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Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information

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Social Design

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

Abstract

The origins of the theory of mechanism design can be traced back to the debate on the relative merits of centralized planning and free markets.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Although published in 1999, drafts of the paper have been in circulation since 1978.

  2. 2.

    See, for instance, Bull and Watson (2007), Kartik and Tercieux (2012) on implementation with evidence, Dutta and Sen (2012), Matsushima (2008a,b), Ortner (2015), Saporiti (2014) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011), for the case when some individuals have a “small” preference for honesty, and Lee and Sabourian (2011), Mezzetti and Renou (2017) for repeated Nash implementation.

  3. 3.

    Note that in the one-stage implementation problem, utility can be ordinal.

  4. 4.

    The reader is referred to Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjostrom (2002) for very comprehensive surveys of the literature.

  5. 5.

    Matsushima (2008a,b), Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011), Ortner (2015) also assume that some individuals have a “small” preference for honesty.

  6. 6.

    Kartik and Tercieux (2012) also prove essentially the same result in a cardinal framework.

  7. 7.

    A mechanism is bounded if any weakly dominated strategy is weakly dominated by a strategy which is itself undominated. Jackson et al. (1994) characterize the class of social choice correspondences that are implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms.

  8. 8.

    Their result goes through even if there is just one partially honest individual. But, then the construction of the mechanism would depend upon the identity of this individual and so the result will not be detail-free.

  9. 9.

    See, for instance, Manzini and Mariotti (2007).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ashoka University, Sonipat, India

    Bhaskar Dutta

  2. University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

    Bhaskar Dutta

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  1. Bhaskar Dutta
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Correspondence to Bhaskar Dutta .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany

    Walter Trockel

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Dutta, B. (2019). Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information. In: Trockel, W. (eds) Social Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_15

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