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Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: The State of the Art

  • Laobing Zhang
  • Genserik Reniers
Chapter
Part of the Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications book series (ASTSA)

Abstract

Large inventories of hazardous chemicals which can cause catastrophic consequences if released maliciously, the presence of chemical agents which can be stolen and be used either in later terrorist attacks or in making chemical and biochemical weapons, along with the key role of chemical plants in the economy and the public welfare and as an integral element in the supply chain have made the security of chemical plants a great concern especially since 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. Aside from the importance of chemical plants themselves as potentially attractive targets to terrorist attacks, the usage of chemicals in more than half of the terrorist attacks worldwide further emphasizes the security assessment and management of chemical plants.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laobing Zhang
    • 1
  • Genserik Reniers
    • 1
  1. 1.Safety and Security Science GroupDelft University of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands

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