Abstract
Even in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, the two governments were able to craft a political-military agreement that would be the basis of their alliance. Marshall noted that he had relieved and transferred officers who grew overly concerned about the Brazilians. He deplored that it was “increasingly apparent that the Brazilians are not seriously cooperating with us to secure that vital area, sea and land, against Axis aggression.” He told Brazilian Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro that in return for Brazil’s offered cooperation he would provide arms, but was certain that Góes understood that he had to meet the minimum requirements of our own forces as well as of other forces in actual combat with the Axis. Marshall replaced General Miller as military attaché in Rio with his close friend Claude M. Adams.
Minister of War Dutra did not believe that the Americans could get Brazilian forces ready for a combat role. The sinking of the Baependy (on August 15, 1942) carrying the officers and men of an artillery unit heightened the desire for an armed response. The chapter follows the story of the German U-boat 507 as its, seemingly unauthorized, attacks took Brazil into the war. Even before Brazil officially declared war, its air force was hunting and sinking Axis submarines. When the supply route to Russia via the Arctic closed, the only available route was via the South Atlantic, around Africa to Iran and overland to the Soviet Union. Tens of thousands of disassembled aircraft made that journey. Brazil was literally the keystone in the edifice of the logistical war. In 1942 the war could be won or lost in the South Atlantic.
Vargas was still not well and initially was uncertain how to respond to the sinkings. The Brazilian navy in the northeast functioned under the command of the American admiral. Opinion in the military moved toward an active role in the war abroad which eventually led to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. They talked about a two-corps force, which would prove beyond their capability. Vargas would soon be preparing for a “secret” Conference at Natal with Roosevelt who would be flying back from the Casablanca Conference. Foreign Minister Aranha laid out Brazil’s wartime goals in a memo for the president. Roosevelt told Vargas that he wanted him at his side at the peace table. Aranha strongly favored an expeditionary force, because it would convince the Americans that Brazil was committed to an alliance “materially, morally, and militarily.” The alliance was his strategy for gaining United States assistance in Brazilian industrialization, which he saw as “the first defense against external and internal danger.” The force would be the start of a wider collaboration, involving Brazil’s total military reorganization. The force was a Brazilian idea, not an American policy to draw Brazil into the fighting.
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Notes
- 1.
Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 318–319; and two unpublished manuscripts “History of US Army Forces South Atlantic,” 34–36, and “History of South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command,” Part I, III, pp. 137–140. These two manuscripts were written by staff historians at the bases in Brazil. There are copies in the US Army, Center for Military History, Washington. The military alliance would endure until 1977.
- 2.
Memo, Marshall to Welles, Washington, May 10, 1942 “Situation in Northeastern Brazil” in Larry I. Bland, Editor, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 3, pp. 193–195; also appears in Foreign Relations, 1942, Vol. 5, pp. 659–661.
- 3.
Marshall to Góes Monteiro, Washington, May 12, 1942 in Larry I. Bland, Editor, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 3, p. 196.
- 4.
On the nickname, see Larry L. Bland, Ed, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 2, “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 502–503. http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-lieutenant-colonel-claude-m-adams/ Adams had a heart attack while completing the command course at Ft. Leavenworth. Marshall’s correspondence with him shows a close friendship. Adams was from Tennessee and had served in the National Guard in World War I and obtained a commission in the Regular Army in 1920. Marshall had requested his transfer from an ROTC assignment at the University of Florida to Vancouver Barracks to be his executive officer. Larry L. Bland, Ed. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 1, “The Soldierly Spirit” December 1880–June 1939 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 551, note 2. Also Marshall to Mrs. Claude M. Adams, August 24, 1939, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #2-036 [2: 39–40.) and Marshall to Claude M. Adams, December 28, 1939, #2-093. http://marshallfoundation.org/library/to-major-claude-m-adams-2/.
- 5.
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939 (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 311–312. As commander Marshall oversaw the area’s CCC activities.
- 6.
McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, p. 281. For Müller’s biography see “Filinto Müller” in Israel Beloch and Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds. Dicionário Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, 1930–1983. Vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984.), pp. 2342–2346. He retired from the army as a Lt. Colonel in 1947. Later he was elected to the Brazilian senate.
- 7.
