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Dual Use Science and Technology, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Ethics ((BRIEFSETHIC))

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Abstract

Scientific research leading to the production of chemical agents and technologies enables malevolent agents to engage in harmful behaviour by way of a number of different pathways. For example, scientific research led to knowledge-how to aerolize chemicals for crop dusting (benefit); yet this discovery also made possible the aerolizing of chemicals for use in weaponry (harm). For nation-states (especially) can and do directly establish chemical weapons research programs. However, according to the definition in this book weapons research programs, including chemical weapons research programs, are not dual use because weapons are designed in the first instance to cause harm, and this is the case even if the weapons in question are developed for defensive rather than offensive use. Naturally, at least in principle, chemical weapons research might be conducted not with the intention of making and potentially using chemical weapons, but rather with the intention merely of understanding the functioning of such weapons so as to enable (say) the design and production of protective clothing in case of a chemical weapons attack by one’s enemies. Such weapons research might be dual use in our favoured sense. It is also argued in this chapter that the management of dual use risks in chemical research should be seen as a collective moral and institutional responsibility of multiple actors that can only be fulfilled with a web of prevention (an integrated suite of regulatory measures).

This chapter was co-authored by Seumas Miller and Jonas Feltes.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Note 1 Chap. 1.

  2. 2.

    Tucker (2012). Bakker and Trapp (2005, 13–17).

  3. 3.

    Note that in military terms sulfur mustard is not considered a lethal, but incapacitating agent since it is not lethal per se, but a blister agent. See Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1992) art.II.9c.

  4. 4.

    See World Health Organisation (2004).

  5. 5.

    Hay (2005).

  6. 6.

    Contrary to most journalistic and other popular accounts, the work of Haber himself cannot be linked directly to the development of the Zyklon agents. However, the work of his employees in the laboratory and especially the research and development of the Degesch company that was founded as a successor institution to Haber’s laboratory was responsible for the development of Zyklon B. See for discussion Dunikowska and Turko (2011, 10050–10062).

  7. 7.

    Although never used on a large scale, the Novichok agent has been used for targeted assassinations. At the time of writing the most recent example of such a case is the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury (UK) in March 2018. See Faulconbridge and Holden (2018). For general discussions concerning the Novichok agent see Sidell et al. (1997, 75).

  8. 8.

    Szinicz (2005, 167–181 [172]); Bajgar et al. (2009, 17–24 [21–22]).

  9. 9.

    OPCW (2016).

  10. 10.

    Amnesty International (2016).

  11. 11.

    Danzig et al. (2011).

  12. 12.

    Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (2016).

  13. 13.

    Varma and Varma (2005, 37–45 [37–38]) and Cassels (1991, 1–50).

  14. 14.

    See for discussion (ed) Kaffka (1996), and Newman and Verdugo (2010, 45–54).

  15. 15.

    Dunikowska and Turko (2011, 10050–10062); Manchester (2002, 64–69); Jansen (2000, 28–33 [31]).

  16. 16.

    Crowley (2013).

  17. 17.

    ibid.

  18. 18.

    Clarke (2005, 121–126).

  19. 19.

    Tabassi and Van der Borght (2006, 36–44 [8–13]).

  20. 20.

    See, for instance, Rappert and McLeish (2014).

  21. 21.

    See for discussion Cohen (2001, 27–53).

  22. 22.

    The difficulties and uncertainties surrounding verification were highlighted in relation to Saddam Hussein ’s biological and chemical warfare programs which existed but were then dismantled under United Nations supervision only to be said not to have been.

  23. 23.

    See for general discussion Cohen (2001); Eitan (2010, 57–62).

  24. 24.

    See de Graaff (2016, 96–103).

  25. 25.

    Discussion concerning the CBRN capabilities of groups like ISIS can be found in Ackerman and Pereira (2014, 27–34); House (2016, 68–75) and Hummel (2016, 18–21).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australia

    Seumas Miller

  2. TU Delft, The Hague, Netherlands

    Seumas Miller

  3. University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Seumas Miller

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Miller, S. (2018). Chemical Industry. In: Dual Use Science and Technology, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction. SpringerBriefs in Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92606-3_5

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