Hachette UK, 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sechser, Todd S. “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.” International Organization 64.4 (2010), pp. 627–660.

    Google Scholar 

  • Signorino, Curtis S. and Jeffrey M. Ritter. “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions.” International Studies Quarterly 43.1 (1999), pp. 115–144.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sullivan, Patricia L. “War Aims and War Outcomes Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.3 (2007), pp. 496–524.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, Mark R. “The Anti-marcos Struggle.” Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines, New Haven and London (1995).

    Google Scholar 

  • Werner, Suzanne. “Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement.” American Journal of Political Science (2000), pp. 720–732.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolford, Scott. “Incumbents, Successors, and Crisis Bargaining Leadership Turnover as a Commitment Problem.” Journal of Peace Research 49.4 (2012), pp. 517–530.

    Google Scholar 

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    Daniel McCormack

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McCormack, D. (2019). Extending Hierarchy. In: Great Powers and International Hierarchy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93976-6_6

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