Nelson Werneck Sodré, Memórias de um Soldado (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1967), p. 207. He labeled the two generals Nazista. By the time he wrote he was disenchanted with American Cold War policies and likely let his criticism of the United States affect his historical judgment.
- 8.
Stanley Hilton, Oswaldo Aranha, uma biografia (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva, 1994), p. 398; McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, p. 278; USN, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, pp. 89–90.
- 9.
Durval Lourenço Pereira, Operação Brasil: O Ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), pp. 133–134. For analysis of Brazilian economic history see Warren Dean, “The Brazilian Economy, 1870–1930” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. 5, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 685–724; and the classic Werner Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development, 5th edition (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press/Praeger, 2001).
- 10.
General Vernon Walters, The Mighty and the Meek: Dispatches from the Front Line of Diplomacy (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 2001), p. 172.
- 11.
In 1936 it was a seven-day trip from New York to Rio on Pan American Airways’ seaplanes. This whole section is based on Durval Lourenço Pereira, Operação Brasil: O Ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), pp. 111–149.
- 12.
Two-thirds of Brazil’s salt came from Rio Grande do Norte and was shipped by sea to other regions. See ibid, p. 136.
- 13.
Ibid, p. 138.
- 14.
Colonel Durval is retired from the Brazilian army and has had interest in World War II since his cadet days. His account will likely be definitive. Durval Lourenço Pereira, Operação Brasil, pp. 183–191. The American historians were Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 323–324. They had a “pack of ten submarines” attacking coastal shipping. Previously I had assumed that they were correct about ten submarines. Stanley Hilton, Oswaldo Aranha, uma biografia, p. 398, said there were eight subs.
- 15.
Elísio Gomes Filho, “u-507: um estudo interpretativo das ações de um sumbarino alemão nas águas do Brasil,” Revista Navigator:subsidios spara a história maritima do Brasil Rio de Janeiro, V. 2—No. 3 (Junho de 2006), pp. 56–71.
- 16.
Jürgen Rower, “Operações navais da Alemanha no literal do Brasil durante A Segunda Guerra Mundial,” Revista Navigator:subsidios spara a história maritima do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, n. 18 (Jan/Dez. 1982), p. 15.
- 17.
See Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 192–193 for a detailed description of the German Navy’s Quadrant map system.
- 18.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 194–197.
- 19.
Ibid, p. 199.
- 20.
Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943 Vol. 1 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 381. The tanks later contributed to the British victory at El Alamein. Convoy AS-4 stopped off at Recife for 40 hours. The Germans knew it was there, but no submarines reached an attack position.
- 21.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 200–202. Durval used the Submarine Command’s operations diary to study the radio messages.
- 22.
Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943, p. 378. The Ingram statement was from September 1941. He went on to say that as a port, Salvador da Bahia was far superior to Recife in every way except for location. It was 400 miles further south from the United States.
- 23.
For the atmosphere and occurrences in Bahia during this time, see Consuelo Novais Sampaio, “A Bahia na Segunda Guerra Mundial,” Olho da História: Revista da Teoria, Cultura, Cinema e Sociedades, UFBA. http://www.ufba.br/search/node/Bahia%20na%20Segunda%20Guerra%20Mundial.
- 24.
The data on numbers of sinkings by so few captains is from Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 210. U-boat net listed Schacht as a “top U-boat Ace.” Site lists U-507 movements. In four patrols the vessels it had sunk were seven American, one Norwegian, one Swedish, two Ho, three British, and six Brazilian. http://uboat.net/men/schacht.htm.
- 25.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 208–213.
- 26.
Ibid, p. 217. The question of responsibility is mixed up in orders and counterorders. The effect of the sinkings on the coastal population was deep and striking. The rumor that the submarine was American apparently had one root in Northeast Brazil. See Luiz Antônio Pinto Cruz and Lina Maria Brandão de Aras, “Submarinos alemães ou nort-americanos nos malafogados de Sergipe (1942–1945)?” Navigator 17, pp. 69–81; and by same authors “A guerra submarina na costa sergipana” Revista Navigator 15, pp. http://www.revistanavigator.com.br/navig15/art/N15_art1.pdf.
- 27.
