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Metaepistemology pp 197–216Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Correctness and Goodness

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the fact that truth is the correctness condition for belief and assertion does not entail that truth is a value—it does not entail that true beliefs and true assertions are good. The way I will put this point is by saying that correctness does not entail goodness. It follows from this that correctness is not a species or kind of goodness and that being correct is not a way of being good. I consider an objection to this, to the effect that correctness amounts to goodness qua representation, and discuss some the consequences of my thesis in the realm of reasons.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The idea that true beliefs and true assertions are good is a familiar one, but for contemporary articulations of the (per se) value of true belief, see Horwich 2006 and Lynch 2009.

  2. 2.

    The same, mutatis mutandis, when it comes to the appeal to intrinsic goodness.

  3. 3.

    You might object that this focus on goodness ignores the possibility that, although correctness doesn’t entail goodness, incorrectness entails badness. As William James observed, the goodness of truth and the badness of falsehood are distinct values, in principle capable of being given separate treatments. However, it seems to me that the case that incorrectness does not entail badness is just as strong as the case that correctness does not entail goodness. Just as there is nothing intuitively good about the belief and assertion of the first traveller, there is nothing intuitively bad about the belief and assertion of the second traveller.

  4. 4.

    Cf. the view (Hazlett 2013, chap. 1) that true belief is generally (normally, typically) better for the believer than false belief.

  5. 5.

    I set aside photographs here; their status as representations is controversial.

  6. 6.

    However, for an argument against this premise, see Thomson 2008, 111–12.

  7. 7.

    “Reasons” here, and in what follows, refers to reasons that are normative (as opposed to motivating), objective (i.e. they do not depend on your evidence or beliefs), and external (i.e. they do not depend on your pro-attitudes).

  8. 8.

    We could just as well put this point in terms of “normativity,” following Christine Korsgaard , who writes that “ethical standards are normative,” such that “when I say that something is good I am recommending it as worthy of your choice ” (1996, 8–9).

  9. 9.

    Note that, like GSR, this is neutral on order of explanation.

  10. 10.

    As on a “buck passing account of value”.

  11. 11.

    Thanks to Anne Baril for comments on a draft of this material.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Washington University at St Louis, St Louis, MO, USA

    Allan Hazlett

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  1. Allan Hazlett
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Correspondence to Allan Hazlett .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Christos Kyriacou

  2. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Robin McKenna

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Hazlett, A. (2018). Correctness and Goodness. In: Kyriacou, C., McKenna, R. (eds) Metaepistemology. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_9

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