Abstract
Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts dispensing expert counsel to non-experts. Moral experts would not be moral experts absent knowledge of moral theory, nor could they play the testimonial role we would expect them to play in moral inquiry and deliberation absent such knowledge.
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Notes
- 1.
Expertise need not involve only propositional knowledge. A good many crafts, arts, etc., involve expertise that consists largely in “knowledge how.” See Dennis Arjo’s contribution to this volume (Chap. 2) for how the concept of expertise might include “knowledge how.”
- 2.
See Dennis Arjo’s contribution to this volume (Chap. 2) for a discussion of how social norms can have moral significance.
- 3.
This is not to preclude that some other theory could also imply this first-order judgment.
- 4.
Other more moderate particularisms (for instance, Little 2001) may admit the possibility that moral experts can meet the testimonial condition.
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Cholbi, M. (2018). Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory. In: Watson, J., Guidry-Grimes, L. (eds) Moral Expertise. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 129. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92759-6_4
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