Abstract
This chapter maps the trajectory of German foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War and reunification and how these have impacted on its approach to EU-level co-operation. It contends that the concept of Germany as a ‘normalised state’ offers a convincing explanation of developments in German foreign and security policy, particularly since the election of the SPD/Green Party Coalition in 1998. In doing so, it argues that today Germany enjoys a position of emergent leadership in foreign policy, mirroring its economic role, and that the ‘reflexive multilateralism’ that for so long characterised its foreign policy-making can no longer be assumed. Rather, Germany is showing greater willingness to behave—and be seen to behave—as a ‘normal’ power.
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Notes
- 1.
Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). Interviewee’s emphasis.
- 2.
Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO2).
- 3.
‘Ich habe nicht nur ‘Nie wieder Krieg’ gelernt, sondern auch ‘Nie wieder Auschwitz’ (2008: 187).
- 4.
KFOR—Kosovo Force, the NATO-led peace-keeping force dispatched to Kosovo in June 1999.
- 5.
Overhaus argues that the Iraq War served to highlight a deeper structural crisis within transatlantic relations, caused by an end to what he terms the ‘benign American hegemony’ which underpinned post-1945 multilateralism. This manifested itself principally in an unwillingness on the part of the Americans to allow their European partners a greater say over policy-making, which was itself a consequence of a repeated European inability to provide political and military leadership when the situation has required (2006). See also: Valasek, T. (ed.) (2012) All Alone? What US Retrenchment Means for Europe and NATO (London: Centre for European Reform).
- 6.
Fischer recalls an angry editorial in the New York Post christening him and then French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin ‘the axis of weasels’ (2012: 216).
- 7.
Following the September 2017 Bundestag elections, Mrs. Merkel led a caretaker administration until a new coalition agreement was signed between the CDU, CSU and SPD in March 2018.
- 8.
The ISAF mission ended in December 2014 and was succeeded by the Resolute Support mission from 1 January 2015. The Bundestag voted in December 2017 to extend German involvement in Resolute Support by an additional 3 months while talks in Berlin continued over the formation of a new government.
- 9.
These comments are similar to the view expressed by one senior British FCO official that after 25 years they are having ‘to learn how to do geo-politics again’. FCO Internal Seminar, January 2015.
- 10.
Merkel hosted the President and his wife to a ‘folksy summer barbeque’ at a village in her home state in the former East Germany, and Bush later described Merkel in his memoirs as ‘trustworthy, engaging, and warm’ and ‘one of my closest friends on the world stage’ (Crawford and Czuczka 2013: 104–5).
- 11.
Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO6). Paterson (2011) notes that she was supported in this by her appointment of Christoph Heusgen, the former Chief of Staff to the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, as her chief foreign policy advisor.
- 12.
Soros declared that ‘As the strongest creditor country, Germany is emerging as the hegemon’.
- 13.
Dempsey suggests that this lack of vision is not restricted to Europe, but also extends to Germany’s relationship with the US (2013: 9).
- 14.
Merkel’s willingness to be assertive in this regard led to accusations that Germany—and she in particular—applied ‘nasty pressure’ to other Member States, including Ireland and Hungary, in order to postpone debate on regulations intended to further reduce car emissions (EurActiv 2013). Germany was reported to have raised the prospect of risks to future bail-out funds for Ireland and the closure of car plants in Hungary unless they supported its wishes, leading one anonymous EU source to describe its behaviour as ‘rogue’ (ibid).
- 15.
In refusing to participate in any military action in Syria, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle made clear that German ‘participation has not been requested, nor are we considering it’ (Werkhäuser 2013). Germany was joined in this by the UK. However in the UK’s case it was because Prime Minister David Cameron, who had advocated British participation in a US-led intervention, was defeated by a vote in the House of Commons.
- 16.
In a statement to the Bundestag on 18 March 2011, Westerwelle stated: ‘During the last few days, we’ve talked over and weighed up the potential benefits and the risks of a military operation in Libya […] We respect and understand those partners in the [UNSC ], in the [EU] and in the Arab League […] However, in view of the considerable foreign policy and military risks involved, the German Government came to a different conclusion […] That’s why we were unable to agree on this part of the Resolution […] Our partners indicated […] that they understood and respected our decision. Germany’s international commitment is appreciated’ (Westerwelle 2011).
- 17.
Interview, Ministry of Defence, UK, London, 2012.
- 18.
Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2017
- 19.
Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2017.
- 20.
It should be noted that the impact of sanctions on the German economy has also been considerable. For example, in 2016 they were estimated to have cost the German pharmaceutical sector alone €2.1 billion with other sectors such as car manufacturers also significantly affected.
- 21.
Interview, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Brussels, 2016.
- 22.
Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2017.
- 23.
German title: ‘Review 2014—Außenpolitik Weiter Denken’.
- 24.
Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, February 2017.
- 25.
Following these attacks, France invoked the Treaty of the European Union’s mutual defence clause, Article 42.7, the first time this had happened. The clause states: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter’.
- 26.
Former German President Horst Köhler coined the term ‘freundliches Desinteresse’ (cordial indifference’ in 2007 to describe the German public’s attitude towards its armed forces and their service overseas (Fiebig 2013: 93).
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Wright, N. (2019). From Perennial Follower to ‘Reluctant’ Leader? Germany’s Relationship with the CFSP. In: The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK. New Perspectives in German Political Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_5
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