Skip to main content

Customizing Europe: Four Member States Compared

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Customized Implementation of European Union Food Safety Policy

Part of the book series: International Series on Public Policy ((ISPP))

Abstract

By focusing on legal compliance, EU policy implementation research has neglected more fine-grained differences in transposition. The top-down focus on compliance might not necessarily explain why member states transcend the EU’s requirements to facilitate context-sensitive problem solving. Can prominent compliance theories account for customization? Moving beyond compliance, this chapter scrutinizes the conditions under which four European Union (EU) member states customize EU food safety policies. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and formal theory evaluation, I assess how policy and country-level factors interact. Results reveal that different customization styles simultaneously reflect the interplay between domestic politics and institutions, and the “fit” of EU regulatory modes with domestic sectoral interventionist styles. Compliance approaches cannot fully explain these fine-grained patterns of Europeanization.

This chapter draws in parts from Thomann, E. 2015. Customizing Europe: Transposition as bottom-up implementation. Journal of European Public Policy 22(10): 1368–1387. Reprinted with permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd., http://www.informaworld.com.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 64.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    I hereafter interpret the term “typically” as a consistent statement of sufficiency.

  2. 2.

    Directive 90/167/EEC was amended as the European Parliament (EP) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) urged for more precise rules, additional regulations, and more detailed definitions without exemption. The EP approved Directive 2001/82/EC without amendment; the EESC recommended that current technical terminology be adopted. Commission Directive 2006/130/EC did not involve stakeholders (source: Eur-Lex).

  3. 3.

    Pearson’s R for interventionist styles and customization restrictiveness: 0.47 (r2 = 0.22); COERC and CUST: 0.30 (r2 = 0.092).

  4. 4.

    The full replication material as well as the truth tables, assumptions made on logical remainders, and all solution types are reported in the online appendix which is available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PJTOCG.

  5. 5.

    The veto player dataset is available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto_players_data (accessed 10 July 2014).

  6. 6.

    The intermediate solution features a fifth path “resp*res*VPO*coerc”. This path is theoretically very interesting, since it includes an inflexible EU rule. However, its unique coverage is zero and it only covers one case: the rules for actors who may administer off-label veterinary drugs in Austria under the Cascade rule, i.e. when there is a supply shortfall. In such situations, the drugs are either not authorized for the species under question, or not for the condition under question, or both. The EU rule defines veterinarians and livestock holders as the only actors allowed to administer drugs. Austria is the only country that has forbidden livestock holders to administer in these cases; only veterinarians are allowed to do so. In other countries, the administration of the drugs only has to be supervised by a veterinarian or not at all (UK ), and is sometimes restricted to certain types of drugs. Due to the comparatively small size of the veterinary pharmaceutical market, and due to the importance of agriculture, supply shortfalls for rare conditions or species occur more often in Austria than in the other countries (Sager et al. 2011, pp. 209, 212, 215, 233–238). Thus, the Austrian regulators sought to ensure that the use of the Cascade rule occurs under controlled conditions. Because supply shortfalls are more exceptional in the other countries, they have tended to differentiate the Cascade rule to allow for some flexibility, rather than rendering it more restrictive. Nonetheless, the issue has low salience in Austria, as it is neither subject to particular discussions nor to resistance from livestock holders. In order to do justice to the solution consistency and coverage scores displayed in Table 4.4, this path has been included in Fig. 4.1. Given its low empirical relevance and for reasons of complexity, I have decided not to include this unique case into the subsequent discussion and theory evaluation.

  7. 7.

    I have omitted two more paths with unique coverage of 0.000 from Table 4.5 (for a justification, see online appendix).

  8. 8.

    Schneider and Wagemann (2012, pp. 295–304) extend this framework by integrating the cases covered by these intersections. First, only cases that have membership in the intersection T*S and also display the outcome Y support the theory. Conversely, cases with ~Y indicate that both the theory and empirical findings predict the outcome which, however, does not materialize. Second, cases in ~T*S that display the outcome Y suggest the direction in which theoretical expectations should be extended. Cases with ~Y, however, weaken this need for theory modification. Third, only cases that display both T*~S and ~Y indicate a delimitation of the theory. Low coverage indicates low empirical importance to delimit the theory. Cases with Y support the theory but weaken the plausibility of the solution. Fourth, if all cases in ~T*~S also have ~Y, then there is no evidence that contradicts both T and S. Conversely, cases with Y indicate that hitherto overlooked explanations for the outcome should be explored.

References

  • Angelova, M., Dannwolf, T., & König, T. (2012). How robust are compliance findings? A research synthesis. Journal of Public Policy, 19, 1269–1291 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.705051

  • Armingeon, K., Careja, R., Weisstanner, D., Engler, S., Potolidis, P., & Gerber, M. (2012). Comparative political data set III 1990–2011. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.