In February and March, the following were sunk in the Atlantic off the United States: Cabedelo, Buarque, Olinda, Aratutã, and Caíru. From May to July, they were followed by seven more in the Caribbean: Parnaíba, Gonçalves Dias, Alegrete, Pedrinhas, Tamandaré, Piave, and Barbacena. Many of these were attacked near the islands of Trinidad, Tobago, and Barbados. Each incident was carefully reported on by Brazilian diplomats, who also interviewed survivors. The reports and interviews are in Ministério das Relações Exteriores, O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, Vol. II (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944), pp. 61–148. For overall context, see Victor Tempone, “A Batalha do Atlântico e o Brasil na II Guerra Mundial,” http://www.revistanavigator.com.br/navig18/art/N18_art3.pdf.
- 28.
The SS Seatrain Texas left New York on July 29, without escort or convoy for the 18-day voyage to Cape Town. It had air cover for a few days. Orders for the risky solo voyage came from FDR himself. At that point the beleaguered British had only 70 tanks to face Rommel’s Panzers. See “American Merchant Marine at War” www. usmm.org. 1998–2001. http://www.usmm.org/images/seatrainroute.gif. See also Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 269–273.
- 29.
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 1423.
- 30.
Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 158. “Dois disparos para prevenir qualquer possibilidade de transmissão de rádio pelo vapor.”
- 31.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 152–161. Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two: German, Italian and Japanese Submarine Successes, 1939–1945 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), p. 116. This is the definitive listing of all sinkings. For various details of the Baependy sinking, see Elísio Gomes Filho, “u-507: um estudo interpretativo das ações de um sumbarino alemão nas águas do Brasil,” Navigator, Rio de Janeiro, V. 2 – No. 3, (Junho de 2006), p. 61.
- 32.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 162–163.
- 33.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 165–166.
- 34.
Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 167.
- 35.
Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 168.
- 36.
Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 169.
- 37.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 170–171.
- 38.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 173–176. For photos of U-Boats see http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/ra/mega/Pub/GP/p3/2012/08/25/VidaCidadania/Imagens/submarino_alemao_240812.jpg.
- 39.
For a close-up of what happened in Fortaleza and elsewhere, see José Henrique de Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), pp. 129–136.
- 40.
John F. Simmons, Counselor of Embassy and Consul General, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3121, (forwards cable from Fortaleza); 832.00/4242, Simmons, Rio, August 18, 1942, Telegram 3091 (forwards cable from Vitória), 832.00/4238; Walker, Pará, August 18, 1942, 832.00/4244; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942 m, Telegram 3118 (forwards cable from Manaos),832.00/4245; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3126 (forwards cable from Porto Alegre) 832.00/4247; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3124 (forwards cable from Natal), 832.00/4248; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3127 (forwards cable from São Paulo), 832.00/4249 all RG 59, NARA.
- 41.
Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 295–299. The captured British captains on board U-507 and their ships were James Stewart (SS Oakbank), Donald MacCallum (SS Baron Dechmont), and Frank H. Fenn (SS Yorkwood). See also José Henrique de Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), p. 425.
- 42.
Caffery, Rio, August 28, 1942, Telegram 3296, 832.00/4268, RG 59, NARA.
- 43.
Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 502–504.
- 44.
Caffery, Rio, August 28, 1942, Telegram 3296, 832.00/4268, RG 59, NARA.
- 45.
Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3122, 832.00/4346, RG 59, NARA. Aranha asked that Caffery, then in Washington, be informed that “Brazil will declare war on Germany tomorrow.” Simmons, Rio, August 21, 1942, Telegram 3182, 832.00/4254, RG59, NARA. See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, American Republics, V, pp. 666 ff.
- 46.
A.D. Struble, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Memo for State Department, August 25, 1942, 832.20/434, RG 59, NARA.
- 47.
Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), p. 507.
- 48.
Caffery, Rio, September 1, 1942, Airgram 203, 740.0011 European War 1939/24081, RG 59, NARA. The decree suspended Constitutional articles 122, 136,137, 138, 156, and 175. For a discussion of Estado de Guerra see Patricia Aparecida Ferreira & Rodrigo Borges de Barros, “O Papel das Forças Armadas na Defesa Nacional” (Universidade de Uberaba, MG, 2016), pp. 6–9. http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/cadn/artigos/xiii_cadn/o_papel_das_forças_armadas_na_defesa_nacional.pdf.
