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Evolutionary Neurology and the Human Soul

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From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience

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Abstract

A nervous system configured by intersubjectivity and a grasp of the distinction between truth and falsity shape our neural function so that we sense, perceive, cognise, and act in ways that elaborate sensori-motor activity to fit us for cognitive function under norms of truth and falsity conveyed by and linked to speech or “propositionising.” The resulting self-formation fits us for a world in which meaningful symbolism and normatively constrained communication imposes truth and falsity and depth as the basis of a well-organised intellect. Thus our sensori-motor and language-related neural functions are fitted for the joint demands of the natural world and the socio-political (or discursive) world through triply responsive neurocognitive assemblies shaped in human cognitive development and underpinning human consciousness, thought, and action.

“Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”

“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”

“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”

“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hurley (2008).

  2. 2.

    These two phenomena are the principle that “neurons that fire together wire together” (Spitzer, 1999, pp. 40–42) and the idea that a connection followed by a reinforcement will persist (Dennett, 1978, p. 71ff), respectively.

  3. 3.

    Hannah Arendt’s complaint against Eichmann “nicht denken” was that he had done what he had done without properly taking note of what he was dealing with—the lives of Jewish men, women, and children.

  4. 4.

    These are not the same, but the theory that Van Fraasen enunciates in Scientific Representation has a great deal in common with post-structuralism and the layers of interconnected meanings there.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dunedin School of Medicine, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

    Grant Gillett

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Gillett, G. (2018). Evolutionary Neurology and the Human Soul. In: From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93635-2_3

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