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Some Remarks on True Undecidable Sentences

  • Enrico MoriconiEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science book series (BSPS, volume 334)

Abstract

In this paper I try to discuss the question of the truth-value of Gödel-type undecidable sentences in a framework which keeps into due account the idea that mathematical inquiry develops in a three-level framework: informal (or pre-formal) mathematics, (informal) theories, and formal theories. Moreover, it is to be stressed that no phase deletes the other ones; all of them, so to speak, live together.

Keywords

Truth Proof Gödel’s incompleteness theorems Undecidable sentences 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del SaperePisaItalia

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