- 49.
Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), p. 509.
- 50.
Simmons, Rio September 4, 1942, #8367, 832.20/437 and Caffery, Rio, September 7, 1942, Airgram 249,832.20/440, RG59, NARA.
- 51.
The 7th Pack Artillery was on board with all its equipment. Among the passengers were the wives and children of the unit’s officers and soldiers. There is a report on the Seventh Group of the army’s pack artillery located outside Recife: Major Charles H. Dayhuff, Recife, July 21, 1943, 6010, G2 Regional Brazil, MMB, RG165, NARA. There is a survivor’s account of the terrifying event: http://www.brasilmergulho.com.br/port/naufragios/artigos/2005/019.shtml.
- 52.
Military Intelligence Division, War Dept. General Staff, MID 6300, 745,009, Aug. 26, 1942, G2 Regional, WFRC, RG165, NARA. An OSS report, Sept 18, 1942, #22875, RG226 (Office of Strategic Services), NA, said that though Dutra has signed it, the proclamation had been written by Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro. Dutra had reportedly opposed the recognition of the state of war. The text of his proclamation is in Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 504–505.
- 53.
“Area Controller, MID 350-05 9-11-42 (7-23-41)” Extract, September 11, 1942, 6300, G2 Files, Box 273, RG165, NARA.
- 54.
Randolph Harrison Jr. (2nd Secretary), Rio, October 4, 1940, 3697 “Anti-Nazi Demonstration at Brazilian Military Academy” 6300, G-2 Regional Brazil, Box 273, RG165, NARA. The German military attaché, General Gunther Niedenfuhr, had offered the films and was present at the showing. Hitler’s appearance caused “pandemonium” to break loose and caused the session to be ended. The school’s commander reprimanded the cadets and suspended leave for a week. The cadet who participated was Octavio Pereira da Costa, who said that the incident showed that “the great majority of the cadets positioned themselves in a irrefutable manner in favor of liberty and democracy.” História Oral do Exército na Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2001), Vol. 5, p. 23.
- 55.
Extract, Military Attaché Weekly Estimate of Stability, No. 4548, September 30, 1942, 6300, G2 Regional, Box 273, RG165, NARA. He gave the names of the officers and their positions. A study comparing such officers with their personnel files would be interesting. Oddly, he said that pro-German feelings were strong in the Coast Artillery, which had been advised by American officers since 1934.
- 56.
The comment about the Tenentes in the class of 1942 is from Captain Richard T. Cassidy (Asst. Mil. Attaché), Rio de Janeiro, October 22, 1942: “Brazilian Army Officers to Visit the U.S. [for training]” Report 6979, 6770, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. He indicated which ones were “tenentes”. For the so-called tenente movement, see McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 209–211, 260–277.
- 57.
The Atlantic Charter was a statement of post-war aims drawn up by FDR and Churchill at their shipboard meeting off of Newfoundland in August 1941 that asserted the right of all peoples to choose their form of government, freedom of the seas, freedom from want and fear, disarmament of aggressor nations, and renounced territorial aggrandizement.
- 58.
Integralism was a Fascist-like movement in Brazil in the 1930s. See Marcus Klein, Our Brazil Will Awake! The Acção Integralista Brasileira and the Failed Quest for Fascist Order in the 1930s (Amsterdam: Cuadernos del CEDLA, 2004). The classic study is Hélgio Trindade, Integralismo: o fascismo brasileiro na década de 30 (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1974).
- 59.
“Estillac Leal,” Beloch, Israel, & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds. Dicionário Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984), Vol. 2, 1753; Claude M. Adams, military attaché, Rio, Nov. 6, 1942, G2 Regional Brazil 5900, RG165, NARA. This report was important enough to be forwarded to Chief of Staff Marshall immediately; see W. Sexton, Memo for Chief of Staff, Nov. 6, 1942, OPD 336 Brazil (11-5-42) (Sec I), MMB, RG 165, NARA. For an idea of the general staff school’s program, see translation of a Brazilian army document, “Program of Instruction for the School Year 1943–1944,” General Staff, Directorate of Instruction, 6740, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. The censorship agency, DIP, also doubled as the government propaganda arm: see “Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda” Israel & Abreu, eds. Dicionário Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, Vol. 2, 1076–1079. Leal rose to be a prominent general commanding at Natal in 1943. In the second Vargas government in 1951, he was minister of war.
