Abstract
I discuss Michael Smith’s recent case against the idea that the concept of a normative reason is unanalysable. Smith argues that, as a matter of conceptual fact, some fact, p, can only be a reason to believe that q, given that p provides evidence for the truth of q, and that this is best explained by the concept of a reason for belief being analysable in evidential terms. Given, then, that the concept of a reason is not a “ragbag,” reasons primitivism fails quite generally. I propose that reasons primitivists can make sense of this evidential constraint on reasons for belief if they adopt a suitable expressivist account of reasons judgements. I conclude by briefly considering a metaphysical version of Smith’s argument.
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- 1.
This formulation is inspired by that offered in Kauppinen (2015).
- 2.
The one-star formulation of reasons primitivism allows for the possibility of giving a metaphysically reductive account of normative properties and facts in terms of natural properties and facts (see, e.g., Schroeder 2007). None of the formulations given above imply the claim that all other normative (or evaluative) concepts, properties and facts would be analysable in terms of reasons.
- 3.
Worries in the same spirit are aired in passing also in Kearns and Star (2009). For other recent criticisms of reasons primitivism or developments of alternatives to it, see Broome (2013, chap. 4); Finlay (2014, chap. 3); Howard (2019); McHugh and Way (2016); Thomson (2008, chaps. 8–9); Väyrynen (2011).
- 4.
For criticism, see Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming); for Heathwood’s response, see his chapter in this volume.
- 5.
For discussion, see Heathwood (2009) and Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming).
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- 7.
Perhaps there is yet another place to look. We could perhaps suggest that while the concept of a reason is to be taken as primitive, the evidential constraint is built into the concept of a belief in that it is true, as a matter of conceptual fact, that we ought to believe in accordance with our evidence, and thus only take something, p, to be a reason to believe something, q, if p is evidence, or makes it more likely, that q (on normativity of belief, see, e.g., McHugh and Whiting 2014).
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- 10.
- 11.
Nishi Shah’s (2003) criticism of Gibbard seems to be partly based on this point.
- 12.
This seems to be how Shah (2003) suggests Gibbard could respond to this particular worry.
- 13.
See also Kyriacou (2012).
- 14.
Just to mention one fairly big issue, expressivists would need to have something to offer in relation to Frege-Geach style worries. Perhaps they should go hybrid/relational (cf. Schroeder 2013; Toppinen 2013; Ridge 2014). Now, this is rough, and extremely preliminary, but perhaps to think that p is a reason to believe that q is, roughly, to (a) have inferential dispositions to raise one’s credences on certain sorts of grounds (or to have certain ways of forming beliefs), and (b) to believe that raising one’s credence in q on the grounds of believing that p would fit the bill (amount to forming a belief in this way). To believe that there’s no reason to believe that q could then be a matter of having these inferential dispositions (ways of forming beliefs) and of believing that such dispositions don’t manifest in raising one’s credence in q (that a belief that q cannot be formed in these ways). For more sophisticated expressivist treatments of judgements concerning epistemic justification or knowledge, see Chrisman (2007), Field (2009), Kappel (2010), Kyriacou (2012) and Ridge (2007). For discussion of how expressivists should understand reasons for action thought, see Ridge (2014, chap. 4) and Sinclair (2016).
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The talk of explaining meaning in terms of states of mind is not very precise. If expressivism is advanced as a metasemantic thesis (see, e.g., Chrisman 2016 and Ridge 2014), it is perhaps possible to have a unified account of reasons-talk and thought at some level despite the fact that the explanation for why this unified account works the way it does would be somewhat disunified.
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Toppinen, T. (2018). Reasons Primitivism and Epistemic Expressivism. In: Kyriacou, C., McKenna, R. (eds) Metaepistemology. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_11
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