Making Sense of Deflationism from a Formal Perspective: Conservativity and Relative Interpretability
The contemporary study of the notion of truth divides into two main traditions: a philosophical tradition concerned with the nature of truth and a logical one focused on formal solutions to truth-theoretic paradoxes. The logical results obtained in the latter are rich and profound but often hard to connect with philosophical debates. In this paper I propose some strategy to connect the mathematics and the metaphysics of truth. In particular, I focus on two main formal notions, conservativity and relative interpretability, and show how they can be taken to provide a natural way to read formally the simplicity of the property and the simplicity of the concept of truth respectively. In particular, I show that, this way, we obtain a philosophically interesting taxonomy of axiomatic truth theories.
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