- 60.
Col. Claude M. Adams, Rio, December 3, 1942, Report # 4683, MID: “Movement of Group of Military Officers,” 6210, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
- 61.
Col. Claude M. Adams, Rio, December 12,1942, #4716, 6905, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
- 62.
Correio da Manhã, Rio, December 23,1942.
- 63.
Col. Claude M. Adams, Rio, December 21, 1942, #4738: “Pro-Allied Political Faction in the Army,” 6110, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
- 64.
Diário Carioca, Rio, December 24, 1942; text of Dec 31 speech is in Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1938–1947), IX, pp. 323–327.
- 65.
Roosevelt to Vargas, n.p., December 24, 1942, President’s Personal File 4473 (Vargas), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY. For the American Ambassador’s review of the political-military situation at the start of 1943, see Jefferson Caffery, Rio, February 6, 1943, 832.00/4349, NARA.
- 66.
Eurico Dutra to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, January 6, 1943, APG, Caixa II, Pasta 4, Doc 2, Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro.
- 67.
Probably the best account of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Casablanca is Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 674–693.
- 68.
Caffery, Rio, January 6, 1943, 832.001 Vargas, Getúlio/ 134 ½: telegram, and Memorandum, FDR to S. Welles, Washington, January 8, 1943 832.001 Vargas, Getúlio/134 2/3 in FRUS, 1943, Vol. V, pp. 653–654.
- 69.
Aranha to Vargas, Rio, January 25, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio.
- 70.
Aranha to Eurico Dutra, Rio, August 11, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio.
- 71.
Aranha to Vargas, Rio, January 25, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio. This document is one of the most important in the history of Brazilian foreign relations. Aranha had let Ambassador Caffery read it, so he was able to brief Roosevelt exactly as to Brazilian thinking before he sat down with Vargas. For more detailed analysis and listing of the 11 objectives, see McCann, Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 304–309. For the Brazilian edition: Aliança Brasil-Estados Unidos, 1937–1945 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1995), 242–246.
- 72.
Caffery to Roosevelt, Rio, Feb. 9, 1943, President’s Secretary File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY; on Brazil’s cooperation see Caffery to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/27590; Telegram in Foreign Relations 1943, Vol. V, 655–656. Caffery was present during the conversations.
- 73.
Caffery, Rio, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/27588:Telegram in FRUS, 1943, Vol. V, p. 656.
- 74.
Oliver La Farge, The Eagle in the Egg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1949), p. 150. As a Reserve Lt. Colonel, La Farge was the Air Transport Command’s chief historian. He was a noted anthropologist and Pulitzer Prize (1929) novelist. For a pictorial history, mixed with memories of a navy man, regarding US military in northeast, see John R. Harrison, Fairwing Brazil: Tales of South Atlantic in World War II (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing, 2014), pp. 24–73, 182–224.
- 75.
Press release, Natal, Jan. 30, 1943, in “Política Exterior do Brasil, 1938–1944,” Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio. For analysis of the Natal Conference and its relationship to Casablanca, see Hélio Silva, 1944: O Brasil na Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1974), pp. 45–61. For images of Natal and FDR with Getúlio, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-fkffohEIEc and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdGxLvxG4wA.
- 76.
BG Gustavo Cordeiro de Farias (Commander of Inf. Div. 14 & Natal Garrison), Natal, February 1,1943: “Conferencia dos 2 Presidentes em Natal,” Relatório, Acervo Pessoal General Góes, Caixa II, Pasta 4, Doc 7, Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro. The Vargas “host” comment is from Caffery to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/27588; Telegram in Foreign Relations 1943, Vol. V, 655–656. It is noteworthy that Vargas flew to Natal in an American aircraft, in the company of Admiral Ingram. He did have two Brazilian aides with him.
- 77.
The Rio embassy created a clipping file of newspaper stories and editorials: “News Summary for week ending February 4, 1943,” 832.9111/34, National Archives. See also “Natal,” Brazil, 17, No. 172 (March 1943), 19.
- 78.