    Google Scholar 

  • Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2003). Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe. In K. Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli (Eds.), The politics of Europeanization (pp. 57–82). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2012). From Europeanisation to diffusion: Introduction. West European Politics, 35(1), 1–19 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631310

  • Bugdahn, S. (2006). Of Europeanization and Domestication: The implementation of the environmental information directive in Ireland, Great Britain and Germany. Journal of European Public Policy, 12, 177–199 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176042000311961

  • Di Lucia, L., & Kronsell, A. (2010). The willing, the unwilling and the unable: Explaining implementation of the EU Biofuels Directive. Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 545–563 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/13501761003673559

  • Duşa, A. (2018). QCA with R. A comprehensive resource. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M., & Leiber, S. (2005). Complying with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft law in the member states (Themes in European governance). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartlapp, M., & Falkner, G. (2009). Problems of operationalization and data in EU compliance research. European Union Politics, 10, 281–304 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116509103370

  • Haverland, M. (2000). National adaptation to European integration: The importance of institutional veto points. Journal of Public Policy, 20(1), 83–103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knill, C. (2015). Implementation. In J. Richardson & S. Mazey (Eds.), European Union: Power and policy-making (371–397). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knill, C., & Lenschow, A. (1998). Coping with Europe: The impact of British and German administrations on the implementation of EU environmental policy. Journal of Public Policy, 5, 595–614 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1080/13501769880000041

  • Knill, C., & Lenschow, A. (2003). Modes of regulation in the governance of the European Union: Towards a comprehensive framework. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 7(1).

    Google Scholar 

  • Knill, C., & Tosun, J. (2012). Governance institutions and policy implementation in the European Union. In J. Richardson (Ed.), Constructing a policy-making state? Policy dynamics in the EU (1st ed., pp. 309–333). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1996). Institutional perspectives on political institutions. Governance, 9(3), 247–264 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1996.tb00242.x

  • March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international political orders. International Organization, 52, 943–969 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550699

  • Mastenbroek, E. (2005). EU compliance: Still a ‘black hole’? Journal of Public Policy, 12, 1103–1120 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500270869

  • Mastenbroek, E., & Kaeding, M. (2006). Europeanization beyond the goodness of fit: Domestic politics in the forefront. Comparative European Politics, 4, 331–354 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110078

  • Perkins, R., & Neumayer, E. (2007). Implementing multilateral environmental agreements: An analysis of EU directives: An analysis of EU directives. Global Environmental Politics, 7, 13–41 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2007.7.3.13

  • Pülzl, H., & Treib, O. (2006). Implementing public policy. In F. Fischer, G. J. Miller, & M. S. Sidney (Eds.), Handbook of public policy analysis: Theory, politics, and methods (pp. 89–107, Vol. 125). Boca Raton: crc Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ragin, C. C. (1987). The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ragin, C. C. (2000). Fuzzy-set social science. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ragin, C. C. (2009). Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA). In B. Rihoux & C. C. Ragin (Eds.), Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 87–121, Applied social research methods series, Vol. 51). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sager, F. (2009). Governance and coercion. Political Studies, 57(3), 537–558 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00743.x

  • Sager, F., Thomann, E., Zollinger, C., & Mavrot, C. (2011). Tierarzneimittelregulierung in Europa. Study mandated by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health. Bern, Center of Competence for Public Management.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sager, F., Thomann, E., Zollinger, C., & Mavrot, C. (2014). Confronting theories of European integration: A comparative congruence analysis of veterinary drug regulations in five countries. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 16, 457–474 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2014.960244

  • Schmidt, S. K. (2008). Beyond compliance: The Europeanization of member states through negative integration and legal uncertainty. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 10, 299–308 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1080/13876980802231016

  • Schneider, C. Q., & Rohlfing, I. (2013). Combining QCA and process tracing in set-theoretic multi-method research. Sociological Methods & Research, 42, 559–597 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124113481341

  • Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Set-Theoretic methods for the social sciences: A guide to qualitative comparative analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Siaroff, A. (1999). Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement. European Journal of Political Research, 36(2), 175–205 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00467

  • Spendzharova, A., & Versluis, E. (2013). Issue salience in the European Policy Process: What impact on transposition? Journal of European Public Policy, 20, 1499–1516 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.781802

  • Steunenberg, B. (2007). A policy solution to the European Union’s transposition puzzle: Interaction of interests in different domestic arenas. West European Politics, 30(1), 23–49 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380601019639

  • Steunenberg, B., & Toshkov, D. (2009). Comparing transposition in the 27 member states of the EU: The impact of discretion and legal fit. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(7), 951–970 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903226625

  • Toshkov, D. (2010). Taking stock: a review of quantitative studies of transposition and implementation of EU law. Institute for European Integration Research, Working paper No. 01/2010.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomann, E. (2018). Food safety policy: Transnational, hybrid, wicked. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.540

  • Töller, A. E. (2010). Measuring and comparing the Europeanization of national legislation: A research note. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(2), 417–444 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.02058.x

    Google Scholar 

  • Treib, O. (2014). Implementing and complying with EU governance outputs. Living Reviews in European Governance. https://doi.org/10.12942/lreg-2014-1

  • Treib, O., Bähr, H., & Falkner, G. (2007). Modes of governance: Towards a conceptual clarification. Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 1–20 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/135017606061071406

  • Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289–325 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400007225

  • Vedung, E. (1998). Policy instruments: Typologies and theories. In M.-L. Bemelmans-Videc, R. C. Rist, & E. Vedung (Eds.), Carrots, sticks and sermons: Policy instruments and their evaluation (pp. 21–58, Vol. 4). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Versluis, E. (2003). Enforcement matters: Enforcement and compliance of European directives in four member states. Delft: Eburon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Versluis, E. (2007). Even rules, uneven practices: Opening the ‘black box’ of EU law in action. West European Politics, 30, 50–67 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380601019647

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Electronic Supplementary Material (S)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Thomann, E. (2019). Customizing Europe: Four Member States Compared. In: Customized Implementation of European Union Food Safety Policy. International Series on Public Policy . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92684-1_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics