Church-Turing Thesis, in Practice
We aim at providing a philosophical analysis of the notion of “proof by Church’s Thesis”, which is – in a nutshell – the conceptual device that permits to rely on informal methods when working in Computability Theory. This notion allows, in most cases, to not specify the background model of computation in which a given algorithm – or a construction – is framed. In pursuing such analysis, we carefully reconstruct the development of this notion (from Post to Rogers, to the present days), and we focus on some classical constructions of the field, such as the construction of a simple set. Then, we make use of this focus in order to support the following encompassing claim (which opposes to a somehow commonly received view): the informal side of Computability, consisting of the large class of methods typically employed in the proofs of the field, is not fully reducible to its formal counterpart.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared as a chapter of my PhD thesis. I would like to thank my supervisors, Gabriele Lolli and Andrea Sorbi, for their guidance and support. I have presented this work at several conferences. In particular, I am grateful to the participants of APMP 2014, in Paris, and of FilMat 2016, in Chieti, for their comments. Finally, Richard Epstein’s remarks were fundamental in rethinking the organization of the present material.
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