Caffery to Roosevelt, Rio, Feb. 9, 1943, President’s Secretary File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY. As it turned out, the British were not pleased with the idea and arranged with Salazar for their forces to go to the islands. On Portugal, see Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1970).
- 79.
Caffery, Rio, Jan. 30, 1943, 740.0011 EW 1939/27588, NA. The summary of the Vargas-FDR conversations is about as detailed as the record allows. The fullest documentary record is in “Conference between President Roosevelt and President Vargas of Brazil at Natal” in Foreign Relations 1943, Vol. V, 653–658.
- 80.
For Brazil’s mobilization, see Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco, O Brasil na II Grande Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1960), pp. 77–79. On army training, officer education, and the influence of the French Military Mission, see McCann, The Soldiers of the Pátria, pp. 241–253.
- 81.
Captain T. L. Ridge (USMC, Asst. Naval Attaché), Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1942, OSS Files 20,128, MMB, RG226, NARA. Mascarenhas described the problems he faced as regional commander at Recife in his Marechal Mascarenhas de Morais: Memórias (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1969), Vol. 1, pp. 110–116. He had about 50,000 under his command, all in fixed and small-scale urban military posts. Such facilities lacked space for combat training.
- 82.
Mascarenhas complained to his staff about the lack of unity of command; see Carlos Meira Mattos, O Marechal Mascarenhas de Morais e sua Época (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. 1, pp. 82–83. The author was the general’s aide de camp.
- 83.
Lt. Colonel John M. Raymond (MIS) to Ch. of Staff USAFSA, Recife, January 13, 1943, “Changes in Brazilian High Command” OPD 319.1 Brazil, MMB, RG 165 and BG R.L. Walsh to Colonel Kenner F. Hartford (Operations Division, Gen. Staff), Recife, January 14, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (Sec I) MMB, RG165, NARA. Walsh commented that Mascarenhas “desires to not bring Rio into the picture.” Walsh had also spoken to Gen. Marshall about arranging a visit to North Africa for General Eduardo Gomes, air force commander in the northeast, whom Walsh considered an important ally. He thought that such a trip would strengthen Gomes’s position in the prestige jockeying going on in Brazil. Not long after that, Gomes did in fact go to Africa at the invitation of General Eisenhower. See Military Attaché (Rio), “Weekly Estimate of Stability,” Report No.5094, March 23, 1943, 6300, G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA.
- 84.
Marshall to Brigadier General Claude M. Adams, Washington, April 16, 1943 Radio No. 872 Secret, “From Marshall to Adams for his eyes only. Reference your 1028 regarding Dutra.” OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, NARA.
- 85.
Military Attaché (Rio), “Weekly Estimate of Stability,” Report No. 4968, February 23, 1943, 6300 G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA.
- 86.
The anti-Nazi campaign was publicized at the time, see Aurélio da Silva Py, A 5a Coluna no Brasil: A Conspiração Nazi no Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre: 1942). The government had expelled the German Ambassador Karl Ritter for his protests against the anti-Nazi policies. The campaign was studied in William N. Simonson’s “Nazi Infiltration in South America, 1933–1945” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School, Tufts University, 1964) and in Priscila Ferreira Perazzo, “O perigo alemão e a repressão policial no Estado Novo.” Revista Histórica, Vol. 3, no. 4 (jul/2001), pp. 69–73.
- 87.
Fernando da Silva Rodrigues, “Discriminação e intolerância: os indesejáveis na seleção dos oficiais do Exército Brasileiro (1937–1946).” Antíteses, vol. 1, no. 2, (jul.-dez. de 2008), pp. 464–465 http://www.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/antiteses The full article is on pp. 455–474.
- 88.
Minutes, War Council meeting, December 16, 1942, Secretary of War Conference Binder 2, Office of Chief of Staff Records, RG 165, NARA.
- 89.
Oswaldo Aranha to Eurico Dutra, Rio, August 11, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC. He wrote this to Dutra who was then visiting the United States to negotiate details of the FEB. He admitted that such a close alliance carried dangers potentially incompatible with Brazilian sovereignty and interests, but that it was the course with the fewest risks and greatest security. It was a lesser evil and they would have to be constantly vigilant to avoid pitfalls.
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McCann, F.D. (2018). Decision to Fight. In: Brazil and the United States during World War II and Its Aftermath. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_5
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