Abstract
The best-known measures of political corruption are in the style of macroeconomic statistics: they are indexes that characterize national governments as a whole. The primary concern is the extent to which high-ranking policymakers in the national capital make decisions that produce big-bucks benefits for a small number of people. The primary information used to create corruption indexes consists of expert perceptions of how politicians behave when handling public money and desk-based research evaluating government institutions. The reforms that are advocated to deal with big-bucks corruption are directed at national institutions.
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Rose, R., Peiffer, C. (2019). Exploiting National Government. In: Bad Governance and Corruption. Political Corruption and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92846-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92846-3_3
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