Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection

  • Laobing Zhang
  • Genserik Reniers
Part of the Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications book series (ASTSA)


In this chapter, we introduce a game theoretic model for protecting a chemical plant from intelligent attackers. The model is named Chemical Plant Protection Game, abbreviated as “CPP Game” [1]. The CPP Game is developed based on the general intrusion detection approach in chemical plants. To this end, the general intrusion detection approach is firstly introduced. We develop and explain the CPP Game by modelling its players, strategies, and payoffs. Afterwards in Sect. 3.3, different equilibrium concepts are used to predict the outcome of the CPP Game [2]. An analysis of the inputs and outputs of the game is provided in Sect. 3.4, from an industrial practice point of view [3]. Finally, conclusions are drawn at the end of this chapter.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laobing Zhang
    • 1
  • Genserik Reniers
    • 1
  1. 1.Safety and Security Science GroupDelft University of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands

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