Conclusions and Recommendations

  • Laobing Zhang
  • Genserik Reniers
Part of the Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications book series (ASTSA)


Chemicals-using industries have an important role in modern society for providing the basic ingredients (fuels, chemicals, intermediates and consumer products) for our modern day lives and luxury. However, they also pose huge threats to society due to the mere use and storage of large amounts of hazardous materials with sometimes extreme processing conditions. The prevention of unintentionally caused events, which is the field of occupational safety and process safety, has been significantly improved in the process industries. Conversely, the physical protection of chemical plants and areas from malicious attacks, being the field of physical security, has not received enough attention yet by both academic researchers and industrial practitioners.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laobing Zhang
    • 1
  • Genserik Reniers
    • 1
  1. 1.Safety and Security Science GroupDelft University of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands

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