Skip to main content

Stationary Nash Equilibria for Average Stochastic Positional Games

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Frontiers of Dynamic Games

Part of the book series: Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications ((SDGTFA))

Abstract

An average stochastic positional game is a stochastic game with average payoffs in which the set of states is divided into several disjoint subsets such that each subset represents the position set for one of the player and each player controls the Markov process only in his position set. In such a game each player chooses actions in his position set in order to maximize his average reward per transition. We show that an arbitrary average stochastic positional game possesses a stationary Nash equilibrium. Based on this result we propose an approach for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Boyd, S., Vandenberghe, L.: Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  2. Dasgupta, P., Maskin, E.: The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53, 1–26 (1986)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Ehrenfeucht, A., Mycielski, J.: Positional strategies for mean payoff games. Int. J. Game Theory 8, 109–113 (1979)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Fan, K.: Application of a theorem concerned sets with convex sections. Math. Ann. 1963, 189–203 (1966)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Flesch, J., Thuijsman, F., Vrieze, K.: Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games. Int. J. Game Theory 26, 303–314 (1997)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Gurvich, V., Karzaniv, A., Khachyan, L.: Cyclic games and an algorithm to find minimax mean cycles in directed graphs. USSR Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 28, 85–91 (1988)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Lozovanu, D., Pickl, S.: Nash equilibria conditions for cyclic games with p players. Electron. Notes Discrete Math. 25, 117–124 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  8. Lozovanu, D., Pickl, S.: Nash equilibria conditions for stochastic positional games. Contribution Game Theory Manag. 8, 201–213 (2014)

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Lozovanu, D., Pickl, S.: Determining the optimal strategies for zero-sum average stochastic positional games. Electron. Notes Discrete Math. 55, 155–159 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Nash, J.: Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math. 54, 286–293 (1953)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  11. Puterman, M.: Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Dynamic Programming. Wiley, Hoboken (2005)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Rogers, P.: Nonzero-sum stochastic games. PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, Report ORC 69-8 (1966)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Shapley, L.: Stochastic games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 39, 1095–1100 (1953)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  14. Vieille, N.: Equilibrium in 2-person stochastic games I, II. Isr. J. Math. 119(1), 55–126 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to the referee for interesting suggestions and remarks contributing to improve the presentation of the paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Dmitrii Lozovanu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Lozovanu, D. (2018). Stationary Nash Equilibria for Average Stochastic Positional Games. In: Petrosyan, L., Mazalov, V., Zenkevich, N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics