Making Sense of Deflationism from a Formal Perspective: Conservativity and Relative Interpretability

  • Andrea StrolloEmail author
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science book series (BSPS, volume 334)


The contemporary study of the notion of truth divides into two main traditions: a philosophical tradition concerned with the nature of truth and a logical one focused on formal solutions to truth-theoretic paradoxes. The logical results obtained in the latter are rich and profound but often hard to connect with philosophical debates. In this paper I propose some strategy to connect the mathematics and the metaphysics of truth. In particular, I focus on two main formal notions, conservativity and relative interpretability, and show how they can be taken to provide a natural way to read formally the simplicity of the property and the simplicity of the concept of truth respectively. In particular, I show that, this way, we obtain a philosophically interesting taxonomy of axiomatic truth theories.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Nanjing UniversityNanjingChina

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