Abstract
The EU has discovered the necessity of having a foreign policy of its own in the aftermath of the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Territorial conflicts and ethnic cleansing, weak and unfinished States urgently required answers, raising, at the same time, difficult questions of political and economic stability and of constitutional values. After the Eastern Enlargement of 2004, the EU’s enlargement policy has been considered as a successful tool capable of adding transformative power to the EU Foreign Policy through the enlargement perspective and the conditionality of reforms. However, although its instruments have been adapted in order to meet the specific challenges of the Western Balkans, stabilization and sustainable transformation of the States in the area still have to be reached. There are even signs of pre-accession fatigue, on both sides: the status quo seems to be the preferred solution of elites in the Balkans while the EU seems to have lost its interest in the area and, consequently, its transformative power. This contribution will explore the reasons and examine recent initiatives, such as the Berlin process, asking what may be done in order to regain momentum.
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Notes
- 1.
This term generally refers to the successor States of SFRY, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, plus Albania. Therefore, it excludes Bulgaria and Romania situated in the Eastern parts of the Balkan peninsula and comprises the former Yugoslav Republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, the former Autonomous Province of Kosovo as well as Albania.
- 2.
Kosovo is still referred to as an “asterisk-country”: in most international documents, an asterisk and a footnote with reference to U.N. resolution 1244/1999 reminds the reader of the fact that its independence has not been generally recognized. Among those who still do not recognize Kosovo, there are also five EU Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain); despite the fact that for years the EU operated a huge Rule-of-Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX, see website: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu) and although it entered into a Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the EU in 2016.
- 3.
For an updated overview, see the EU Commission, Progress Reports and NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2017.
- 4.
Only Serbia and Montenegro have opened accession negotiations; Albania and Macedonia are hoping to do so in 2018, if Macedonia can resolve its name dispute with Greece. Bosnia is hoping to gain EU “candidate” status, while Kosovo is still a “potential candidate”, but is considering formally asking for candidate status.
- 5.
EU Commission, DG European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (website: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/about/directorate-general_en).
- 6.
Considering the time in the waiting room, the transition of the Western Balkans seems to be an endless process, even compared to the Eastern enlargement 2004. It is true that also for Central and Eastern European Countries, nearly 15 years had passed from their independence until accession; Croatia, the last State to enter the Union in 2013, already needed 5 more years, i.e. a full decade from its application for membership to accession.
- 7.
This is impressively illustrated by the current difficulties in the Brexit negotiations and the EU Withdrawal Act.
- 8.
Expressly and prominently provided for in the Constitutional Treaty (article I-6), supremacy of EU Law is currently relegated to a Declaration annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007: 17. Declaration concerning primacy, Official Journal 115, 09/05/2008 P. 0344. However, as part of the general principles of EU law, supremacy continues to be part of primary law.
- 9.
Further examples are the (new) role of national Parliaments (art. 12 TEU and First Protocol) and the preliminary subsidiarity control procedure (articles 5.3. and 12 b TEU and Second Protocol).
- 10.
This fuzzy picture of—real or presumed—convergence is illustrated by the concept of “equivalence” the German Federal Constitutional Court has applied since its Solange II-judgment, 1986 (accepting Human Rights protection through the ECJ’s case-law as “equivalent” to its own protection).
- 11.
Most notably the “political” Copenhagen criteria of 1993: Democracy, Human Rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and the Rule of Law; since 2009 anchored as fundamental values of the EU in art. 2 TEU.
- 12.
At international level, this spirit is famously expressed in the 1990 CSCE “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, which promises a “New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity” and solemnly declares: “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations”. (emphasis added). At domestic level, new Constitutions mark the formal ratification of the start of democratic and constitutional transition.
- 13.
With the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009), they have become part of positive Treaty Law (art. 2 TEU).
- 14.
For the negotiation with Croatia, the acquis has been split into 35 chapters; more than 100,000 pages had to be translated. In 2010, Croatia delivered the Croatian language version (now considered an official EU version) to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 15.
This has been formalized with re-structuring the instruments of technical and financial assistance in the “IPA” framework (“Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance”). For the period 2007–2013, IPA had a budget of some 11.5 billion euros; its successor, IPA II, will build on the results already achieved with 11.7 billion euros for the period 2014–2020; see for an overview (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en).
- 16.
“Local ownership (…) provides the crucial link in the search for both effectiveness, legitimacy, and sustainability in international peacebuilding initiatives”. However, the “concept of local ownership is heavily contested” in all its elements (Ejdus and Juncos 2018, p. 13; see also Donais 2012; Chandler 2011).
- 17.
Chapter VIII (articles 143–146) introduced specific provisions on membership of the European Union in the Croatian Constitution. (Narodne Novine 76/2010 of 16 June 2010).
- 18.
The exceptional and transitional character of extraordinary measures, such as the Bonn Powers, has been clarified not least by the Venice Commission (2005).
- 19.
However, elements from the (common) past are often either seen as compromised or simply not known by foreigners and consultants.
- 20.
