Abstract
This chapter explores the significance of the principle of constitutionalism to accountability in relation to the functional independence of each of the branches of the government. In this regard, we reviewed selected cases of the Constitutional Court: United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly, Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others, and Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others. We used these judgments to affirm the argument herein. We argue that constitutionalism is an amalgam of the principle of judicial review and a basic tool for enforcing accountability. It further raises the question of whether constitutionalism is at a crossroad in South Africa, because of what seems to be a lack of moral and ethical leadership in the regulation of state authority within the required standards and norms (Shaikh and Zungu 2017). There were reports that the President called on people take the money to bribe them, and used it to pay for their children’s school fees and then voted correctly. He said this to the loud cheers from the group. This report indicated a grave compromise of moral authority and ethical leadership that, in fact, should steer the exercise of state authority in a way that conforms to the principle of constitutionalism.
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- 1.
2017 (8) BCLR 1061 (CC) (hereinafter ‘UDM’).
- 2.
2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) (hereinafter ‘Black Sash’).
- 3.
2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC) (hereinafter ‘Nkandla’).
- 4.
1995 (6) BCLR 665.
- 5.
Makwanyane at para 266.
- 6.
Nkandla at para 22.
- 7.
1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC).
- 8.
Ibid, at para 108.
- 9.
Ibid, at para 110.
- 10.
UDM at para 4.
- 11.
Makwanyane at para 266.
- 12.
[2017] ZACC 17 (hereinafter E-tv).
- 13.
E-tv at para 94.
- 14.
Makwanyane at para 357.
- 15.
E-tv at para 6.
- 16.
[2017] 3 All SA 124 (GP).
- 17.
UDM at para 7.
- 18.
UDM at para 12.
- 19.
[2008] ZACC 8.
- 20.
Nyathi at para 80.
- 21.
Jordaan and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v New Ventures Consulting and Services (Pty) Limited and Others; Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Livanos and Others (CCT283/16, CCT 293/16, CCT294/16, CCT283) [2017] ZACC 31 (hereinafter Jordaan).
- 22.
Certification at para 44 and all footnotes omitted.
- 23.
Nkandla at para 20.
- 24.
See: AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd. v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency [2013] ZACC 42; 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC); 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (AllPay 1), and AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd. v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency [2014] ZACC 12; 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC); 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC) (AllPay 2).
- 25.
Black Sash at para 3.
- 26.
ibid.
- 27.
ibid., at para 6.
- 28.
ibid., at para 8.
- 29.
Black Sash at para 34.
- 30.
Ibid, at para 44.
- 31.
Ibid note 1 at para 58.
- 32.
Black Sash at paras 64–73.
- 33.
See section 1 of the Constitution.
- 34.
Black Sash at para 43.
- 35.
See section 27(1)(c)&(2) of the Constitution.
- 36.
Black Sash at para 7
- 37.
See Certification at paras 76–78.
- 38.
UDM at para 13.
- 39.
UDM at para 15.
- 40.
Tlouamma v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (1) SA 534 (WCC).
- 41.
UDM at paras 17–18.
- 42.
UDM at para 25.
- 43.
UDM at para 28.
- 44.
UDM at para 31.
- 45.
UDM at paras 32–34.
- 46.
The section provides that:
-
(1)
The Deputy President and Ministers are responsible for the powers and functions of the executive assigned to them by the President.
-
(2)
Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.
-
(3)
Members of the Cabinet must:
-
(a)
act in accordance with the Constitution; and
-
(b)
provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control.
-
(a)
-
(1)
- 47.
The section states that: ‘Deputy Ministers appointed in terms of subsection (1)(b) are accountable to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions’.
- 48.
UDM at para 36.
- 49.
See UDM at paras 49–57.
- 50.
The section provides that:
The National Assembly may:
-
(a)
determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures; and
-
(b)
make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement.
-
(a)
- 51.
UDM at para 59.
- 52.
UDM at para 68–69.
- 53.
UDM at para 43.
- 54.
UDM at para 31.
- 55.
Para 1.
- 56.
Paras 2–3.
- 57.
See: Mogoeng CJ in Nkandla at para 22.
- 58.
Mazibuko v Sisulu and Another 2013 (11) BCLR 1297 (CC).
- 59.
See section 165(4) of the Constitution.
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Mcineka, A., Ntlama, N. (2019). A Perspective on the Principle of ‘Constitutionalism’ in Relation to Executive and Legislative Accountability in South Africa. In: Fagbadebo, O., Ruffin, F. (eds) Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa. Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93509-6_3
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