Abstract
In western philosophical discussions, the debates on moral expertise often concern whether moral opinions come to us with certain level of guarantee that they are true. In other words, we doubt whether moral expertise possess the justifiable right of telling us to do X and not to do Y. In ancient Chinese philosophical discussions, people believe that there are moral experts in the form of sages (shengren 聖人), who command a body of moral values, and have knowledge or techniques recognized by a community. However, for ancient Chinese sages, moral experts do not necessarily entail the right to tell people whether one should do X or should not do Y. Nor does the status of moral expertise presuppose that others should always listen to their decisions, especially when facing dilemmas, namely situations to which either of the actions will lead to unsatisfactory ends. In this paper, through the ideas of Confucius and Zhuangzi, I examine questions regarding what ancient Chinese moral experts tell others when facing dilemmas.
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Notes
- 1.
I am grateful for the comments and suggestions from editors Jamie Watson and Laura Guidry-Grimes. I also thank the suggestions given by Rens Krijgsman.
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A review of debates can be seen in Parker, Lisa S. 2005. Ethical expertise, maternal thinking, and the work of clinical ethicists. In Ethics expertise: History, contemporary perspectives, and applications, ed. Lisa Rasmussen, 165–207. Dordrecht: Springer. Moreover, we see Alison Hills calling for the idea of “moral understanding” as a reason to defer to moral experts. Hills, Alison. 2009. Moral testimony and moral epistemology. Ethics 120: 94–127. Michael Cholbi questions non-experts’ ability to identify and appreciate the testimony of moral experts when facing complex moral issues. See Cholbi, Michael. 2007. Moral expertise and the credentials problem . Ethical theory and moral practice 10: 323–334.
- 3.
Driver, Julia. 2006. Autonomy and the asymmetry problem for moral expertise. Philosophical studies: An international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition 128: 619–644.
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Jones, Karen.1999. Second-hand moral knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 55–78.
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Hopkins, Robert. 2007. What is wrong with moral testimony? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 611–634.
- 6.
Singer, Peter. 1972. Moral experts. Analysis 32: 115–117.
- 7.
See Zagzebski, linda Trinkaus. 2012. Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford university press.
- 8.
Frey argues that what we want from moral experts are normative decisions instead of sound arguments. See Frey, R. G. 1978. Moral experts. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 59: 47.
- 9.
This paper only concerns single person dilemmas instead of multi-person ones.
- 10.
Quinn, Phillip, 2006. Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford university Press, 6.
- 11.
For example, once a lawyer finds out that his/her defendant is guilty, one’s role as a lawyer may conflict with the general obligation of telling the truth due to the attorney-client privilege. The conflict of values due to a person’s multiple roles is more easily encountered in early China. Some scholars argue that early Confucian ethics are in fact “role ethics”. See Rosemont, Henry Jr. and Ames, Roger T., eds. 2016. Confucian Role Ethics, Confucian Role Ethics. Taipei: National Taiwan University press.
- 12.
A talented artist who travels around the world to learn new skills and gains? inspiration may not be seen as a responsible spouse, since such an artist is mostly away from for his/her family. In this case, one’s responsibility to develop one’s talent is in conflict with one’s duty as a spouse.
- 13.
Donagan, Alan. 1977. The Theory of Morality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. See especially Chapter 5.
- 14.
Singer, Peter. 1972. Moral experts. Analysis 32: 115.
- 15.
Morality here refers to a series of codes of conduct that are recognized and accepted by society for living a good life. The early Chinese moralistic view has been discussed by scholars. For example, David Wong calls for a kind of moral relativism in the Zhuangzi, which is unseen in the Wester philosophical tradition. See Wong, David B. 2006. Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Also, Huang Yong points out the “ethics of difference” in the Zhuangzi. See Huang, Yong. 2010a. The ethics of difference in the Zhuangzi. Journal of American Academy of Religion 78.1: 65–99. 2010b. Respecting different ways of life: A Daoist ethics of virtue in the Zhuangzi. Journal of Asian Studies 69: 1049–1070. Other moralistic ideas for living a good life can be found in Kjellberg, Paul Kjellberg, ed. 1996. Essays on skepticism, relativism, and ethics in the Zhuangzi. Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy & Culture. As for Confucian moral ideas, see for example, Olberding, Amy. 2012. Moral exemplars in the Analects: The good person is that. New York: Routledge. Olberding argues for emulating moral exemplars, which can make people be moral, and how it is possible for people to identify moral exemplar with their pre-theoretical ability. Also, Confucianism is frequently related to virtue ethics. See Angle, Stephen C. and Slote, Michael. ed. 2013. Virtue ethics and Confucianism. London: Routledge.
- 16.
See Introduction footnote 1.
- 17.
For a detailed analysis on the concept of morality, please see Gert, Bernard. 2016.
- 18.
For a detailed analysis on Chinese ethics, please see Wong, David. 2013.
- 19.
Goldin, Paul R. 2016. Women and Moral dilemmas in early Chinese narrative. In The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender, Pang-White Ann A ed., Bloomsbury Academic, 25–33.
- 20.
Guarde-Paz, César. 2016. Moral Dilemmas in Chinese Philosophy: A Case Study of the Lienü Zhuan. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 15, 1: 81–101
- 21.
Goldin, Paul R. 2016, Women and Moral dilemmas in early Chinese narrative, in The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender, Pang-White, Ann ed., Bloomsbury Academic, 29. For a more detailed discussion on this concept of weighing in early China, see also Vankeerberghen, Griet. 2005–2006. Choosing balance: weighing (quan) as a metaphor for action in early Chinese texts. Early China 30: 47–89. Goldin, Paul R. 2005. The Theme of the Primacy of the Situation in Classical Chinese Philosophy and Rhetoric. Asia Major 18.2: 1–25.
- 22.
For the English translation of the Mencius, please see Lau, D.C. 2003 [first edition 1972]. Mencius. London: Penguin, p.84.
- 23.
Yang, Bojun楊伯峻. 2010 [first edition 1984]. Mengzi Yizhu孟子譯注. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, pp.177–178.
- 24.
For the importance of ritual in relation to ethical cultivation, please see for example Shun, Kwong-loi. 1993. Ren and Li in the Analects. Philosophy East & West 43: 457–79.
- 25.
The translation mainly follows that of Lau, D.C. 1979. The Analects---The Sayings of Confucius. London: Penguin.
- 26.
Knapp, Keith N. 2005. Selfless offspring: filial children and social order in medieval China. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i press, pp. 3–4.
- 27.
Brown, Miranda, 2007. The politics of mourning in early China, New York: SUNY Press.
Knapp, Keith N. 2005. Selfless offspring: filial children and social order in medieval China. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i press.
- 28.
The translation is adapted from that of Watson, Burton trans. 1968. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 29.
Guo, Qingfan郭慶藩. 2007 [first edition, 1961]. Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. pp. 152–155.
- 30.
Greespan, Patrica S. 1983. Moral dilemmas and guilt. Philosophical Studies 43 (1): 117–125.
- 31.
The summary of this case is quoted from McConnell, Terrance. 2014.
- 32.
Zimmerman, Michael J. 2008. The concept of moral obligation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 7.
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Yuan, A. (2018). If There Were Moral Experts, What Would They Tell Others? Answers for Dilemmas from Early Chinese Philosophy. In: Watson, J., Guidry-Grimes, L. (eds) Moral Expertise. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 129. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92759-6_8
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