Serious concerns over democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Hungary have been expressed by European institutions after the adoption of a series of laws implementing Hungary’s new Constitution, in force since January 2012. Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s party had won a two-thirds majority in a parliamentary election in 2010 and immediately after rewrote the country’s Constitution attracting widespread criticism for threatening the essentials of democracy. After ordering a change to the country’s media law in 2011, the EU Commission in January 2012 began infringement procedures on laws concerning the retirement ages of judges, independence of the central bank and the independence of the data protection agency. On 18 July 2012, the EU Commission issued a report in which it questioned whether the Romanian government has the “understanding of the meaning of the rule of law in a pluralist democratic system”. The report contained an 11-point-long to do list, including the independence of the judiciary.
- 21.
For its impact as well as the requirement of unanimous decision in the Council, art. 7 TEU is known as the “nuclear option”. Currently, the difficulties are illustrated by the EU’s complex response to the judiciary reforms in Poland: a special Rule of Law Framework established by the Commission in January 2016 led to the adoption of a Rule of Law Recommendation (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2161_en.htm) on 26 July 2017 and to the Commission’s decision to trigger the procedure under article 7 TEU on 20 December 2017. In parallel, the Commission activated an infringement procedure against Poland, with a letter of formal notice.
- 22.
As announced by the EU Commission in July 2012, in the event of Bosnia not amending its Constitution in order to comply with the ECtHR judgment in the Sejdic-Finci-case.
- 23.
However, a similar logic and rhetoric also dominates the populist and eurosceptic parties in Western Europe.
- 24.
Some refer to the Balkan States as “formal democracies” and part of the category of “hybrid regimes” according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2016. Another indicator is the low turnout at elections ranging from 41% in Kosovo to 54% in Serbia and BiH; an exception is Montenegro with 73%.
- 25.
While not replacing accession negotiations (which still have to begin), the High Level Accession Dialogue (HLAD), introduced in March 2012, shall ensure “a structured, high level discussion on main reform challenges and opportunities”; see EU Commission Conclusions (http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/20120315_conclusions.pdf).—In June 2012, a High Level Dialogue on the Accession Process has also been launched with Bosnia and Herzegovina for explaining the requirements and the methodology of accession negotiations and what is expected from BiH in the accession process; see Joint Conclusions (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/503&type=HTML).
- 26.
Apart from the judicial prosecution in war crime-trials—by the ICTY and more recently also by local judges.
- 27.
Such as the ICJ judgments on Srebrenica, Kosovo and the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia or in the case of the constitutional system of Bosnia by the Constitutional Court (“Constituent Peoples” in 2000) and by the ECtHR (Sejdic-Finci case in 2009).
- 28.
Signed by Ministers of Western Balkan countries in Salzburg, 28 and 29 April 2010, the Sarajevo Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Internal Security can be considered a step in the right direction.
- 29.
The narrative about the EU as a peace project is about integration through cooperation and reconciliation.
- 30.
According to many sources, Russian activity in Serbia has considerably increased in recent years, in particular by influencing the media in the Balkans with anti-EU propaganda and by stoking Serb nationalism with arms deals.
- 31.
The Western Balkans Civil Society Forum took place in Trieste on 11–12 July 2017, preceding the fourth edition of the Western Balkans Summit (14 July) in the city.
- 32.
Due to a lack of agreement between its Entities, Bosnia—Herzegovina was unable to sign the Treaty; the funds allocated for projects with its participation have been suspended.
- 33.
It will be interesting to assess the UK’s Western Balkan strategy, once it has left the EU; see House of Lords (2018).
- 34.
Revising its scheme based upon annual reporting, the Commission will publish its regular progress reports on the Western Balkan countries just before this summit, in April 2018; the last reports are from November 2016.
- 35.
In its strategy paper “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans” (6 February 2018), the European Commission lists all critical elements of the current situation, such as state capture, organized crime, corruption, border disputes, etc., but it also offers greater EU support through “six new flagship initiatives”: rule of law; socio-economic development; digital agenda; security and migration; transport and energy connectivity; reconciliation and good neighbourly relations. Thus, in 2018, total EU investment in the Western Balkans is foreseen at 1.07 billion euros. Some days after the presentation of the strategy, however, EU foreign ministers disagreed over the integration of the Western Balkans with some saying that it was “not realistic”. The European Council is expected to formally endorse the strategy at the special EU-Western Balkans Summit in Sofia, on 18 May 2018. For a first assessment, see Bildt (2018).
- 36.
“The Western Balkans partners now have a historic window of opportunity. For the first time, their accession perspective has a best-case timeframe”, the Commission is to say in the strategy paper (Rettman 2018).
- 37.
Croatia and Slovenia, which are already EU members, cannot agree on their maritime border. Croatia also has open border talks with Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia. Kosovo had agreed on its border with Montenegro, but Pristina is now refusing to honour the accord.
- 38.
After talks in January 2018, Prime Ministers say they are close to reaching a UN-mediated compromise on the Macedonia-Greece name dispute, which may be resolved by June 2018.
- 39.
However, as of January 2018, the situation in Kosovo seems to be deteriorating again, as Kosovo’s new leader, Ramush Haradinaj, has vowed to block an EU tribunal in The Hague on Kosovo guerrilla war crime allegations and Oliver Ivanov, a leader of Kosovo Serbs, has been shot dead in Kosovska Mitrovica.
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Woelk, J. (2019). From Enlargement Perspective to “Waiting for Godot”? Has the EU Lost Its Transformative Power in the Balkans?. In: Antoniolli, L., Bonatti, L., Ruzza, C. (eds) Highs and Lows of European Integration. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93626-0_3
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